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“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 
“it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.” 
 
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can 
make words mean so many different things.” 
 
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, 
“which is to be master – that’s all.” 
 
Lewis Carroll 
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Chapter I.  Introduction 
 
 
“Law in particular becomes then only a rational study, when it is traced 
historically, from its first rudiments among savages, through successive 
changes, to its highest improvements in a civilised society. And yet the 
study is seldom conducted in this manner. Law, like geography, is 
taught as if it were a collection of facts merely: the memory is employed 
to the full, rarely the judgment.”1 
 
Lord Kames, like so many of his contemporaries, embodied interdisciplinarity 
and, despite having enjoyed no university education, wrote with equal erudition 
about law, history, philosophy, religion, aesthetics, literary criticism and 
agricultural improvements. In the above extract from the introduction to his 
Historical Law Tracts, Kames not only shows himself as the staunch defender 
of the study of legal history that he was, but he also deplores what we would 
describe in today’s jargon as the compartmentalised autonomy of the study of 
law: seeing ‘facts’ in isolation with limited concern for contexts. Whilst the study 
and profound knowledge of autonomous ‘facts’ are no doubt essential, the 
contribution to scholarship is only truly informative and fascinating if context is 
created by taking a step back from the conditions of autonomy and adding 
dimension by comprehending the issues from a broader angle. The present 
research was born from such thinking and considerations. 
 
Its aim was to trace the advent and early use of the concept of consideration 
in English contract law, by studying the doctrinal development in parallel with 
the corresponding terminological evolution between the 15th and 18th 
centuries. It was essential to adopt a two-track, interdisciplinary approach to 
the research and to mark out a research field beyond the mere content 
analysis of the case law and legal writings. On the one hand, the enquiry of 
the legal historian revealed the historical process of the legal thought that 
initiated this concept. On the other hand, the pragmatic and empirical angle of 
																																																						
1 H. Home (Lord Kames) (1761) Historical Law Tracts, 2nd edition, Edinburgh : Kincaid, at pp. 
ii-iv 
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studying the language in its context by the linguist showed how legal thought 
was encoded in linguistic expressions and meanings. This allowed for a better 
understanding of the continuous interaction between the way legal thought 
creates meaning in language and language creates realities in law. 
 
Interdisciplinarity is, as the term indicates, an approach that brings together 
two or more academic disciplines. It allows for thinking to make links between 
different fields of ideas and areas of study. Crossing disciplinary boundaries in 
this way liberates the creative thinker from the shackles of restrictive 
perceptions and practices associated with one or the other discipline. But it 
comes with the price of having to define an inter-disciplinary space linking the 
different subjects, in which the research is to be carried out. The majority of 
scholars find it a challenge to think and ‘feel’ across disciplinary categories. It 
is comparable to the phenomenon that few people are truly bi- or multilingual. 
And as counting, dreaming, swearing still tends to be in the same ‘first’ 
language for multi-linguists, researchers also relate intuitively to the theoretical 
and methodological paradigms of their ‘first’ discipline, which can become a 
stumbling block for interdisciplinary work. It is indeed possible that 
representatives from all the different disciplines involved in a given research 
initiative will be dissatisfied with the process and results because they are likely 
to be missing a paradigm that is familiar to them, while being confronted with 
a way of thinking and proceeding that is not. 
 
This very point has been one of the main challenges for the present research. 
It felt at all times to be a fine balancing act between requirements established 
by the legal scholar, the historian or the linguist. Maybe, the best observation 
is to acknowledge that the balancing act was only possible to the extent that 
the inter-disciplinary space was defined in relation to the specificities of this 
particular research initiative, rather than on an absolute level. The research 
was then carried out in relation to the parameters of that specific ‘third’ space, 
which comes with all the imperfections of only including certain aspects of the 
theory and methodology from each discipline involved. 
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Legal history is, in itself, an interdisciplinary undertaking. Law is not totally 
independent of context but enjoys some autonomy and the historical approach 
takes law out of its semi-autonomous position to place it within its historical 
context. In this research, a further dimension was added, namely the study of 
language and terminology. However, the various disciplines are not brought 
together in equal measure. This is primarily an enquiry into the diachronic 
evolution of legal thinking in relation to a particular issue, and the study of the 
relevant language is a tool in this enquiry. The novelty of the approach in 
relation to legal texts lies in the use of corpus linguistics methodologies2 as 
models for a better understanding of the development of legal thinking beyond 
the mere content approach that legal research usually practices. 
 
But the tension of combining the study of law and that of language remained. 
Matilla describes it as follows:  (my emphasis) 
“Legal science is mainly interested in abstract entities – concepts – that 
are to be found in the background of terms, that is, in the meanings of 
terms. This science systematises the legal order through legal 
concepts. Terms are designations of concepts, necessary to legal 
science. However, the primary interest of this science does not have 
bearing on legal terms but on the concepts themselves. By contrast, in 
legal linguistics it is the terms as such that constitute the primary object 
of research.”3 
 
The present study has attempted to bring together the two ‘sciences’ in an 
inter-disciplinary space that makes linguistics a means for studying legal 
concepts. 
 
For the linguistic community, the methodology and conclusions are of interest 
in relation to the use of specialists’ language and terminology - language for 
special purposes or LSP. From the linguistic study of the concept of 
consideration, we observe the opposite of what has so far been described in 
																																																						
2 Corpus linguistics studies language based on large collections of computerised texts using 
linguistic software, which retrieves alphabetically or otherwise sorted lists of linguistic data 
from the corpus.	
3 H. Mattila (2013) Comparative Legal Linguistics. Language of Law, Latin and Modern 
Lingua Francas, Surrey : Ashgate, at p. 15 
Chapter	I	:	Introduction	4	
the area of LSP, namely a semantic shift from everyday vocabulary and the 
general register of ordinary life via repeated use in a legal context with 
increasing legal connotations to a highly specialised, incomprehensible and by 
now sometimes archaic register. This semantic development moved in the 
opposite direction from what is usually associated with LSP studies. 
 
However, the diachronic corpus linguistics approach does not result in a full, 
general and statistical linguistic analysis of the language of law reporting 
between the 15th and 18th centuries. Such an approach, typical for the linguistic 
research community, was not imported into the inter-disciplinary space. The 
use of linguistics methodologies was restricted to revealing a specific 
development of legal thinking and doctrine. It is the study of how legal concepts 
materialise, evolve and are translated into the letter of the law that stands at 
the centre of the inter-disciplinary space created for this research. 
 
******** 
 
From our 21st century view, we often perceive long-standing, well-established 
legal concepts and the language used to express them as having been carved 
in stone as far back as the legal mind can remember. Yet, the customary law 
set-up of the late Middle Ages allowed more readily for the intellectual and 
doctrinal process involved in the development of a concept to be revealed. The 
language used is frequently less set and settled in comparison to that of 
dogmatic writing or statute law. Studying this language and terminology 
reveals how legal concepts materialise, evolve and translate into the letter of 
the law. This is the underlying interest of the present research. 
 
The object to be examined is the common law concept of consideration, its 
historical development and how its terminology changed and shifted 
throughout this evolution. In today’s perception, the doctrine of consideration, 
as a central element to contract formation, appears so well anchored in 
contract law and in our legal minds, that we may find it difficult to imagine its 
development took a tortuous and at times haphazard path, stretching over 
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several centuries. The forerunners of consideration arose in a medieval legal 
world of archaic procedures and complex technicalities, and where the need 
was increasingly felt for the development of a tool that could meet the rising 
commercial needs in terms of contracts and quasi-contracts. But various 
strands from different legal issues came together in the idea that informal 
promises should be enforceable. The evolution was somewhat haphazard 
because the facts in case law tended to appeal to different established legal 
actions. Every decision related to specific facts and was then extrapolated onto 
wider issues but it was not devised as part of an overall doctrine of contract 
law. Indeed, there was no general common law theory of contract law at the 
time - that would be initiated only in the 18th century by Blackstone and his 
treatise-writing contemporaries. Today’s contract law doctrine of offer and 
acceptance as the moment when a promise becomes binding was unknown 
then; there was no requirement, as there is in modern contract law, for the 
plaintiff to show that a contract had been made. Instead, it had to be 
demonstrated that a promise had been made for good consideration but had 
not been honoured. 
 
To retrace the development along this path was the ambition of this research, 
but the approach was to go beyond looking at the mere content of the historical 
material and to study the language used in the ‘making’ of the concept of 
consideration. Language as an act of communication encodes meanings in 
accordance with the socio-political, cultural and historical contexts in which 
they are uttered. Similarly, the language used in particular in legal proceedings 
is the product and a reliable indicator of these contexts and of how laws are 
created, practiced and interpreted. There is continuous interaction between 
the way laws create meaning in language and how language creates realities 
in law.4 Consequently, studying the language means gaining a better 
																																																						
4 M. Van Hoecke, M. Warrington (2010) Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal 
Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, first published 1998, reprinted in M. 
Del Mar, W. Twinning, M. Giudice (eds.) Legal Theory and the Legal Academy, The Library 
of Essays in Contemporary Legal Theory, vol. III, Farnham: Ashgate, 291-332, at p. 535 
Chapter	I	:	Introduction	6	
understanding of the contexts and the realities of the law, including prior legal-
discursive traditions. 
 
The function of language that is of particular interest to this research is its 
representational aspect, as it encodes our experience of the world and thus 
conveys a picture of reality. Researching that representational aspect informs 
us about the concordance between the historical and conceptual development 
of ‘consideration’ and the way the relevant terms and vocabulary have been 
used, changed and shifted throughout this evolution, most notably the 
increased abstraction of both the legal concept and the language. For 
example, considering the vocabulary used in relation to the concept of making 
informal agreements enforceable by looking beyond the traditional grammar 
classification of the words in question and considering the function they play, 
we can get a more complete and in-depth picture of the evolution of that 
vocabulary.  
 
The methodology adopted to reveal how language and the evolution of legal 
concepts interact is to examine the language in question in its textual context. 
The use of corpus linguistics methods and linguistics/concordance software is 
ideal for this sort of empirical approach, as it allows for systematic diachronic 
analysis of authentic evidence of large scale electronically held corpora. 
 
But it was the application of corpus linguistics and the interpretations of the 
results that revealed some of the main methodological challenges, mainly 
because (common law) lawyers and linguists have different views and 
methodologies for the evaluation of textual evidence. In law based on legal 
precedents, some shifts in legal thinking can, at times, originate in a few short 
sentences (maybe even in a mere subordinate clause) that can be found in a 
discussion, legal argument, decision or mere dictum. Essential for common 
law legal thinking is that some of these points, however fleetingly touched upon 
in a legal action, form the basis (precedent) for taking the law into specific 
directions. In other words, the textual evidence for such shifts in legal 
thinking/decision may be very slim at times. A linguist, on the other hand, works 
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on the basis of a lot of textual evidence, which forms the support for an 
empirical approach of analysing language-in-use rather than mere content 
analysis. This paradox was not easy to resolve in the inter-disciplinary space 
and it may well be a contentious issue that satisfies neither discipline. But, as 
mentioned above, the linguistics methodologies were used as tools to indicate 
tendencies in legal thinking. The purpose was not to make a full analysis of the 
language in the Year Books and Law Reports. 
 
The results confirmed tendencies sufficiently definite to show a concordance 
between the hesitant and at times confused development of the concept of 
consideration and the terminology used in discussions of the issue in case law. 
It also revealed the many proposals and attempts that were made before legal 
thinking settled on the terminology as we know it today. The study showed how 
a prepositional expression denoting a causal relationship (en consideration de) 
gave rise to a fully-fledged legal term crystallising the new concept which had 
hitherto only be expressed through paraphrase. This raises interesting 
questions of how neologisms develop. Of particular interest is the observation 
that while certain aspects of the new legal action were already established and 
confirmed in subsequent cases, the terminology still lingered behind and 
remained on well-trodden paths. So for example, the promissory notions 
increasingly present in informal agreements were not necessarily expressed 
by the use of the term ‘promise’.  With today’s hindsight, we understand that 
promise was actually already at the heart of the new legal thinking, but the 
terminology continued to refer to prior discursive elements of proprietary 
concepts. While the legal mind was progressing along a path of new ideas, the 
language expressing such innovations remained conservative. 
 
The following chapters will take us on a journey retracing the evolution of the 
concept of consideration from the legal as well as the linguistic angle. The next 
chapter discusses the notion of legal concepts and their relation to language 
and specialised terminology. The method of combining the two areas of study 
in an approach akin to Begriffsgeschichte will be outlined briefly. Chapter III 
describes the view this research took of language, how language encodes 
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meanings and how it interacts with law and legal thought. It also includes an 
explanation of the corpus linguistics methodologies that were used for the 
research. In chapter IV, we travel back in time to the 14th century and consider 
the legal language that dominated England for three hundred years and how 
this Anglo-Norman import intermingled and interacted with the local vernacular 
until it was abolished in the early 17th century. Chapter V takes us on a similar 
journey, though this time through the intricacies of the common law concept of 
consideration. Having thus become acquainted with the cultural and linguistic 
landscape of multilingual England and its specific situation of medieval legal 
text production, as well as with the origins and historical evolution of the legal 
concept of consideration, chapter VI describes in detail the corpus linguistic 
analysis that was carried out in order to highlight the concordance between the 
development of the concept of consideration and the terminology used in the 
discussions of the issue in the case law. This includes an explanation of how 
the different corpora of texts taken from the Year Books and Law Reports were 
constituted, as well as a detailed description of the methodology applied. The 
last chapter will summarise the observations and conclusions that can be 
drawn from the research. 
 
The case law used for this research has been drawn from the Year Books, the 
Lawbook Exchange, the Selden Society series, the Ames Foundation 
publications or the English Reports, Full Reprint. All documents can be 
accessed electronically through www.heinonline.org. The first three are listed 
under the title of ‘Selden Society Publications and the History of Early English 
Law’, the last one can be found under ‘English Reports’. A detailed description 
of each can be found in annex 2. All reported cases mentioned are usually 
listed with their name and two references: one relating to the name of the 
original report and one to the compilation in which they can be found on 
HeinOnline.  
 
Examples for case references: 
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Watton v Brinth (1400) Y.B. 2 Hen. IV, 3, 9, or LBEx  :  
- first the name of the case and the date it was reported (between 
brackets), N.B. many early cases do not have a name; 
- followed by the reference of the original report: here it can be found in 
the Year Book (Y.B.) during the second year of the reign of Henry IV, 
sometimes the legal term is also included (Michaelmas: Oct.-Dec., 
Hilary: Jan.-Apr., Easter: Apr.-May, Trinity: June-July); 
- followed by two numbers signposting the section within the Year Book; 
- followed by ‘or’ and the reference for finding it on HeinOnline: here it is 
in the Lawbook Exchange publications. 
 
Cleymon v Vyncent (1535) Y.B. Trin. 27 Hen. VIII, 23, 21 or 119 Selden 
Society at 46-47: 
- case dated 1535; 
- originally reported in the Year Book of the Trinity term of the 27th year 
of the reign of Henry VIII; 
- two numbers to signpost the specific section; 
- ‘or’ in the 119th volume of the Selden Society series at pp. 46-47 on 
the HeinOnline database. 
 
Norwood v Reed (1558) 1 Plowd. 180 or 75 Eng. Rep. 277: 
- cases dated 1558; 
- originally reported in the first volumes of the Plowden Reports in 
section 180; 
- ‘or’ in volume 75 of the English Reports, Full Reprint, on page 277 on 
the HeinOnline database. 
 
A table of cases can be found in annex 5. The table is subdivided into one 
sorted by date and one in alphabetical order. It lists the cases mentioned in 
the theoretical discussion of the concept of consideration, that is in chapter V. 
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Chapter II. Legal concepts and terminology 
 
 
In this discussion of legal concepts, I have resisted the temptation to start by 
defining the concept of law itself, as this would go well beyond the ambit of the 
research. In any case, many eminent legal scholars, throughout the centuries, 
have offered definitions of the concept of law, some of which are modified by 
the rise of supra-national legal systems such as international law, EU law etc. 
In the present study, the concept of consideration was examined in its 
evolution from a collection of piecemeal legal rules established in the case law 
and for pragmatic requirements, to a fully-fledged doctrine that still dominates 
today’s contract formation in the common law. The underlying question to ask 
relates to the stage in this development at which this array of piecemeal rules 
began to be considered a legal concept. In other words, the object of the 
research is the process of bundling together a collection of rules into a legal 
concept, and the approach was to study the language as an indicator for this 
process. 
 
To track the advent and early use of the concept of consideration in English 
contract law and to trace the historical process of legal thought that constituted 
this concept required a wider ambit than just the description and analysis of 
the content of the case law and legal writings. Though these are essential units 
of analysis, they must be placed within their diachronic contexts for the 
conceptual shifts in thought and meaning to be revealed. 
 
This approach is akin to the Begriffsgeschichte work undertaken in German-
speaking academia, in particular by scholars such as Brunner, Conze, 
Koselleck and Meier who worked on the encyclopaedia Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe.1 This monumental work is a historical study of the concepts and 
semantic fields that constitute the language of social and political thought and 
																																																						
1 O. Brunner, W. Conze, R. Koselleck (eds.) (2004) Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. 
Historisches Lexikon zur Politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 9 
volumes 
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economic structures, and provides insights into the meanings and uses of 
words and concepts in classical, medieval and modern languages.2 The aim 
of the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe project was to test the hypothesis that the 
main concepts used in German political and social language were transformed 
during what Kosselleck, one of the principal editors, called the Sattelzeit – the 
period between approximately 1750 to 1850, a century of crisis and transition, 
during which conceptual change led to transformations in political, social and 
economic structures.3 
 
One of the methodological principles applied by the editors of the 
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, was to analyse the semantic fields of political 
and social language, because language offers a reliable indicator of the 
thinking and contexts in which concepts are established and are shifting in 
meaning. Methodologies imported from linguistics sciences, such as philology, 
historical semantics and structural linguistics are essential tools for 
Begriffsgeschichte research.4 In the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, these were 
used for the 
“purpose of charting both continuities and discontinuities in the use of 
concepts. Concerned to identify persisting meanings in concepts 
transmitted from the classical or medieval thought, it also studies 
decisive shifts of meaning in concepts that continue to be designated 
by the same word. Finally, it seeks to identify neologisms.”5 
 
The application of linguistics methodologies to the analysis of concepts 
historically was related to the shifts in their meanings throughout the period of 
structural political, social and economic transformations. In other words, the 
study of the language used to discuss society, politics and economics was 
																																																						
2 There were other similarly important German works: J. Ritter, K. Gründer, G. Gabriel (eds.) 
(1971 - 2007) Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Basel: Schwabe, mainly concerned 
with the history of philosophical concepts; R. Reichardt, E. Schmitt, H.J. Lüsebrink, J. 
Leonard (1985-) Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680-1820, 
München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftverlag 
3 R. Koselleck (1979) Begriffsgeschichte und Sozialgeschichte, in: Vergangene Zukunft. Zur 
Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, at pp. 107-129 
4 R. Koselleck (2006) Begriffsgeschichten, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, especially at pp. 
32-55 
5 M. Richter (1987) Begriffsgeschichte and the History of Ideas, in: Journal of the History of 
Ideas, vol. 48, N° 2, 247-263, at p.261 
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combined with the identification of the transformations in the structures during 
the Sattelzeit. 
 
This particular aspect of the Begriffsgeschichte approach guided the present 
research of tracing the historical process of legal thought that constituted the 
advent and early use of the concept of consideration in English contract law. 
Linguistic means of expression are central to law and legal texts are endowed, 
besides the informative and communicative purposes, with prescriptive and/or 
performative functions, which make, for example, their translation into another 
language or socio-political and cultural context particularly complex.6 The 
study of law is, among others, an enquiry into the abstract entities that make 
up a legal order. Law is a phenomenon entirely created by man, it does not 
exist as such in the physical world. Consequently, the language used to 
describe this phenomenon is intrinsically linked to its specific reality. This 
contrasts with the natural sciences, which represent to a certain degree an 
objective reality and where the language used to describe it cannot change 
that physical reality, though admittedly conceptual systems in natural sciences 
and the language to express them are also conditioned and influenced by the 
societal and cultural contexts. The legal reality of a legal system exists through 
the linguistic means of expression. 
 
A concept, according to a general definition as, for example, in the Oxford 
English Dictionary, is a general idea or notion, a universal; a mental 
representation of the essential or typical properties of something, considered 
without regard to the peculiar properties of any specific instance or example. 
In other words, concepts are constituents of thought, abstract representations 
created by the human mind on the basis of features specific to a thing or 
matter. A ‘term’ is the verbal expression of a concept and is usually a part of 
the conceptual system of a specialised language or language for special 
propose (LSP). 
 
																																																						
6 C. Laske (2012) Translating the Law, in: Rechtgeleerd Magazijn Themis, 267-278, at p. 
270 
Chapter	II:	Legal	concept	and	terminology	14	
In law, a clear dividing line is not always drawn between legal conceptions and 
non-legal conceptions. According to Hohfeld,7 this is because of a failure to 
differentiate between purely legal relations and the physical and mental facts 
that create such relations. He believes there are two reasons for this confusion. 
First of all, in a specific issue, the ideas associated with each set of relations 
can be very similar, leading to a blending of legal and non-legal quantities. For 
example, the early action of debt in medieval common law was applicable to 
real contracts where a res had passed between the parties.8 It was based on 
the proprietary notion of possessing a corporeal entity. Rights could be 
transferred if they were embodied in a physical thing, the premise being that 
the defendant had received something (a res) from the plaintiff and, hence, 
there had been a quid pro quo. In other words, the action of debt was based 
on a proprietary notion (physical/mental facts leading to a legal relation) rather 
than promissory one (legal relation) and it evolved around the fiction that the 
lender was claiming what belonged to him, rather than what the object of a 
promise was. Historically, in the example of debt, there was no differentiation 
between the physical and mental facts that constitute the legal relation and the 
actual legal relation itself. 
 
This was emphasised by a general ambiguity in the legal terminology, which 
is the second reason for the confusion between legal conceptions and non-
legal conceptions. Hohfeld discusses the term ‘property’ as one example for 
such looseness of the terminology: 
“Sometimes it is employed to indicate the physical object to which 
various legal rights, privileges, etc. relate; then again – with far greater 
discrimination and accuracy – the word is used to denote the legal 
interest (or aggregate of legal relations) appertaining to such physical 
object. Frequently there is a rapid and fallacious shift from the one 
meaning to the other. At times, also, the term is used in such a ‘blended’ 
sense as to convey no definite meaning whatever.”9 
 
																																																						
7 W. N. Hohfeld (1913-1914) Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, in: 23 Yale Law Journal, 16-59, at p. 20 
8 The action of debt also applied to formal contracts under seal specifying a sum. 
9 W. N. Hohfeld (1913-1914) Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, in: 23 Yale Law Journal, 16-59, at pp. 21-22 
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Hohfeld also cites Mr. Justice Smith in the leading case of Eaton v Boston 
Concord & Montreal Rail Road Co:10 
“In a strict legal sense, land is not ‘property’, but the subject of property. 
The term ‘property’, although in common parlance frequently applied to 
a tract of land or chattel, in its legal signification means only the rights 
of the owner in relation to it. It denotes a right over a determinate thing.” 
 
In the example of ‘property’, we can observe how the term is being used in 
relation to corporeal and incorporeal entities alike, hereby further obscuring 
the differentiation between legal and non-legal conceptions. In the case of 
legal relations, the term is used figuratively. One of the reasons for this 
‘looseness’ of legal terminology is that although certain terms refer to highly 
complex legal concepts, the actual language is imported from general 
language registers and many terms refer to everyday physical things, while 
actually describing an abstract legal concept. Pollock and Maitland described 
this as follows: 
“Few, if any, of the terms in our vocabulary have always been technical 
terms. The license that the man of science can allow himself of coining 
new words is one which by the nature of the case is denied to lawyers. 
They have to take their terms out of popular speech; gradually the 
words so taken are defined; sometimes a word continues to have both 
a technical meaning for lawyers and a different and vaguer meaning for 
laymen; sometimes the word that lawyers have adopted is abandoned 
by the laity.”11 
 
This demonstrates perfectly the difference between the notion of concept as a 
cognitive category (constituents of thought) on the one hand, and as a 
linguistic category (semantic meaning) on the other.12 To understand the 
fundamental nature of legal language, it is important to make that distinction. 
But it also shows the intrinsic link between the two and the inevitable confusion 
that can be created when they come together. 
																																																						
10 (1872) 51 N. H., 504, at p. 511 
11 F. Pollock, F.W. Maitland (1895/1968) The History of English Law before the Time of 
Edward I, vol. II, Cambridge: CUP, at p. 31 
12 “Der Begriff ist eine erkenntnistheoretische Kategorie, die Bedeutung eine linguistische.” 
in: H. Felber (2001) Allgemeine Terminologielehre, Wissenslehre und Wissenstechnik. 
Theoretische Grundlagen und philosophische Betrachtungen, Wien: Termnet, at pp. 58-59; 
also: H. Mattila (2012) Legal Vocabulary, in: P. Tiersma,  L. Solan (eds.) The Oxford 
Handbook of Language and Law, 27-51, at pp.27-28  
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Legal terminology, as Pollock and Maitland have pointed out, has often 
migrated from general language into the specialised legal register. A lot of it is 
the result of linguistic short-cuts, adapting the ordinary language to serve the 
functional needs of practising lawyers.13 Ordinary language terms are given 
specialised meanings by each legal system. This specialised meaning is 
conceptually related to the core meaning of the word in common speech. ‘Offer 
and acceptance’ is one such example: these words reflect the core idea that 
was taken up by contract law doctrine, yet the ambit of the semantic field of 
those words in law is different and much wider than in the ordinary language. 
Similarly the collocation ‘in consideration of’ and even more so the term 
‘consideration’ have been subject to this kind of semantic shift, as this study is 
demonstrating. Malinowski14 goes so far as to write that a general language 
term which has not undergone this semantic shift cannot be treated as a law 
term. It goes without saying that there are many other types of legal terms, 
such as for example technical terms in a stricter sense, that relate to 
institutions and concepts, which do not exist outside the legal field. A legal term 
can be formed in a variety of ways. Apart from terms migrating from general 
language to specialised legal terminology, a term can also be borrowed from 
a foreign legal language or new terms or neologisms may be created. 
 
As already mentioned in the previous chapter, lawyers and linguists approach 
(legal) language from a different view point. Lawyers tend to adopt a 
deterministic view of legal terms,15 while for the linguist the legal terms are in 
their nature mainly polysemic, their intended meaning being dependent on the 
context in which they occur.16 As legal systems are in a constant state of 
																																																						
13 L.M. Friedman (1964) Law and its Language, in: 33 George Washington Law Review, 
563-579, at p. 565 
14 A. Malinowski (2006) Polski jezyk prawny. Wybrane zagadnienia, Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo Prawnicze LexisNexis, at p. 154 
15 H.L.A. Hart (1961) Positivism and the separation of law and  morals, in: Harvard Law 
Review 71/4, 593-629; H. Kelsen (1967) The Pure Theory of Law, Berkeley: University of 
California Press; D.N. MacCormick (1974) Law as Institutional Fact, in: Law Quarterly 
Review 90, 102-129 
16 For example: G. Cornu (2005) Linguistique Juridique, Paris: Montchrestien; G. Cornu 
(2007) Vocabulaire juridique, Paris: PUF; J-C. Gémar (1995) Traduire ou l’art d’interpréter, 
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evolution and change, are not isolated but influence each other in both time 
and space, we can observe a high frequency of polysemy in legal 
terminology.17 This polysemy together with the fact that legal discourse dealing 
with everyday problems or phenomena is often addressed to society at large, 
can create the illusion of comprehension by the lay person. But even among 
lawyers, polysemy causes confusion in legal interpretation and translation. In 
legal translation, the difficulties of transferring legal concepts from one legal 
culture/language to another can be addressed by combining conceptual 
analysis and cognitive linguistics. This allows us to determine the set of 
characteristics brought together in a particular concept, and the relation 
between a characteristic and the concepts it describes.  
 
So much for a brief discussion of legal concepts and the language to describe 
them. Before turning to the question of retracing the making of a concept and 
the concurring shift in meanings of the terminology, let us first consider the 
angle from which language was considered for this research. 
 
  
																																																						
Langue, droit et société: éléments de jurilinguistique, tome 2: Application – Traduire le texte 
juridique, Saint-Nicolas: Presses de l’Université du Québec; J.E. Joseph (1995) 
Indeterminacy, Translation and the Law, in: M.Morris (ed.) Translation and the Law, 
Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 13-36; S. Roszkowski 
(1999) The language of law as sublanguage, in: J. Tomaszczyk (ed.) Aspects of Legal 
Language and Legal Translation, Lodz: Lodz University Press, 7-16 
17 H. Mattila (2012) Legal Vocabulary, in: P. Tiersma, L. Solan (eds.) The Oxford Handbook 
of Language and Law, 27-51, at p. 30 
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Chapter III.  Language, functional linguistics and  
corpus linguistics 
 
 
1. Language: the theory of functional linguistics 
 
Starting with the angle on language, we first need to outline how this 
research considered language, how language is used to encode meanings 
and how it interacts with law and legal thought.1 According to the Oxford 
English Dictionary, language has a multitude of meanings. These can relate 
to the concept of language, to specific linguistic systems, or systems of 
communication, including non-verbal, signal or gestural communication or 
expression in music and art, to computing, to manner/style of expression or 
specific jargon, to a community of people or a nation etc. In this research, we 
are not concerned with language as a mental faculty nor with the human 
capacity for language as universal and altogether innate and as a unique 
development of the human brain2. Nor will this research explore the 
structuralist view of language as a system of symbols and as a closed 
system in which elements are held in balance and are assembled according 
to specific (grammatical) rules. In the structuralist approach, meaning is not 
given in advance but is created with the formation of the sign itself and it is 
not rooted in some universal logic but is the result of entirely arbitrary 
decision on the part of each linguistic community. Consequently, if two 
communities construct different meanings for the same thing, there is no 
objective basis for deciding which meaning is better or right.3 
 
																																																						
1 See also C. Laske (2013) Translators and Legal Comparatists as Objective Mediators 
between Cultures? in: J. Husa, M. Van Hoecke (eds.) Objectivity in Law and Legal 
Reasoning, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 213-227 
2 Chomsky’s Universal Grammar is a prominent exponent of this school of thought, see e.g. 
N. Chomsky (1965) Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. MIT Press; N. Chomsky (2000) The 
Architecture of Language, New Delhi: OUP (India); N. Chomsky (2007) Approaching UG 
from Below", in: H-M. Gärtner, U. Sauerland (eds.) Interfaces + Recursion = Language? 
Chomsky's Minimalism and the View from Syntax-Semantics. Studies in Generative 
Grammar. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter 
3 F. de Saussure (1916/2005) Cours de linguistique générale, Paris : Payot & Rivages 
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The premise on which this research is based, is that of language as an act of 
communication. It is a pragmatic view which stresses the function, notably 
the social function, of the use of language when people interact with each 
other. This approach has been adopted mainly in the context of socio-
linguistics and linguistic anthropology. In the context of examining the use of 
legal language, the approach which emphasises usage, communicative 
function and social context of language seems the most appropriate to adopt. 
The theory of language to be discussed here is generally known as systemic 
functional linguistics, or systemic functional grammar or systemic linguistics 
and was first adopted by Michael Halliday in the 1980s.4 
 
It offers an account of language as it is used in actual social situations and is, 
in this sense, always concerned with the meaning, communicative 
functionality and rhetorical purposes of language. At the heart of systemic 
linguistics is the understanding of the communicative properties of written 
and spoken texts of all types (why a text means what it does and why it is 
valued as it is), as well as the understanding of the relation between 
language, on the one hand, and culture, community, social grouping and 
ideology, on the other.5  
 
For functional linguists, language appears to have developed and is used for 
three purposes, which Halliday has called metafunctions:  
 
(i) Ideational metafunction, encodes meanings of experience which 
realise field of discourse (‘experiential meanings’). It refers to the 
use of language to represent experience and construct a view of 
reality with the various categories language offers to talk about 
real-world happenings. There are three main constituents: 
processes (typically expressed as verbs identifying entities and 
states of affairs), participants (typically expressed as nouns 
																																																						
4 The standard reference work for systemic theory is M. Halliday (1985/1994) An Introduction 
to Functional Grammar, London: Edward Arnold 
5 Halliday (1985/1994) An Introduction to Functional Grammar, London: Edward Arnold, at p. 
xxi 
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identifying entities), and circumstances (typically expressed as 
adverbs or prepositional phrases acting to provide some context to 
the first two elements). 
An example of the simplest clause constituent structure in the experiential 
function would be: 
The train departs 
(participant) (process)  
The dog barked 
(participant) (process)  
 
This becomes more elaborate when other participants are added: 
My uncle missed the train 
(participant) (process)  (participant) 
 
Or circumstance is added: 
The train departs at six o’clock 
(participant) (process)  (circumstance) 
My uncle missed the train by five minutes 
(participant) (process)  (participant) (circumstance) 
 
(ii) Interpersonal metafunction, encodes meanings of attitudes and 
relationships which realise tenor of discourse (‘interpersonal 
meanings’). It refers to the use of language to represent interaction 
between speakers, the way they construct and fill social roles, 
adopt and/or express attitudes/points of views, form relationships 
and alliances and so on. A speaker can adopt four basic 
interpersonal positions (which can be complicated, qualified and 
extended): declarative (offering information), interrogative 
(demanding information), imperative (commands in relation to 
action or response rather than information) and offer (willingness to 
supply action and response). 
There are many elements that indicate interpersonal meanings and it is not 
possible to go into any detail. For a better understanding, here are few 
examples: 
- mood (order, apologise, invite, reject, describe etc.): Sit down! Please be 
seated. 
 
- modal auxiliary: will (inclination/futurity), can (ability/possibility), should or 
have to (obligation); e.g. I will collect her. I could go and collect her after 
work. You should go to the station now! 
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- use of pronouns: I, you, we, our, your; e.g. Before we begin, I would like to 
like to set out the main stages of our trip together. 
 
(iii) Textual metafunction, encodes meanings of text development 
which realise mode of discourse (‘textual meanings’). It refers to 
the use of language to organise the experiential and interpersonal 
meanings into a coherent, connected and unified entity. The most 
prominent textual function in this context is what has been termed 
the ‘theme’ which indicates the angle or the point of departure 
adopted by the speaker. Themes can be subdivided into simple, 
multiple, topical, interpersonal or textual themes. The rest of the 
clause is called ‘rheme’. 
The following example illustrates how the organisation of a text informs the 
textual meaning: 
THEME   RHEME 
My dog   chased the cat all around the garden. 
The cat   was chased all around the garden by my dog. 
All around the garden, the cat was chased by my dog. 
 
From the simple examples above, we can see how meanings are encoded in 
what linguists call ‘text’ which is a piece of language in use that can be of any 
length and in either written or spoken form. It is “language that is functional”.6 
A text, in this sense, is a coherent collection of meanings appropriate to its 
context. The way the text’s meanings are combined gives the text its texture 
and the text’s structure rests on the mandatory structural elements used in 
the combination of these meanings. Encoding the meaning depends on two 
surrounding contexts, illustrated in figure 1 below. The context of culture 
refers to the general outer cultural environment in which a text occurs. It 
includes elements such as conventions of address, politeness, discourse 
etc., which shape meanings within a particular culture. It has been described 
																																																						
6 M Halliday, R Hasan, eds. (1985) Language, context and texts: Aspects of language in a 
social semiotic perspective, Geelong: Deakin University Press 
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“as the sum of all the meanings it is possible to mean in that particular 
culture”.7 
 
Within that general context of culture, there is an inner context, which 
functional linguists have named the ‘context of situation’ and which refers, as 
the term indicates, to the specific situation in which a text occurs and in 
which meanings are formed. It includes “the things going on in the world 
outside the text that make the text what it is”.8 Linguists have identified three 
basic parameters of the situational differences within context of situation, 
namely field, tenor and mode. Field relates to experimential meanings, tenor 
to interpersonal meanings and mode to textual meanings, as described 
above in relation to the metafunctions of language (also illustrated in figure 2 
below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Figure 1: Text in context 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
7 D. Butt, R. Fahey, S. Feez, S. Spinks, C. Yallop, eds. (2000) Using Functional Grammar. 
An Explorer’s Guide, Sydney: Macquarie University, at p 3 
8 Butt, Fahey, Feez, Spinks, Yallop, eds. (2000) Using Functional Grammar. An Explorer’s 
Guide, Sydney: Macquarie University at p. 4 
Text	
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Figure 2: Parameters of context of situation9 
 
The study of language developed by linguists who consider language as an 
act of communication, and who show how meanings are encoded by 
examining the extra-linguistic levels of context of culture and of situation, will 
stress the function, notably the social function, of the use of language when 
people interact with each other. The lexical or grammatical analysis 
considers the elements in the language by describing how it functions. This 
approach has been adopted in the present research. The lexical and 
grammatical patterning surrounding key terms, such as ‘consideration’, 
‘assumpsit’ or ‘promise’ were examined in relation to their functional 
purposes, which has revealed the extent of the abstraction and technicality of 
the legal language.   
 
Moving beyond traditional grammar classification of words and considering 
the function they play, we can shine a very different light onto the meanings 
and realities they represent. In our quest to understand the evolution of the 
use of ‘consideration’ in the context of developing the concept of 
																																																						
9 D. Butt, R. Fahey, S. Feez, S. Spinks, C. Yallop, eds. (2000) Using Functional Grammar. 
An Explorer’s Guide, Sydney: Macquarie University, at p. 4 
Text	
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consideration in contract law, we can examine diachronically the experiential 
function and meanings encoded from the experience that conveys a picture 
of reality. As illustrated in the figure 3 below, the experiential function of 
language is to be understood by proceeding from the centre outwards from 
PROCESS, realised by the verbal group, interacting with the 
PARTICIPANTS, realised by the mainly nominal groups and placed into 
context by the CIRCUMSTANCE(S) of human experience, expressed by 
adverbial groups, prepositions phrases and sometimes nominal groups 
acting as if they were adverbs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 : Patterns of experience in the clause10 
 
In the case of, for example, the phrase ‘in consideration of’, we are on the 
outer layer of the experience:  
§ something is (done) = PROCESS  
§ in relation to something or someone = PARTICIPANTS 
§ in consideration of = CIRCUMSTANCES 
For example: 
“Such a promise might be made in consideration of delivering up a letter.”11 
																																																						
10 D. Butt, R. Fahey, S. Feez, S. Spinks , C. Yallop (2000) Using Functional Grammar : An 
Explorer’s Guide, Sydney : Macquarie University, at p.46 
11 Haigh v Brooks (1839) 10 Ad. & E. 309 or 113 Eng. Rep. 119 
			Verbal	group	
			as	PROCESS	
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In contrast, when studying the experiential function of the word consideration 
in its technical and abstract uses, we find ourselves in the middle layer of the 
functional constituents represented by the three rings in figure 3 above, 
namely that of the participants in the process, most commonly realised by 
nominal groups. 
For example : 
“Such a consideration appears not to be sustainable.”12 
Or adapting the example given above: 
The consideration for the promise consists in delivering the letter. 
 
The methodology most appropriate to reveal how language and the evolution 
of legal concepts interact, is to examine the language in question in its 
textual context. The use of corpus linguistics methods and 
linguistics/concordance software is ideal for this sort of empirical approach, 
as it allows for systematic analysis of authentic evidence. The rest of this 
chapter will describe corpus-based and concordance methodologies, 
including how these relate specifically to the research question and historic 
sources selected for this project. Also discussed will be the way that 
sampling decisions were taken, revised and adjusted, and the way corpora 
and sub-corpora were constituted. The specifically technical details will be 
dealt with in chapter VI. 
 
2. Corpus linguistics 
 
Corpus and concordance work as a method of exegesis on the basis of 
detailed searches of words and phrases in multiple contexts and among 
large amount of texts, goes back as far as the Middle Ages, when biblical 
scholars manually indexed the words of the Holy Scriptures.13 Subsequently, 
																																																						
12 Meyer v Haworth (1838) 8 Ad. & E. 467, or 112 Eng. Rep. 916 
13 M. Albaric (2004) Hugues de Saint-Cher et les concordances bibliques latines (XIII-XVIII 
siècles, in: L-J. Bataillon, G. Dahan, P-M Gy (eds.) Hugues de Saint-Cher (+1263), bibliste et 
théologien: Etudes réunies, 467-479 
Chapter	III:	Language,	functional	linguistics	and	corpus	linguistics	 27	
it has also been practised by literary scholars14 and lexicographers.15 The 
first computer-generated concordance tools appeared in the 1950s, when it 
took twenty-four hours to process 60,000 words and used punched-card 
technology for storage! Modern corpus work, as we know it today, emerged 
in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
Corpus linguistic methodologies have been used in a number of domains16 
ranging from language teaching17 and translation18, to literary criticism19 and 
media language/discourse analysis,20 just to name a few. Enquiries using 
digitally held corpora allow for access to large bodies of texts of naturally 
occurring language, that can be searched electronically, according to given 
criteria with a few mouse clicks, providing information on the data that is both 
quantitative and qualitative, and is empirical rather than intuitive. Our own 
intuition of the relative frequency of words, phrases and structures can be 
little more than vague and general. And while we may be conscious about 
the frequency of lexis, it is highly unlikely that we have any precise intuitions 
																																																						
14 e.g.: A. Becket (1787) Concordance to Shakespeare, London: G.G.J. and J. Robinson 
15 e.g.: S. Johnson (1755) Dictionary of the English Language: in which The Words are 
deduced from their Originals, and Illustrated in their Different Significations by Examples 
from the best Writers; Ancestor of the OED (first published in 1884 as unbound fascicles) A 
New English Dictionary on Historical Principles; Founded Mainly on the Materials Collected 
by The Philological Society 
16 For an overview, see e.g. E. Tognini-Bonelli (2001) Corpus Linguistics at Work, 
Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins 
17 See e.g.: S. Hunston, G. Francis (1998) Verbs Observed: A Corpus-driven Pedagogic 
Grammar, in Applied Linguistics, 19/1, 45-72; E. Tognini-Bonelli (2001) Corpus Linguistics at 
Work, Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, at pp. 14-46 
18 See e.g.: M. Baker (1993) Corpus Linguistics and Translation Studies: Implication and 
Applications, in: M. Baker, G. Francis, E. Tognini-Bonelli (eds.) Text and Technology: in 
Honour of John Sinclair, Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 233-250 ; S. 
Laviosa (1998) The corpus-based approach : a new paradigm in translation studies, in : 
Meta XLIII, 4, 478-479; J. Munday (1998) A computer-assisted approach to the analysis of 
translation studies, in : Meta XLIII, 4, 542-556 ; M. Tymoczko (1998) Computerized corpora 
and the future of translation studies, in : Meta XLIII, 4, 652-660; E. Tognini-Bonelli (2001) 
Corpus Linguistics at Work, Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 131-156 
19 See e.g.: B. Louw (1997) The Role of Corpora in Critical Literary Appreciation, in: A. 
Wichmann, S. Fligelstone, T. McEnery, G. Knowles (eds.) Teaching and Language Corpora, 
London and New York: Longman, 240-251 
20 See e.g.: P. Chang (2002) Who’s behind the personal pronouns in talk radio? Cartalk: a 
case study, in: A. Sanchez-Macarro (ed.) Widows on the World: Media Discourse in English, 
Valencia: University of Valencia Press; A. O’Keeffe (2006) Investigating Media Discourse, 
London: Routledge; K. O’Halloran (2010) How to use corpus linguistics in the study of media 
discourse, in: A. O’Keeffe, M. McCarthy (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Corpus 
Linguistics, London: Routledge, 563-576 
Chapter	III:	Language,	functional	linguistics	and	corpus	linguistics	28	
about the frequency of grammatical categories. Corpus linguistics 
methodologies can be purely descriptive and ideologically neutral, but can 
also be used in discourse analysis and coupled with critical approaches.21 
This is best done by undertaking a diachronic linguistic and semantic 
analysis using corpus linguistics methodologies. Besides providing an 
empirical basis for studying language in use, corpus work also has a heuristic 
function to the extent that the analysis of the material systematized in a 
corpus generates new knowledge. By using algorithm-based analytical tools, 
the researcher may find him/herself confronted with results that were 
unexpected. 
 
Besides statistical information, linguistic concordance tools allow for search 
terms to be placed within their textual context (KWIC22 lines), which in turn 
reveals the patterns associated with particular uses of the search term. If we 
start from the premise of communicative functionality of language, it may be 
more productive to look at patterns first, rather than at meaning in an isolated 
fashion. If a word has several meanings or its meaning has shifted 
throughout time, we will find a tendency for each meaning to be associated 
most frequently with different patterns, consequently words which share a 
pattern also tend to share aspects of meaning23. This approach dismantles 
the traditional distinction between grammar and lexis24. Sinclair argues that 
the two do not operate independently, as separate systems, but together, as 
a single system: lexical items cannot be described without reference to their 
grammatical patterning, meaning is dependent upon grammar and vice-
versa, all grammar patterning is dependent upon lexical choice. Sinclair 
reverses the common (Chomskyan) assumption that grammatical 
																																																						
21 K. O’Halloran (2011) Critical discourse analysis, in: J. Simpson (ed.) The Routledge 
Handbook of Applied Linguistics, London and New York: Routledge, 109-125 
22 Key Word In Context 
23 Examples of this are given in S. Hunston, G. Francis (1998) Verbs Observed: A Corpus-
driven Pedagogic Grammar, in Applied Linguistics, 19/1, 45-72 
24 Of the traditional split between ‘grammar’ and ‘lexis’, Sinclair wrote : “In the explicit 
theoretical statement of linguistics, grammatical and lexical patterns vary independently of 
each other. In most grammars, it is an assumption that is obviously taken for granted … 
Equally, it is rare for a dictionary to note the common syntactic patterns of a word in a 
particular sense.” in: J. Sinclair (1991) Corpus Concordance Collocation, Oxford: OUP, at p. 
103 
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generalisation arises from an underlying rule and believes such 
generalisations to be derived from the observation and extrapolation of 
experience: 
“The new evidence suggests that grammatical generalizations do not 
rest on a rigid foundation, but are the accumulation of the patterns of 
hundreds of individual words and phrases. The language looks rather 
different when you look at a lot of it at once”.25 
 
Work on electronically held corpora and with linguistics software obviously 
offers the perfect basis for observations of language in use. 
 
The type of corpus constituted for this research is diachronic in nature, which 
means we are dealing with a collection of texts that vary along the parameter 
of time. Strictly speaking most linguistic corpora are constructed in this way, 
but what makes a corpus diachronic is for the corpus compiler to divide it into 
successive periods according to self-determined criteria.26 Quantitative 
analytical methods have been applied to the growing field of corpus-based 
socio-linguistics27 investigating, for example, parameters such as gender, 
dialect and genre in grammatical change. But standards of how to interpret 
statistically the frequency changes in diachronic data are still debated.28 The 
present research is less concerned with purely sociolinguistic premises but 
																																																						
25 J. Sinclair (1991) Corpus Concordance Collocation, Oxford: OUP, at p. 100 
26 M. Hilbert, S. Gries (2009) Assessing frequency changes in multistage diachronic 
corpora : Applications for historical corpus linguistics and the study of language acquisition, 
in : Literary and Linguistic Computing, vol 24, No. 4, 385-401, at p. 386 
27 T. Nevalainen, H. Raumolin-Brunberg, eds. (1996) Sociolinguitics and Language History. 
Studies based on Corpus of Early English Correspondence, Amsterdam: Rodopi; D. Biber, J. 
Burges (2000) Historical change in the language use of women and men. Gender 
differences in dramatic dialogue, in : Journal of English Linguistics, 28(1), 21-37; T. 
Nevalainen (2000) Gender differences in the evolution of standard English. Evidence from 
the corpus of the early English correspondence; in: Journal of English Linguistics, 28(1), 38-
59; T. Nevalainen, R. Reppen, S. Fitzmaurice, D. Biber (eds.) (2002) Using Corpora to 
Explore Linguistic Variation, Amsterdam: Benjamins; H. Raumolin-Brunberg (2003) Historical 
Socio-Linguistics: Language Change in Tudor and Stuart England, London: Pearson 
Education; M. Hilpert (2006) Distinctive collexeme analysis and diachrony; in: Corpus 
Linguistics and Linguistic Theory, 2(2): 243-257; A. Hinneburg, H. Mannila, S. Kaislaniemi, 
T. Nevalainen, H. Raumolin-Brunberg (2007) How to handle small samples: bootstrap and 
Bayesian methods in the analysis of linguistic change, in: Literary and Linguistic Computing, 
22: 137-150; S. Gries, M. Hilpert (2008) The identification of stages in diachronic data: 
variability-based neighbour clustering; in: Corpora, 1: 59-81 
28 M. Hilbert, S. Gries (2009) Assessing frequency changes in multistage diachronic 
corpora : Applications for historical corpus linguistics and the study of language acquisition, 
in : Literary and Linguistic Computing, vol. 24, No. 4, 385-401 
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uses corpus linguistics methods for the purposes of illustration. Yet, it is 
essential to strike the appropriate balance in the interactive relation between 
human processing (human analyst), computer processing (software) and 
corpus data (database), which largely depends on the extent the human 
analyst delegates the responsibility for analysis to the computer.29 In the 
corpus work carried out for this research, the linguistic software is a tool for 
sorting and counting data but the analysis, evaluation and interpretation of 
the data provided by the software is done by a human researcher providing 
the necessary linguistic, legal and historical insights. The aim of the present 
analysis is not to provide a full statistical linguistic analysis, as corpus-based 
socio-linguists would do, but rather to reveal trends in the use of language 
and semantic contents to retrace the concordance between the evolution of a 
new legal concept and that of the language used to describe it. 
 
Apart from socio-linguistics, the diachronic approach to corpus work is 
relevant to terminological studies, as it provides essential insights for the sort 
of terminological work, akin to Begriffsgeschichte, adopted in this research. 
‘Terms’ are usually defined as words, compound words or phrases used in a 
definite or precise sense in some particular subject, expressing a notion or 
concept, or denoting an object of thought.30 It has been argued that a 
diachronic approach to terminology questions the traditional opposition 
between words and terms. Instead it may be: 
“more appropriate to consider terms as lexical entities which 
transcends the boundaries of expert language and can also be used 
by the general public in non-specialised communication.”31 
 
This has been described as a process of de-terminologization.32 However, 
the linear terminological evolution studied in this research takes, in fact, the 
opposite path. Rather than moving from the specific to the general, it shifts 
																																																						
29 G. Leech (1991) The state of the art in corpus linguistics ; in: K. Aijmer, B. Altenberg (eds.) 
English Corpus Linguistics, London: Longman, 8-29 
30 Oxford English Dictionary definitions 13 a & b 
31 P. Dury (2005) Terminology and Specialized Translation: the Relevance of the Diachronic 
Approach, in: LSP & Professional Communication, vol. 5, nr. 1, 31-40, at p. 38 
32 I. Meyer, K. Macintosh (2000) When Terms Move into our Everyday Lives : An Overview 
of De-terminologization, in Terminology 6(1), 111-118, at p. 112 
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from general language usages of specific words and phrases to a highly 
technical and abstract legal use of the very same words and phrases. 
Corpus-work on a diachronic corpus divided into successive periods, is an 
essential tool to reveal this process, in particular because it allows for the 
relevant words/phrases to be placed in their context and as they appear in 
the texts under consideration. In this way, we can study the terminological 
evolution and various transitional situations of general usages via usage in 
legal contexts to abstract usage of an autonomous legal concept. 
 
2.1. Constituting a corpus - representativeness  
 
A corpus is usually defined as a systematic collection of naturally33 occurring 
texts of both written and spoken language that has been computerised. It 
offers the empirical basis for carrying out systematic linguistic investigations 
on authentic evidence. The fact that it is held digitally and searchable 
electronically offers possibilities that are not otherwise available. Yet, the 
corpus linguistics methodologies only make sense if a corpus is designed in 
such a way that it forms a representative basis for making generalisations 
about a language as a whole or as defined by the underlying premises of the 
research. The overall corpus design is conditioned by the methods of text 
sampling and sampling decisions made by the researcher whether conscious 
or (in part) unconscious. Only a well-defined conception of what the sample 
is intended to represent will subsequently allow for choices to be evaluated 
as to the adequacy or representativeness of the corpus. It is less a question 
of sample size and more one of being representative for the range of text 
types in the target population (the latter of which has to be defined in turn) 
and for the range of linguistics distribution in the population. 
 
																																																						
33 Natural language, as opposed to artificial or constructed language devised for international 
communications, computer programming or mathematical purposes, is language that has 
evolved naturally, is hereditary and in extended use (see definition in the OED). 
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Biber34 has developed a very comprehensive set of principles for achieving 
‘representativeness’ in corpus design, which will not be repeated here. His 
main message is that corpus design is cyclical, the bottom-line being: 
“that the parameters of a fully representative corpus cannot be 
determined at the outset”.35 
 
He has represented this process schematically as follows: 
 
Pilot empirical investigation  Corpus             Compile portion            Empirical 
and theoretical analysis  design            of corpus   investigation 
        
 
Figure 4: Biber’s cyclical process to achieve ‘representativeness’ in corpus design 
 
This process of continuously revising the design of the corpus following 
empirical research carried out on the initial pilot corpus in order to adjust the 
design parameters, has been an important part of the process of constituting 
a corpus for this research. This was particularly relevant in view of the 
complexity of working with medieval texts of a specialised but not very 
uniform register. It has meant that the standard corpus-based strategies of 
extracting data could not be applied as such but had to be adjusted to the 
specificities of the medieval Year Books and Tudor/early Stuart Law Reports. 
It was precisely the cyclical process of revising the corpus design in 
response to further empirical investigation that allowed for adjusting and 
refining the constitution of the corpus, including the creation of new sub-
corpora. The way that sampling decisions were taken, revised and adjusted, 
and the way corpora and sub-corpora were constituted in relation to 
diachronic aspects and on the basis of the search terms, are described in the 
next section (2.2). The technical details are further discussed in chapter VI. 
 
 
 
																																																						
34 D. Biber (1993) Representativeness in Corpus Design, in: Literary and Linguistic 
Computing, Vol. 8, No. 4, 243-257 
35 D. Biber (1993) Representativeness in Corpus Design, in: Literary and Linguistic 
Computing, Vol. 8, No. 4 at p. 256 
Chapter	III:	Language,	functional	linguistics	and	corpus	linguistics	 33	
2.2. Corpus for this research – sampling decisions 
 
The initial sampling decisions for constituting the present corpus were fairly 
straightforward but evolved cyclically, both in relation to the time span of the 
selected documents and in relation to the types of cases that were selected 
for inclusion in the corpus. It was thought that the most representative 
naturally occurring language in relation to the evolution of the concept of 
consideration would be found in the reports of cases that lawyers were 
extracting as early as the 1220s from the plea rolls. While plea rolls remained 
the most authoritative source of precedents their formulaic Latin language 
and the use of phrases instead of detailed assertions, the omission of the 
evidence, the arguments of counsel and the reasons for judgments, meant 
that debates and arguments were less prominent in those records. But 
precisely these elements would reveal the dynamic process of the evolving 
conceptual thinking on a particular legal issue. A mere record of the 
formalised results of a legal case without including the exchanges between 
the parties that led to the decision, is a poor reflection of the legal and 
conceptual thinking involved in the decisions. These could not be captured in 
set formulae.  
 
The Year Books and early Law Reports did not supplement the rolls for 
official purposes. There is no evidence of appointments or payments of 
official reporters, and the Year Books were not preserved with the records 
and office-books of the courts. Their “purpose must have been to record the 
intellectual aspect of litigation.”36 In that sense, discrepancies between the 
earliest reports must not be seen as lacking historical authenticity as 
precedents, but rather as a way of teasing out specific ideas and suggestions 
in a case by adapting the facts. For these reasons and for the purposes of 
this research, these sources allow for plenty of insights into the development 
of thought on the enforceability of informal agreements. 
 
																																																						
36 J.H. Baker (2007) An Introduction to English Legal History, Oxford: OUP, at p. 179 
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Yet, their use is not without challenges, as they are neither systematic nor 
official, nor standardised, but scant, personal and erroneous in matters of 
factual details at times.37 This was particularly the case up to the early Tudor 
period, at which point the reports began to change in character as a result of 
developments in the legal systems during the renaissance period. From the 
late 15th century, the reports dealt more with the discussion of substantive 
law and less with the type of tentative pleading that could be found in the 
earlier Year Books. 
 
Moreover, the texts from which the corpus was constituted, are reports and 
notes in varying registers, different structures and styles. The texts were 
written in Anglo-French, except for three (later) documents38 which are in 
Middle English. The facts of the case are sketched briefly and the arguments 
described succinctly. Some entries appear as scant as a note that may have 
been scribbled on a spare piece of parchment. Frequently, official records 
are paraphrased in Latin, but these Latin texts were not taken into account 
for constituting the corpus. The diversity in register that can be found 
throughout the texts under consideration, is not only due to the different 
format of reporting and the long time span during which they were written, 
but also because the reported cases were heard in differing circumstances. 
For example, reports of cases that came before the King’s Council and Star 
Chamber39 contain a lot of formal language addressed to the King in forms of 
praise, pleas, requests or prayers etc.  
 
																																																						
37 The Year Books have been compared to the (early) Lois de Lille, see D. Heirbaut (2012) 
The spokesmen in medieval courts: the unknown leading judges of the customary law and 
makers of the first continental law reports, in: P. Brand, J. Getzler (eds.) Judges and judging 
in the history of the common law and civil law: from antiquity to modern times, Cambridge: 
CUP, 192-208 
38 Select Cases in the Council of Henry VII  (1485-1509) (75 Selden Society); Select Cases 
Before The King's Council in The Star Chamber, vol. I, A.D. 1477-1509 (16 Selden Society); 
Select Cases Before The King's Council in The Star Chamber, vol. II, A.D. 1509-1544 (25 
Selden Society) 
39 Select Cases before the King's Council, 1243-1482 (35 Selden Society); Select Cases in 
the Council of Henry VII  (1485-1509) (75 Selden Society); Select Cases Before The King's 
Council in The Star Chamber, vol. I, A.D. 1477-1509 (16 Selden Society); Select Cases 
Before The King's Council in The Star Chamber, vol. II, A.D. 1509-1544 (25 Selden Society) 
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An interesting feature, to be found in particular in the Year Books, is the 
paraphrasing of direct speech. Changes and shifts in language are generally 
considered to take place in the spoken form first, before materialising in the 
written one.40 But it is only the relatively recent technical means of sound 
recording that can offer genuine empirical proof for such developments. For 
the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance period under consideration here, 
we have to rely on written records that are produced albeit by and for the 
small elite of literate people in a generally illiterate society. This raises the so-
called ‘bad data’ problem41 that the written record does not reliably reflect the 
linguistic changes in the spoken language. While paraphrasing direct speech 
is nowhere near as good evidence as a sound recording may be, it does offer 
some limited glimpses of the spoken interaction in court hearings. Ingham 
has used these documents in comparison with the legal register written-
mode origin texts in the Parliament Rolls of the same period, to investigate 
the language change in Anglo-Norman.42 While such a purely linguistic 
approach is not the object of this research, the use of paraphrased, 
admittedly selected, direct speech offers insights into the evolution of the 
legal mind. 
 
The size of the Year Books and Law Reports sources, in terms of word 
tokens,43 was not ascertainable as the HeinOnline database does not offer 
the possibility of counting the word tokens. The implications of this on the 
methodology will be discussed in greater detail in chapter VII 1.3. 
 
Standard corpus linguistics requires that decisions be made about the target 
population that the sample is supposed to represent. This includes 
considerations of the boundaries and hierarchical organisation of the target 
population. In order to evaluate the adequacy and representativeness of a 
																																																						
40 M.S. MacMahon (1994) Understanding Language Change, Cambridge: CUP, e.g. at p. 8 
41 U. Weinreich, W. Labov, M. Herzog (1968) Empirical foundations for a theory of language 
change, in: W.P. Lehmann, Y. Malkiel (eds.) Directions for Historical Linguistics: A 
Symposium, Austin: University of Texas Press, 95-195 
42 R. Ingham (2016) Investigating language change using Anglo-Norman spoken and written 
data, in: Linguistics, 54(2), 381-410 
43 Word tokens are the total number of words in a text. 
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corpus, it is essential to decide which texts are included and excluded from 
the population, what text categories are to be included and what are their 
definitions.44 In the present research, the possibilities of sampling decisions 
are much conditioned by the relative scarcity of readily available 
electronically accessible original language documents. A well-defined 
conception of what the sample is intended to represent could be drawn up 
but not necessarily applied in detail due to the limitation of available sources. 
This has meant that texts of different styles, formats and registers, as 
described above, were all included, as long as it was believed the texts could 
reveal the legal thinking relevant to the development of the concept of 
consideration. Whatever their diversities, the texts’ commonalities lie in the 
fact that they are the results of lawyers listening to arguments discussed in 
court. The target population is lawyers (in the generic sense) who 
communicate about legal court cases because it was recognised that opinion 
of the courts and serjeants45 were good indicators for the law and for 
accepted practice. This dynamic process was best captured in the 
abstracting and annotating of legal texts and case notes that were a part of 
the legal self-education in the rapidly evolving common law system. In 
addition to excluding the rolls and official court documents for the reasons 
mentioned above, the sources that can be found at the Inns of Court were 
not considered for lack of available time. 
 
Sampling was ring-fenced by the time span chosen as most appropriate to 
reveal the intellectual evolution relating to the research question. The 
concept of consideration materialised in the 16th century and the initial corpus 
was constituted on the basis of the occurrence of that word in Tudor 
documents. But to have concentrated solely on that century would have 
precluded any investigation of the origins of the new action. To understand 
																																																						
44 D. Biber (1993) Representativeness in Corpus Design, in: Literary and Linguistic 
Computing, Vol. 8, No. 4, at p. 243 
45 Serjeants at (the) law or serjeants of (the) law are members of a superior order of 
barristers at the English bar, from which, until 1873, the common law judges were chosen. 
Formally created under Henry II, the order was abolished by the Judicature Act 1873. The 
etymology of the term can be found in the Latin serviens ad legem (one who serves [the 
king] in matters of law). 
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the intellectual evolution that lead to the rise of the new concept, it was 
necessary to go back in time and examine its forerunners, namely trespass 
on the case and the action of assumpsit, both evidence for the emerging idea 
during the 14th century46 that it was necessary to enable certain informal 
undertakings and promises to become legally enforceable. The resulting 
diachronic corpus was subject to the cyclical readjustment and refinement 
described earlier, and divided into sub-corpora of successive periods. This 
has led to the initial corpus being supplemented by further corpora 
constituted from available documents from the 14th and 15th centuries. As it 
was technically (intellectual property limitations) not possible to load all the 
Year Books and Law Reports into the linguistics software, the sampling 
decision was made to search the documents for words thought relevant to 
the question at hand: assumpsit, promise, consideration. This sampling 
decision has meant that the corpus was constituted of text extracts that, by 
the virtue of the occurrence of the terms listed, were likely to deal with the 
legal issue to be studied. In addition, the words ‘consideration’ and ‘promise’ 
that were likely to occur in other contexts than a specifically technical one, 
could also be examined in these other contexts. This also allows for any 
shifts from the general usage to a special language usage to be revealed. 
 
So much for the methods of how sampling decisions were taken, revised and 
adjusted, and the way corpora and sub-corpora were constituted in relation 
to diachronic aspects and on the basis of the search terms. The technical 
details are discussed further in chapter VI. 
 
  
																																																						
46 The first trespass on the case actions were reported in the second half of the 14th century. 
Actions of assumpsit emerged in the 15th century. 
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Chapter IV. Legal language in England from  
the 14th to the 17th centuries 
 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, law cannot be imagined without the 
use of language and, in particular, without the use of written language for the 
common law. The way meanings are encoded in spoken or written form 
depends on the context of culture, on the one hand, and on the context of 
situation, on the other. Medieval text production is never truly monolingual 
and the linguistic landscape of multilingual England was particularly diverse. 
As in other parts of Europe, besides the vernacular, Latin was the language 
of the learned, the church, the administration and the law. Specific to 
England was that the invading Normans imported their Norman-French 
language. This paved the way for future language contact opportunities, as 
well as for the import of French culture (literature etc.) and certain legal 
concepts, such as feudal law.  
 
Boundaries between the three languages were porous and language contact 
phenomena such as, code-switching and calque 1  meant there were 
continuous interplay and lexical borrowings, in particular, between 
continental (Parisian-basin) French, Norman-French, insular French and 
Middle English on English soil. Rothwell provides us with examples which 
clearly show that, at times, the French of England went its own semantic way 
irrespective of developments in continental French dialects. 2  So, Anglo-																																																								
1 Code-switching and calque are common phenomena among multi-linguals. Code-switching 
in linguistic terms is the practice of alternating in conversation between two or more 
languages or language varieties, using them in a way consistent with the phonology and 
syntax of each language. Calque, also called loan translation, occurs when a phrase or word 
is borrowed from another language by literal translation and introduced in the target 
language as a new lexeme. It is the a very common type of word-formation in a multi-lingual 
environment. See G. Miller (2002) The Death of French in Medieval England, in : C. 
Wiltshire, J. Camps (eds.) Romance Phonology and Variation, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: 
John Benjamins Publishing, 145-160, at p. 149; W. Rothwell (1998) Arrivals and Departures: 
The Adoption of French Terminology into Middle English, in: 79 English Studies, 144-165   
2  W. Rothwell (1993) From Latin to Anglo-French and Middle English: the Role of the 
Multilingual Gloss, in: 88 Modern Language Review, 582-599, at p. 584; W. Rothwell (1998) 
Arrivals and Departures: The Adoption of French Terminology into Middle English, in: 79 
English Studies, 144-165 at p. 156 
Chapter	IV:	Legal	Language	in	England	from	the	14th	to	the	17th	centuries	40	
French and the absorption of French words into Middle English were the 
results of language contacts on English soil. In other words, Anglo-French 
was a contact variety of French in its own right and should be considered as 
a part of the medieval French dialect continuum.3 To that extent the French 
language in England both influenced English and was influenced by it.   
 
It is, however, important to stress that the linguistic situation in England was 
multilingual rather than diglossic. In his ground-breaking article of 1959, 
Ferguson4 defines diglossia as: 
 
"... a relatively stable language situation in which, in addition to the primary 
dialects of the language (which may include a standard or regional 
standards), there is a very divergent, highly codified (often grammatically 
more complex) superposed variety, the vehicle of a large and respected 
body of written literature, either of an earlier period or in another speech 
community, which is learned largely by formal education and is used for 
most written and formal spoken purposes but is not used by any section of 
the community for ordinary conversation." 
 
This was subsequently extended by Fishman5 to include the use of unrelated 
languages beyond mere dialectical variations. The linguistic situation of 
medieval England was somewhat different to the ones Ferguson6 had in 
mind when he formulated his concept, mainly because of the inherently 
unstable situation of the languages in question. The Middle Ages was an era 
when texts interchanged their languages both in terms of phraseology as well 
as lexis, responding to constantly changing socio-cultural and (geo-) political 
circumstances. Language contact models were therefore extremely complex 
with: 
“deeply interwoven lexical borrowings back and forth from English to 
French and from French to English that makes the boundaries of our 																																																								
3 D. Trotter (2003) Not as eccentric as it looks: Anglo-French and French French, Forum for 
Modern Language Studies 39, 427-428 
4 C. Ferguson (1959) Diglossia. Word 15: 325-340 
5 J. Fishman (1967) Bilingualism with and without diglossia; diglossia with and without 
bilingualism. Journal of Social Issues 23 (2): 29-38 
6 Greece: the alternation of Katharevusa and Demotic, 
Switzerland: the alternation of Swiss German and German, 
Arabic-speaking countries: the coexistence of literary and dialectal Arabic, 
Haiti: the alternation of Creole and French. 
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modern dictionaries of 'Middle English' and 'Anglo-Norman' 
themselves problematic.”7 
 
The “relatively stable language situation” of Ferguson's diglossia definition 
does not correspond to the realities of medieval text production, at least not 
during the period when both Middle English and the French of England were 
in constant mutation. From the period of early modern or Tudor English, 
when English had gained the upper hand and ousted French in all but a few 
sectors, Law French showed characteristics of being a “very divergent, 
superposed variety” as defined by Ferguson. If the concept of diglossia could 
be used it may be in relation to that period. Yet, the hierarchical notion of 
H(igher) (the prestigious, codified varieties used in education) and L(ower) 
varieties is not necessarily applicable. Law French was not highly codified 
but in a gradual process of degeneration and it never underwent the kind of 
successive cycles of renaissance that, for example, Latin experienced. Yet 
the use of French in the law continued because it had developed appropriate 
vocabulary for expressing legal concepts. This vocabulary was in the process 
of being totally absorbed into the English language during the Tudor era. 
 
It has traditionally been argued that the everyday use of French was 
abandoned from the mid-13th and especially 14th centuries in favour of 
English, and that French declined into a corrupt language. It was described 
as “mauvais français […] en Angleterre”8 and “gradually became a dead 
language that [...] always had to be taught” 9 . Price10  describes it as “a 
language in advanced state of decline.” He adds that: 
“grammatically it was often little more than 'bad French' [...] Late 
Anglo-Norman is characterised by so many and such marked 
deviations from any other kind of French at the time as to lead one to 
the view that what we have before is not just another authentic 																																																								
7 J. Wogan-Browne (2009) Introduction. Wogan-Browne (ed.), Language and Culture in 
Medieval Britain, York: York Medieval Press; at p. 6 
8 P. Meyer, L. Toulmin-Smith (1889) Les contes moralisés de Nicole Bonzon; Paris: Société 
des anciens textes français. 
9 M. Pope (1934) From Latin to Modern French, Manchester: Manchester University Press; 
at p. 424 
10 G. Price (1984) Anglo-Norman, in G. Price (ed.) The Languages of Britain, London: 
Edward Arnold; at p. 224 
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speaker French but incorrect French written by people for whom it was 
foreign language and whose command of it was inadequate.” 
 
The key lies in the notion of deviation from any other kind of French: as long 
as the French of England is being compared to Continental French, it will 
appear as an imperfectly learned second language on the path to serious 
degeneration. If the Insular French was indeed in such decline, it appears 
difficult to explain why this language was still being used for legal education 
and legal writing. 
 
More recent research - a lot more work is still required in this field - has 
suggested the French of England as a contact variety of French in its own 
right 11 . And it is this very language contact that has put the French of 
England on a different path from the Continental French, in relation to lexis or 
morphology, for example. Ingham shows how supposedly deviant 
grammatical features, such as chaotic gender-marking on articles and 
modifiers, or the lack of a tonic/atonic object personal pronoun distinction, or 
the extension of the -er ending of the first conjugation to other classes can be 
explained with a view to the wider historical contexts of language contact 
influences and a general medieval dialect continuum. In other words, we are 
not dealing with divergence due to imperfect second language acquisition, 
but with disparity between first language dialects. 
 
1. French in Medieval England 
 
The story of French in medieval England12 started with the advent of Norman 
rule over a realm that included England from 1066, consolidated by centuries 
of Plantagenet rule, vast estate holdings in France and feudal alliances to the 																																																								
11 R. Ingham (2010) Later Anglo-Norman as a Contact Variety of French?, pp. 3-25; and: 
The Transmission of Later Anglo-Norman: Some Syntactic Evidence, pp. 164-182, both in: 
R. Ingham (ed.) The Anglo-Norman Language and its Contexts, Yock: York Medieval Press; 
Jespersen, O. 1955 reprint/1935. Growth and Structure of the English Language, Garden 
City: Doubleday. See also W. Rothwell (1992) The Problem of Law French, in: French 
Studies, XLVI, 3, 259-271 
12 For an overview of the phenomenon of Law French between the 13th and 17th century, see 
C. Laske (2016) Losing touch with the common tongues – the story of Law French, in : 
International Journal of Legal Discourse, 1(1) : 169-192 
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French crown. In England the door was opened to the French and their 
language and diverse dialects. But the exact impact of the French language 
and culture on the English medieval linguistic and cultural landscape is still 
subject to considerable debate. A lot of the thinking, at least until the middle 
of the 20th century, about the linguistic situation in medieval England was 
skewed by the fact that linguists and historians alike relied for decades on 
writings that appear to have misinterpreted or ignored historical sources, 
common linguistic experience and actual Anglo-Norman-French material.13 
The view that French had first been brought over by the conquering 
Normans, imposed on the English, then used as a vernacular in a bilingual 
setting and ultimately adopted as an official language in the second half of 
the 13th century, was held by a number of writers14 on Anglo-Norman-French. 
It has since been questioned by academics, 15  based on more recent 
empirical research using modern linguistic methodologies. The impact and 
influence of French on the linguistic landscape of medieval England is much 
more subtle than has been argued hitherto.  
 
Long before the Norman conquest, the Anglo-Saxons had used the 
vernacular to set down their laws in writing, unlike the Germanic tribes in 
																																																								
13 R. Wilson (1943) English and French in England 1100-1300, in: History, 28, 107, 37-60. 
Rothwell made this point in several articles, especially in: W. Rothwell (1975) The Role of 
French in Thirteenth-Century England, in: 58 Bulletin, John Rylands Library,  445-466; W. 
Rothwell (1998) Arrivals and Departures: The Adoption of French Terminology into Middle 
English, in: 79 English Studies, 144-165 
14 for example: K. Lambley (1920) The teaching and cultivation of the French language in 
England, Manchester: The University Press; J. Vising (1923) Anglo-Norman language & 
literature, London: OUP; M. Pope (1934) From Latin to Modern French, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press; J. Orr (1948) The Impact of French on English, The Taylorian 
Lecture, Oxford: Clarendon Press; M.  Legge (1963) Anglo-Norman Literature and Its 
Background, Oxford: Clarendon Press; H. Suggett (1968) The Use of French in England in 
the Late Middle Ages, in: R. Southern, Essays in Medieval History: selected from the 
transactions of the Royal Historical Society on the occasion of its centenary, London 
15 for example: G. Woodbine (1943) The Language of English Law, 18 Speculum 395-436; 
W. Rothwell (1975) The Role of French in Thirteenth-Century England, in: 58 Bulletin, John 
Rylands Library,  445-466; W. Rothwell (1991) The missing link in English etymology: Anglo-
Norman, Medium AEvum LX. 173-196; W. Rothwell (1993) Language and government in 
medieval England, in: 93 Zeitschrift für französische Sprache und Literatur, 258-270; W. 
Rothwell (1998) Arrivals and Departures: The Adoption of French Terminology into Middle 
English, in: 79 English Studies, 144-165; W. Rothwell (2001) English and French in England 
after 1362, in: English Studies 82, 539-559 
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continental Europe who used Latin.16 Old English had been more mature 
than the Norman-French of William I's time, which was still developing from 
its Latin origins. And according to Woodbine, this is the reason why the 
Norman kings did not use Norman-French in their documents, though 
(besides mainly Latin) they did use English.17 In other words, English was not 
a lingua rustica incapable of literary culture and inadequate for official use. 
There can be no doubt that the invading Normans brought with them their 
Norman language and dialects, yet the extent to which it became a widely 
spoken language imposed in England, let alone a vernacular, is far less 
clear. 
 
First of all, the English were no strangers to the Norman language. There 
had been numerous contacts between the two cultures in the past. 
Aethelred, King of the English from 978 to 1013 and again from 1014 to 
1016, married Emma of Normandy (985-1052) with the intention of pacifying 
Normandy and uniting against the invading Vikings who frequently used 
Normandy as their base to raid England. Aethelred, Emma and their children 
took refuge in Normandy during the two years that King Sweyn Forkbeard of 
Denmark had conquered England. When Cnut of Denmark became King of 
England in 1016, Aethelred's son Edward (later Edward the Confessor), who 
subsequently ruled England between 1042 and 1066, went into exile for two 
decades, probably mainly in Normandy. Edward brought back a number of 
Norman customs, such as the sealing of documents, and the seal-keeper 
and document secretary was described with the Norman-French term of 
canceler.18 In 1051, William, later the Conqueror, had visited his childless 
cousin King Edward in England and the visit was returned. So, the Normans 
and the English were, at least on the level of their ruling class, no strangers 
to each other. 
 
																																																								
16 H. Brunner (1907) The Sources of English Law, in: Committee of the Association of 
American Law Schools Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, vol. 2. at p. 8 
17 G. Woodbine (1943) The Language of English Law, 18 Speculum 395-436, at p. 404 fn. 3 
18 D. Mellinkoff (1963) The Language of the Law, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., at p. 60 
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Secondly, the long held view that the conquerors tried to oust the English 
language when they landed on the southern shores, is a misinterpretation of 
the historical evidence. William saw himself as the rightful successor to the 
English throne, not as a conqueror. He tried (unsuccessfully) to learn English 
and was acclaimed King in French by the Normans and in English by the 
local population19 at his coronation in 1066. He vowed to the French and 
English of London to uphold the law as it had been under Edward the 
Confessor.20 He was, in other words, not set on dismantling the structures of 
English society, but rather to operate through them if appropriate.21 This also 
holds true for the tale that the use of French in the law was attributed directly 
to the Norman conquest and seen as a hallmark of Norman tyranny.22 This 
line of thinking goes back to some anonymous historical writings that have 
since been revealed as a 14th century forgery.23 But its narrative continued to 
live in the writings of prominent authors such as Fortescue (15th century) or 
Selden (17th century). As there was no-one at Pevensey with a tape recorder 
in 1066 to greet the disembarking invaders, the nature of the speech they 
used must remain a matter of conjecture, but it is most unlikely that it could 
be adequately described in terms of any all-embracing formula such as 
'Norman dialect’.24 In fact, the irretrievable loss of any substantial evidence of 
the spoken language output at the time of the invasion means we know very 
little about the overall English linguistic landscape of the 11th century. 
 
																																																								
19 P. Shelly (1921) English and French in England: 1066-1100, Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania, at p.  75, 77, 81 
20 "Will'm kyng gret [...] and ealle tha burhwaru binnan Londone Frencisce and Englisce 
freondlice. and ic kyde eow that ic wylle that get beon eallra thaera laga weorde the gyt 
waeran on Eadwerdes daege kynges [...]" Charter of William I to the City of London, in: W. 
Stubbs (1913) Select charters and other illustrations of English constitutional history, Oxford: 
The Clarendon Press, at pp. 82-83 
21 An interesting exception to this is the imposition of political feudalism by the invading 
Normans and with it the import of Norman-French feudal vocabulary. Though Susan 
Reynolds has argued that it could not have been the Normans who imported feudalism to 
England; in her opinion feudalism was a later development (Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval 
Evidence Reinterpreted, Oxford: OUP, 1994). This is an ongoing debate! 
22 The so-called 'Norman yoke' 
23 G. Woodbine (1943) The Language of English Law, 18 Speculum 395- 436, at p. 403 
24 W. Rothwell (1998) Arrivals and Departures: The Adoption of French Terminology into 
Middle English, in: 79 English Studies, 144-165, at p. 150 
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Thirdly, the premise that, following the Norman invasion, French became the 
vernacular in England in a bilingual set-up is a misinterpretation of the 
sources. If the term 'vernacular' is used in its Oxford English Dictionary 
definition of a language - that it is naturally spoken by the people of a 
particular country, rather than one acquired for commercial, social or 
educative purposes - there appears to be no evidence that Norman-French 
became the spoken language of the people in England in general as a result 
of the Norman invasion.25 Similarly, there can be no question of bilingualism 
in the Oxford English Dictionary sense of the habitual use of two languages 
colloquially. The English outnumbered the incoming conquering forces. Yet, 
Orr speaks of a “state of almost complete bilingualism”26, and Legge states 
that “most people, down to the very poorest, were bilingual.”27 In view of the 
lack of evidence of the spoken language output, as mentioned above, these 
writers can only have relied on written sources. But, considering the 
widespread illiteracy of 11th century England, one cannot infer complete 
bilingualism from the existence of some Anglo-Norman-French texts, to 
which the great majority of the population would not have had access. 
Suggett, unwittingly contradicts herself by calling the Anglo-Norman 
“a true vernacular whose roots had penetrated deeply into all classes 
of English society who could read and write.”28 
 
As we have seen from the Oxford English Dictionary definition, vernacular 
refers to spoken, not written language, and if Suggett refers to the classes 
who could read and write she actually excludes the bulk of the population. 
So, neither at the time of the Norman conquest, nor for the century that 
followed, can there be any question of French as a vernacular tongue outside 
																																																								
25 G. Woodbine (1943) The Language of English Law, 18 Speculum 395-436, at p. 433; W. 
Rothwell (1975) The Role of French in Thirteenth-Century England, in: 58 Bulletin, John 
Rylands Library,  445-466, at pp. 449, 453 
26 J. Orr (1948) The Impact of French on English, The Taylorian Lecture, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, at p. 5 
27 M.  Legge (1963) Anglo-Norman Literature and Its Background, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
at p. 4 
28 H. Suggett (1968) The Use of French in England in the Late Middle Ages, in: R. Southern, 
Essays in Medieval History: selected from the transactions of the Royal Historical Society on 
the occasion of its centenary, London, at p. 235 
Chapter	IV:	Legal	Language	in	England	from	the	14th	to	the	17th	centuries	 47	
the Norman elite, neither in the true sense of the word, nor in quantitative 
terms. 
 
Nevertheless, it can be said that medieval England was multilingual to the 
extent that these languages were in use, but the distribution of that use was 
by no means uniform.29 Within a century, as a result of intermarriage, it was 
no longer possible to distinguish who was of Norman and who of English 
birth among the freemen.30 The language the Normans had brought with 
them blended into the English linguistic landscape and was evolving fast 
along its own insular path. From the 12th century, the French of the Parisian 
basin was becoming a more accepted standard for written texts in a large 
part of Northern France, yet the different local languages with their diverse 
dialectical features continued to co-exist. In a parallel movement, the French 
of England, despite its specific insular features, became a recognised 
standard intelligible beyond dialectical restrictions, which was a major 
advantage over English.31  
 
Fourthly, the invading army of 1066 was by no means a homogeneous 
Norman group. William had contracted many Bretons, contingents from 
Picardy and further up the French coast, and included those provided to him 
by the Count of Flanders. In addition, the social aspect of dialectical 
fragmentation makes it unlikely that a common speech was even shared by 
the Norman section of the army.  
 
During the 13th century, on both sides of the Channel, French began to 
develop into a language of culture, education, science, diplomacy and 
administration (including the law). In other words, French was used as a 																																																								
29 B. Crespo (2000) Historical Background of Multilingualism and its Impact on English, in: D. 
Trotter (ed.) Multilingualism in Later Medieval Britain, Cambridge: Brewer, 23-35 at p. 24 
Table 1 
30  "Set iam cohabitantibus Anglicis et Normannis et alterutrum uxores ducentibus vel 
nubentibus, sic permixte sunt nationes ut vix decerni possit hodie, de liberis loquor, quis 
Anglicus quis Normannus sit genere." written in 1179 by Richard FitzNeale Dialogus de 
Scaccario, cited by W. Rothwell (1975) The Role of French in Thirteenth-Century England, 
in: 58 Bulletin, John Rylands Library,  445-466, at p. 449 
31 W. Rothwell (1975) The Role of French in Thirteenth-Century England, in: 58 Bulletin, 
John Rylands Library,  445-466, at p. 456 
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vehicle for ideas, a position that hitherto had been occupied only by Latin32 
and its advantage over English was that it could be understood more widely, 
while English was not comprehended beyond England’s shores.33 In other 
words, it is less a question of French being turned into an official language 
during the 13th century and much more that the upward surge of French, as 
the main non-classical currency for creativity in the cultural and 
administrative spheres, offered the possibilities to handle and transmit new 
ideas and concepts. Woodbine argues that the increasingly generalised use 
of written French in medieval England was not a result of the Norman 
conquest (Norman-French) but due to the French literary revival (Central-
French sources) during the reign of Henry II and his wife Eleanor of 
Aquitaine,34 and subsequently, although this is disputed,35 to the major influx 
of French officials following Henry III's marriage to Eleanor of Provence in 
1236, a period dubbed 'that other French invasion.'36 The age of French as a 
language of 'learning and gentility' was well under way.37 Hence, French was 
becoming more dominant, not through demographic weight but in relation to 
cultural prestige. 
 
Meanwhile, during the years following the Norman invasion, English38 was 
neglected as a language of learning and literature, but it continued on its path 
of being a popular tongue and was in constant contact with the other 
languages. It was developing in a rather disorderly fashion,39 fragmented by 
dialects, with no rules on grammatical structure or spelling, an unsettled 
																																																								
32 W. Rothwell (1975) The Role of French in Thirteenth-Century England, in: 58 Bulletin, 
John Rylands Library,  445-466, at p. 464  
33 The great diversity of dialects in England meant that even within its own borders people 
did not necessarily understand each other. 
34 G. Woodbine (1943) The Language of English Law, 18 Speculum 395-436, at p. 404 fn.3 
35 W. Rothwell (1998) Arrivals and Departures: The Adoption of French Terminology into 
Middle English, in: 79 English Studies, 144-165, at p. 151-152 
36 G. Woodbine (1943) The Language of English Law, 18 Speculum 395-436, at p. 402 
37 D. Mellinkoff (1963) The Language of the Law, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., at p. 70 
38 This was the period of Middle English, which was in use in England between approx. 1100 
and 1500, linking the Anglo-Saxon language with its Germanic influences of Beowulf to the 
early Modern English of Shakespeare. It developed out of Old English (with major changes 
in the grammar, pronunciation and writing) and massively incorporated chunks of Norman-
French and Latin. Its literary high point was the work of Chaucer. 
39 G. Marsh (1869) The Origin and History of the English Language, at p. 380 
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alphabet, and no language dictionaries (as opposed to glossaries) nor any 
grammatical manuals to impose uniformity.40 The 13th century saw a rise in 
feelings of English identity, starting with the loss of Normandy, the Barons' 
War (1258-1265), in part a reaction against foreign (French) influence, and 
later the hostilities with France that started the Hundred Years' War (1337-
1453) during the reign of Edward III. The English Channel began to be 
conceptualised as a peripheral boundary marking a border, rather than a 
central conduit that could carry a traveller from one half of the realm to the 
other, as had been the case following the conquest and during the rule of the 
early Plantagenet/Angevin kings. 
 
The English language played an essential role in this quest for English 
identity. Its use became increasingly the common currency of 
communication, not just among the 'lower classes'. This rise in (linguistic) 
English identity found its expression in the 1362 Statute of Pleading, written 
(ironically!) in French and attempting to oust French in favour of English. 
Although it is concerned with the specific use of language in court pleadings, 
the text of the statute provides us with interesting information about language 
usage in general (my emphasis): 
"[...] les leyes custumes & estatutz du dit realme [...] sont pledez 
monstrez & juggez en la lange Franceis, qest trop desconue en dit 
realme; issint q les gentz q pledent ou sont empledez en les Courtz le 
Roi & les Courtz dautres, nont entendement ne conissance de ce qest 
dit p' eulx ne contre eulx p lour Sergeantz & auts pledours; et q 
resonablement les dites leyes & custumes sront le plus tost apris & 
conuz & mieultz entenduz en la lange usee en dit realme, et p tant 
chescun du dit realme se p'roit mieultz govner sanz faire offense a la 
leye [...]"41 																																																								
40 D. Mellinkoff (1963) The Language of the Law, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., at p. 84 
41 Pleading in English Act 1362 (36 Edw. III. Stat. 1. c. 15): "[...] the laws, customs and 
statutes of the said realm [...] are pleaded, shewed and judged in the French tongue, which 
is much unknown in the said realm; so that the people who plead or are impleaded, in the 
king's court, and in the courts of others, have no understanding nor knowledge of that which 
is said for them or against them by their serjeants and other pleaders; and that reasonably 
the said laws and customs are learnt, known and better understood in the tongue used in the 
said realm, and so every man of the said realm can better govern himself without offending 
the Law [...]" (my own translation). The original text can be found on www.heinonline.org - 
Statutes of the Realm – 1 (1235-1377) at p. 375. 
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Three interesting facts are worth pointing out: first of all, French is described 
as a language 'trop desconue', secondly pleading should be undertaken in 
the tongue that is generally understood (English), and thirdly this statute talks 
about the 'people' who come to court and 'every man' who wishes to respect 
the law and defend his belongings. In other words, although we are dealing 
with the restricted situation of a court of law, the statute describes the 
general linguistic landscape of every man, in which English was considered 
the tongue generally used and French as the one too little known. It is helpful 
to draw on the distinction Ormrod42 makes between speaking a language, 
and merely comprehending it (fully or partially) by listening or reading. He 
argues that the (top) elite, such as the royal family, the members of the 
central administration, the senior judiciary and some of the high nobility, all 
knew how to speak French, whether that was its dialect of Languedoil of 
Northern France and the southern Low Countries, the insular Anglo-Norman 
French or the technical jargon of Law French. They continued to use French 
in oral communication until the end of the 14th century and beyond for certain 
purposes. However, by the end of the 13th century, the use of French among 
the lower ranks of the polity, the gentry and bourgeoisie was largely a mere 
pragmatic skill for understanding administrative, accounting and court/legal 
documents. That increasingly limited knowledge of French after the 13th 
century contributed during the 13th and 14th centuries to the development of 
Law French in the courts and of Anglo-Norman French as the recognised 
language of written communication in royal and civic governments. It is, in 
fact 
“the employment of French as a formal and authoritative language of 
process actually increased in inverse proportion to its use as a 
language of generalised social exchange.”43 
 																																																																																																																																																													
For a comprehensive description (including contextual information) and analysis of the 1362 
Act see W.M. Ormrod (2003) The Use of English: Language, Law and Political Culture in 
Fourteenth-Century England, in: Speculum 73/3, 750-787  
42 W.M. Ormrod (2003) The Use of English: Language, Law and Political Culture in 
Fourteenth-Century England, in: Speculum 73/3, 750-787, at p. 754 
43 W.M. Ormrod (2003) The Use of English: Language, Law and Political Culture in 
Fourteenth-Century England, in: Speculum 73/3, 750-787, at p. 755 
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A further distinction must be made between language as a spoken or written 
means. While the 1362 Act was a statutory abolition of Law French as the 
spoken language in the courts of law, it appears to have had little effect on 
the written language of court records - law reporting continued in French, 
which is, however, no proof of what language was actually spoken in court. It 
is likely that French continued to be used in the Inns of Court and the 
educational process, as much of the training centred around the elaborate 
forms of oral debate.44 The fact that the statute was not scrupulously followed 
by lawyers, may indicate that the legislator had underestimated the influence 
of the bar,45 rather than question the linguistic landscape as it had been 
painted in the statute. 
 
While French was affirmed as the language of the law, its more general use 
was declining, restricted to the noble, wealthy and powerful. 46  Yet its 
standing as the language of learning meant that English speakers enhanced 
their language with 'high-class' foreign usage47  or simply because, at times, 
they found the French vocabulary more effective. Surveys show that the 
period of the most extensive penetration of French words into English was 
1251-1400. 48  Crystal 49  estimates that of the 27,000 words which got 
absorbed into the English language during that time, 22% (approx. 5940 
words) were words of French origin (2,500 French words in the period 1375-
1400 alone). Baugh50 claims that during the Middle English period, about 
10,000 French (including Anglo-French and continental French) words 
entered into the English language, of which some 7,500 are still in use today. 
These words were absorbed in different ways: a French word may simply 																																																								
44 W.M. Ormrod (2003) The Use of English: Language, Law and Political Culture in 
Fourteenth-Century England, in: Speculum 73/3, 750-787, at p. 765-766 
45 The reforms undertaken during the reign of Edward I (1272-1307) substantially settled the 
jurisdiction of the common law courts and thus professionalised the practice of the law. This 
resulted in a significant rise in the power of the bar and the legal profession in general. 
46 D. Mellinkoff (1963) The Language of the Law, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., at pp. 95-96 
47  O. Jespersen (1955 reprint/1935) Growth and Structure of the English Language, Garden 
City: Doubleday, at p. 47 
48 D. Mellinkoff (1963) The Language of the Law, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., at p. 97 
49  D. Crystal (2004) The Stories of English, London: Penguin Books, at p. 155 
50 A. Baugh (1935) A History of the English Language, New York: Appleton-Century, at p. 
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replace an Anglo-Saxon one or be juxtaposed to it, expressing a new 
meaning, or even name something new or unknown. The generally held view 
is that French words were borrowed in the context of cultural life, of the 
nobility, of social elites, and of political and religious powers, while the basic 
vocabulary of the English language relating to semantics of daily life, popular 
culture and emotions remained Anglo-Saxon.51 
 
The socio-linguistic take on this would be that language typically evolves 
when individuals diversify their social relations, and hence become mediators 
between their own social circle and the new one(s) they operate in. The 
French of the English upper classes trickled further into English society by 
the inevitable interaction between the lords and their servants, bailiffs and 
manorial stewards and the increasingly professionalised administrative 
classes in institutions relating to justice, administration and representation. 
Lawyers, royal officers and parliamentary representatives further propagated 
the absorption of French words into the English language in their interaction 
with their own circles.52 In addition, but on a different level, literary grandees 
of the 14th century like Chaucer, Wycliff and Langland continued to enrich 
Middle English, already permeated by French vocabulary, with cultural 
importations from a variety of sources in several languages. 
 
Given that medieval text production is not truly monolingual and that 
boundaries between languages are porous, language contacts meant there 
was continuous interplay and lexical borrowings between the languages. But 
																																																								
51 S. Lusignan (2009) French Language in Contact with English: Social Context and 
Linguistic Change, in: J. Wogan-Browne (ed.) Language and Culture in Medieval Britain, 
York: York Medieval Press, 19-30, at p. 24; Rothwell had challenged this long standing view 
by showing that some vulgar English terms are of Anglo-French origin: see W. Rothwell 
(1996) Adding Insult to Injury: The English Who Curse in Borrowed French, in H-F. Nielsen, 
L. Schosler (eds.) The Origins and Development of Emigrant Languages, Odense: Odense 
University Press, 41-54 
52  S. Lusignan (2009) French Language in Contact with English: Social Context and 
Linguistic Change, in: J. Wogan-Browne (ed.) Language and Culture in Medieval Britain, 
York: York Medieval Press, at p. 25, based on Milroy's model: J. Milroy (1992) Linguistic 
Variation and Change, Oxford 
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Anglo-French was a contact variety of French in its own right and should be 
considered as a part of the medieval French dialect continuum.53  
 
2. Law French 
 
The linguistic landscape of medieval England was inhabited by three 
languages - Latin, English and French, though not in equal shares - but in 
continuous and subtle intermingling, in particular of the French and English 
languages and cultures. The role each language played, changed and 
evolved both in time and in terms of geographical and geo-political 
distribution. It is precisely that intermingling/interlocking of tongues that can 
be so well observed in the medieval language of the English common law. 
Blackstone,54 quoting Lord Bacon, wrote: 
“ Our laws […] are mixed as our language: and as our language is so 
much the richer, the laws are the more complete.” 
 
Admittedly, Blackstone also included the entire history of the 
“intermixture of adventitious nations, the Romans, the Picts, the 
Saxons, the Danes, and the Normans.” 
 
As mentioned earlier, the use of French in the law was previously attributed 
directly to the Norman conquest and seen as a hallmark of Norman tyranny. 
However, this contradicts William I's promise to uphold the law as it had been 
under Edward the Confessor, as well as the general message he wanted to 
promote, that he was the rightful successor to the crown. It is interesting to 
note that the political feudalism that was brought over and imposed by the 
Normans came with the vocabulary that described it. These Norman-French 
terms of feudal import described the relationships and functioning of 
feudalism, unknown as such in England before the Norman invasion. 
However, in general, the Normans did not use French but Latin in their legal 
documents. It is, therefore, likely that they continued to do so on arrival in 
																																																								
53 D. Trotter (2003) Not as eccentric as it looks: Anglo-French and French French, Forum for 
Modern Language Studies 39, at pp.427-428 
54 W. Blackstone (1765) Commentaries on the Laws of England, Introduction, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, at p. 64 
Chapter	IV:	Legal	Language	in	England	from	the	14th	to	the	17th	centuries	54	
England. 55  It is also important to note that the French language of 
Westminster and of the King's Court had evolved from the tongue brought 
over by the conquering Normans two centuries before (see above), into a 
dialect with strong Picard and Angevin influences56 and as a part of the 
medieval dialect continuum. 
 
The textual evidence of the earliest surviving plea rolls of the English royal 
courts from the 1190s shows the use of Latin, though it is unlikely that it was 
also spoken in court.57 Writs and charters were written in Latin, but some 
were in English and a few in both languages.58 It is a fact that in the second 
half of the 13th century,59 French became the language used for some official 
documents, legal tracts, treatises and statutes (though writs, plea rolls and 
other official records remained in Latin) – “something happens to make 
Englishmen write about law in French and frame statutes in that language.”60 
Though it may well be that French was introduced in the royal (common law) 
courts when these were established under Henry II (1154-1189) who was 
French-speaking  though he understood English.61 
 
From the textual evidence we can see that from the time of Edward I (1272-
1307), French was the language used for the formal initiation and 																																																								
55 Two centuries later the Record's Commission's Statutes of the Realm shows the first 
twelve entries between 1236 and 1267 (incl. Statute of Merton 1236, Statute of Marlborough 
1267) to be still all in Latin. 
56 J.H. Baker (1998) The Three Languages of the Common Law, in: 43 McGill Law Journal 
5-24, at p. 17 
57 P. Brand (2010) The Language of the English Legal Profession: The Emergence of a 
Distinctive Legal Lexicon on Insular French, in: R. Ingham (ed.) The Anglo-Norman 
Language and its Contexts, York: York Medieval Press, 94-101, at p. 95; F. Pollock, F.W. 
Maitland (1898) The History of English Law, Cambridge: CUP, at p. 66 
58 G. Woodbine (1943) The Language of English Law, 18 Speculum 395-436, at p. 405, 
footnote 3 for textual sources used and statistical analysis of languages used. 
59 There is textual evidence that French was used in legal texts before the second half of the 
13th century, see W. Rothwell (1975) The Role of French in Thirteenth-Century England, in: 
58 Bulletin, John Rylands Library,  445-466, at p. 457; W. Rothwell (1993) Language and 
government in medieval England, in 93 Zeitschrift für französische Sprache und Literatur, 
258-270, at p. 262 
60 G. Woodbine (1943) The Language of English Law, 18 Speculum 395-436, at p. 402 
61 P. Brand (2000) The Languages of the Law in Later Medieval England, in: D. Trotter (ed.) 
Multilingualism in Later Medieval Britain, Cambridge: Brewer, at p. 66 challenging 
Woodbine’s view (Speculum 18 (1943)) that Law French was an invention of Henry III’s 
reign. 
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subsequent argument conducted in the courts.62 This would, however, have 
been a different tongue from the Norman-French William I brought over from 
Normandy. Under Henry's great grandson, Edward I, major constitutional, 
administrative and judicial reforms were put in place. The judiciary was 
professionalised and began to form an organised legal body. This improved 
standards of professional conduct, but it also meant that the law was 
becoming a 'closed profession'. 63 This was emphasised by the use of a 
language not generally comprehensible by the ordinary man and further 
separated lawyers from laymen. 
 
During that same period, court case reporting, which unlike later law 
reporting also included personal comments, notes, criticisms and 
speculations, was first compiled in the Year Books.64 These were written in 
French, which does not necessarily mean it was also the language spoken in 
court pleadings.65 Brand66 has cited evidence that would suggest the use of 
spoken French in pleadings, but the evidence in favour of either scenario is 
slight. It is most likely that it was a bilingual set-up but we do not know in 
what proportions. French was probably used for the specifically legal parts, 
while proverbial phrases may well have been in English. The language of 
monopoly for statutes had hitherto always been Latin. In the second half of 
the 13th century, French began to be used, and it dominated by the 14th 
																																																								
62 G. Woodbine (1943) The Language of English Law, 18 Speculum 395-436, at p. 434; P. 
Brand (2000) The Languages of the Law in Later Medieval England, in: D. Trotter (ed.) 
Multilingualism in Later Medieval Britain: French was not only used in pleadings at the royal 
court's but also in some county and city courts, at p. 75. 
63 T. Plucknett (1956) A Concise History of the Common Law, 5th ed., Boston: Little, Brown 
and Co., at pp. 217-219 
64 These run approx. from 1260-1535, unlikely to have been written by officially appointed 
reporters, handed down from private collections (unlike the French 'Olim'), see F.W. Maitland 
(1903) Of the Anglo-French Language in the Early Year Books, in: Introduction to Year 
Books of Edward II, 17 Selden Society, at p. xiii; T. Plucknett (1956) A Concise History of the 
Common Law, 5th ed., Boston: Little, Brown and Co., at pp. 268-273 
65 T. Plucknett (1956) A Concise History of the Common Law, 5th ed., Boston: Little, Brown 
and Co., at p. 268; F. Pollock, F.W. Maitland (1898) The History of English Law, London: 
CUP, at pp. 84-85; G. Woodbine (1943) The Language of English Law, 18 Speculum 395, at 
pp. 426-428, 433-435 
66 P. Brand (2000) The Languages of the Law in Later Medieval England, in: D. Trotter (ed.) 
Multilingualism in Later Medieval Britain, Cambridge: Brewer, pp. 63-76 
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century. 67  Practical pleading compilations also appeared in French, e.g. 
Brevia Pleidez (1260, also known as Brevia Placitata), Fat Asaver, La Court 
de Baron (c.1265), Le Ple de la Coroune, as well as the 15th century law 
books, such as Littleton's Tenures (1481/82) and the Statham's Abridgment 
of the Law (1490s), 16th century Fitzherbert La Graunde Abridgement (1541) 
collection of Year Books cases and attempt to provide a summary of English 
law, Brooke Le Graunde Abridgement (posth. 1578) etc. French also became 
the language of English legal instruction 68  and for moots in the Inner 
Temple.69 
 
A century after the 1362 Statute of Pleading, Fortescue suggested that the 
courts took no notice of the provisions, because lawyers could not do without 
the “terms which pleaders do more properly express in French than in 
English.”70 Law reporting continued in French until the 17th century, though 
this is no proof for what language was actually spoken in court. But in many 
case reports, we find entire passages in English in the French language 
report. These usually referred to declarations made (in written or spoken 
mode) by one of the parties to the case. It is reasonable to conclude that the 
English passages were verbatim original language transcripts of what had 
been declared and were reproduced as such in the Law French reports.71 																																																								
67 Record's Commission's Statutes of the Realm show the following entries: first twelve 
entries between 1236 and 1267 (incl. Statute of Merton 1236, Statute of Marlborough 1267) 
are all in Latin; 1275: first Statute of Westminster in French; then three in Latin, two in 
French, two in Latin, three in French etc.; 1285: Statute of Westminster is both in Latin and 
French; 1290: eleven entries in Latin and nine in French; Statute of Mortmain and all statutes 
of 1291-95 are in Latin; 1297: confirmation of Great Charter in both Latin and French; until 
1307 (end of reign of Edw. I) nine statutes in Latin, seven in French; 1307-27: one in both 
Latin and French, six in Latin, fifteen in French; during reign of Edw. III of 55 entries 52 were 
in French. Data from G. Woodbine (1943) The Language of English Law, 18 Speculum 395-
436, p. 401, ft. 4 
68 P. Brand (2000) The Languages of the Law in Later Medieval England, in: D. Trotter (ed.) 
Multilingualism in Later Medieval Britain, at p. 72 
69 J.H. Baker (1998) The Three Languages of the Common Law, in: 43 McGill Law Journal 5, 
at p. 20 
70 J. Fortescue (1741 - 2nd ed.) De Laudibus Legum Angliae, at p. 114; W. S. Holdsworth 
(1927 - 4th ed.) A History of English Law, vol. 2, London: Methuen, at p. 478 
71 e.g. a case dated 1560 reported by Benloe (82) in 123 Engl. Report pp. 63-65: “Et auxy il 
plede ue certain bill del dit seignior W. P. per q il declare que il & le seignior Audely & 
seignior Russel were pleased and also did nominate and appoint and fully agree that I Lord 
Bray should marry the said Anne, upon which our pleasure, nomination and assent the said 
marriage was solemnized per que le dit J. Seignior Bray prist a feme le dit Anne …” See 
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The intriguing question of why the use of French in the law rose and 
persisted, has preoccupied generations of writers and been the subject of 
much speculation. Some 72  have connected the phenomenon to the 
contemporary major influx of French courtiers following Henry III's marriage 
to Eleanor of Provence in 1236. But it is likely that the Barons' War and the 
not-very-Francophile Edward I put a stop to this development, and yet 
French persisted. In all probability and given the innate conservatism of 
lawyers, French was the most convenient and practical language to use in 
the English courts. Latin, though the language of the learned, was more rigid 
and archaic and lend itself less well for adaptation to the new situations of an 
evolving society and legal system. English, on the other hand, was still fairly 
untried in the 13th century, especially in relation to the demands of the writ 
systems that required strict adherence to the prescribed form of the writ, any 
lapse from which would bring about a failure of an action. With Latin as the 
source language, it was easier to transpose more precisely into the closely 
related French as the target language than into the very different English. In 
other words, French was the most operative language at that time and it 
therefore played a pivotal role in that era when the foundations of the English 
common law systems were being laid. It was like a dual building site of two 
edifices that propped each other up: the law and the development of its 
concepts, on the one hand, and the language and the evolution of its 
technical, specialised vocabulary, on the other. Brand argued that the 
existence of a specialist legal vocabulary in insular French can be traced 
back to before the emergence of the legal profession and, while it does not 
as such owe its existence to that profession, its future evolutions certainly 
happened at the hands of the English lawyers.73  
																																																																																																																																																													
other examples: case of 1535 in Benloe 13 or 123 Eng. Rep. at 10; case of 1586 in Savile 81 
or 123 Eng. Rep. at 1024 
72 G. Woodbine (1943) The Language of English Law, 18 Speculum 395-436, at p. 402 
73 P. Brand (2010) The Language of the English Legal Profession: The Emergence of a 
Distinctive Legal Lexicon on Insular French, in: R. Ingham (ed.) The Anglo-Norman 
Language and its Contexts, York: York Medieval Press, at p. 100 
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The “English bar and bench [...] used Anglo-French to create an 
entirely new legal vocabulary, the basis indeed of a new 
jurisprudence, by giving special meanings to ordinary words.”74 
 
Maitland described it as the 
“elaboration of rough native material into a highly technical, but at the 
same time durable, scheme of terms and concepts.”75 
 
The continuous and highly specialised use of French within the closed ranks 
of lawyers resulted not only in the formation of specialised Law French but 
also in a separation of this professional jargon from French that was 
massively imported into English. The central residue was the technical part of 
Law French, while the everyday terminology was gradually taken over by 
English. What we are left with is a “lingering professional dialect, more often 
written than spoken.”76 But it evolved in sophistication and abstractness in 
parallel with the development of law and legal concepts it was used to 
describe and was like a kind of shorthand. It became 
“highly technical because English lawyers had been able to make a 
vocabulary, to define their concepts, to think sharply as the man of 
science thinks.”77 
 
Once the upswing of the legal profession and the law in general went hand in 
hand with the blossoming of Law French, the two were intrinsically linked, 
and survived even during a period when in general terms French gave way to 
English. Law French was like a hyphen that kept alive the general framework 
of an earlier vocabulary and syntax until a time when English had become a 
full and flexible language and had appropriated all the necessary French 
elements, expressions and vocabulary.78 
 
																																																								
74 J.H. Baker (1990) Manual of Law French, Aldershot: Scolar Press, 2nd edition, at p.  4 
75 F.W. Maitland (1903) Of the Anglo-French Language in the  Early Year Books, in: 
Introduction to Year Books of Edward II, 17 Selden Society, at p. xviii 
76 J.H. Baker (1990) Manual of Law French, Aldershot: Scolar Press, 2nd edition, at p. 3 
77 F.W. Maitland (1903) Of the Anglo-French Language in the Early Year Books, in: 
Introduction to Year Books of Edward II, 17 Selden Society, at p. xxxvi 
78 S. Stoljar (1954) A Common Lawyer's French, in 47 Law Library Journal, 119-224, at p. 
224 
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Law French was not a foreign tongue, but started as the general French of 
Westminster Hall with all the inconsistencies in its spelling. 79  Yet, as 
described above, its use was more operative than the less learned English. 
Later, when Coke translated Littleton's Tenure from Law French into English, 
he carried over a great many terms without much change, which in itself is an 
indication of the extent to which technical Law French easily became a part 
of the English law language, e.g. the French fee simple became fee simple,80 
the French fee taile became fee tail,81 the French heires became heirs.82 
 
Pollock and Maitland have drawn up a (non-exhaustive) list of French words 
basic to the law vocabulary:83 
 
action   damage  judges  pledge 
agreement  debt   judgment  police 
appeal  declaration  jurors   possession 
arrests  defendant  justice   prisons 
arson   demand  justices   property 
assault  descent  larceny   purchase 
attorneys  devise  lien    reprieve 
battery  easement  marriage  robbery 
bill   evidence  misdemeano(u)r  sentence 
claim   execution  money  servant 
condition  felony   note    slander 
constables  gaols   obligation  suit 
contract  grant   pardon   tort 
counsel  guarantee  parties  treason 
count   guardian   partner  trespass 
court   heir   payment   verdict 
covenant  indictment  plaintiff     
crime   infant   pleadings 
 
More than half of these came into written English with a legal meaning by the 
middle of the 14th century.  Today, we would recognise this list to be no 																																																								
79 F.W. Maitland (1903) Of the Anglo-French Language in the  Early Year Books, in: 
Introduction to Year Books of Edward II, 17 Selden Society, at pp. xxxiii, xliii 
80 E. Coke (1703 - 10th ed.) Commentary upon Littleton, at f.1a 
81 E. Coke (1703 - 10th ed.) Commentary upon Littleton at f.18b 
82 E. Coke(1703 - 10th ed.) Commentary upon Littleton at f.1a 
83 F. Pollock, F.W. Maitland (1898) The History of English Law, London: CUP, at p. 81 
Chapter	IV:	Legal	Language	in	England	from	the	14th	to	the	17th	centuries	60	
longer exclusive to the field of law, nor would we think of most words as 
particularly foreign, they have become common currency in contemporary 
English. Yet, a great many terms have very specifically technical legal 
meanings. If we take the words 'trespass' and 'covenant', for example, it is 
understood by the ordinary man as a wrongdoing or transgression in the 
case of the former and as an agreement in the broad sense of the latter. And 
yet, it has very precise meanings for the common law lawyer who applies 
these terms to very specific circumstances. So both lawyer and non-lawyer 
use the same terms but still speak different languages. 
 
Moreover, a number of Law French terms and phrases have survived in 
today's common law English that are distinct from both the English words of 
French origin and modern French:84 
alien, in the sense of to transfer 
cestui que trust 
chose in action 
de son tort 
estoppel 
estoppel in pais 
esquire 
fee simple and fee tail, which like attorney general retain the French word 
order 
laches 
metes and bounds 
oyez 
pur autre vie 
quash 
roll, as in judgment roll 
save, in the sense of except 
speciality, in the sense of sealed contract 
voire dire 
 
In its beginnings, the French used in the law was not as such a technical 
language. But with time and the general decline of French in England, Law 
French became a highly specialised use of that language within the closed 
confines of the legal profession and abstract from everyday usages. The 																																																								
84 D. Mellinkoff (1963) The Language of the Law, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., at p. 16 
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language contact was such that, on the one hand, the French used in the law 
took an independent path from the French that became widely absorbed into 
the English language. On the other hand, lawyers speaking native English 
and acquiring French, constituted the link that allowed for great quantities of 
French words with legal connotations to penetrate the English language.85 
 
3. Protecting privileges 
 
During the 16th century, Law French was still used at the Inns of Court and 
very occasionally in the law courts. The early law reports86 were also written 
in French. The legal profession hung onto this idiom that had shaped their 
law, legal thinking, habits and the construction of their concepts and 
arguments. Coke87 described Law French as: 
“vocabula artis [...] so apt and significant to express the true sense of 
the laws, and are so woven in the laws themselves, as it is in a 
manner impossible to change them [...]” 
 
He practiced what he preached in the sense that in his translation of Littleton 
he simply transferred much of the technical Law French vocabulary straight 
into English.88 In his Commentary upon Littleton (1628), Coke thought Law 
French to be “most commonly written and read, and very rarely spoken.”89 In 
other words, he acknowledged the use of Law French as very restricted. But 
when he published his Reports (1600-1615), he did so in French, because he 
contended that: 
“it was not thought fit nor convenient, to publish either those or any of 
the statutes enacted in those days in the vulgar tongue.” 
 
He used the language to which he was accustomed and warned at the same 
time that publishing his reports in English would raise the risk that: 																																																								
85 D. Mellinkoff (1963) The Language of the Law, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., at p. 109 
86 The so-called 'old' reports first appeared during the reign of Henry VIII and ran until 1865. 
87 For example: fee simple was fee simple, fee taile became fee tail, heires became heirs. 
88 One of the reason Coke hung onto French may also have been his fear of unwanted 
interference by King James I, who turned to Roman law with its wider powers for the king, 
while Coke was a staunch defender of parliamentary sovereignty. Coke also had a keen 
interest in ensuring that the legal profession did not lose touch with its corporate intellectual 
memory of English law embodied in the older body of case law and legislation in Law 
French. 
89 E. Coke (1832 - 19th ed.) Commentary upon Littleton, at p. xxxix 
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“the unlearned by bare reading without right understanding might suck 
out errors, and trusting to their conceit, might endamage themselves, 
and sometimes fall into destruction.”90 
 
In other words, the reading of the law should be restricted to those who 
understand the tongue in which it is written. This is echoed by Bulstrode91 in 
the introduction to his reports where he describes the use of French as: 
“being most proper [...] and most convenient for the Professors of the 
law, who indeed are the only competent judges thereof. For the laws 
of England, do best commend themselves to them that understand 
them.” 
 
This echoes the charge that has been levelled against the use of Law 
French. Bentham famously wrote that: 
“a large portion of the body of the law was, by the bigotry or artifice of 
lawyers, locked up in an illegible character, and in a foreign tongue.”92 
 
It is an idiom known to the noble and wealthy classes and their sons, often 
educated in the law. Even from the time when English became more 
common, the wealthy, keen to maintain their privileges, through land law in 
particular, continued the use of Law French for the reasons mentioned 
above, but also to “lock up trade secrets in the safe of an unknown tongue.”93 
John Warr94 suggests that: 
“the unknownness of the law, being in a strange tongue; whereas, 
when the law was in a known language, as before the Conquest, a 
man might be his own advocate. But the hiddenness of the law, 
together with the fallacies and doubts thereof, render us in a posture 
unable to extricate ourselves; but we must have recourse to the shrine 
of the lawyer, whose oracle is in such request, because it pretends to 
resolve doubts.” 
 																																																								
90 3 Co. Rep. at xl 
91 E. Bulstrode (1658, reprinted 1688 - 2nd ed.) The Reports of Edward Bulstrode of the 
Inner Temple. In Three Parts, London: Lee, Pakeman and Bedell, Part II: To the Reader 
92 J. Bentham (1823) A Fragment on Government, Or, A Comment on the Commentaries, 
London: E. Wilson, at p. xxxv 
93 D. Mellinkoff (1963) The Language of the Law, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., at p. 101 
94 J. Warr (1650/1810) 6 The Harleian Miscellany, London: Dutton (new ed., this pamphlet 
was originally from 1649, it contains the debate leading up to the 1650 Act) at pp. 221-223. 
John Warr was a Leveller and independent reformer of law, arguing for the participatory 
liberty of the individual as the basis of all legal norms. Levellers and reformers like him 
initiated the process of establishing individual liberty at the centre stage of the political 
process. Later this was fully developed by Locke and the modern natural law tradition. 
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There is little evidence for this being a deliberate process, but it was certainly 
a collateral benefit for the powerful.95 As Mellinkoff96 pointed out, it had been 
done before by the Celts who apparently perpetuated their customary law in 
a “learned archaic language.” It is significant that the general movement of 
making things more accessible to the ordinary man during the Interregnum of 
1649-1660, brought a major onslaught on the use of Law French, which, by 
that time, had become totally incomprehensible to anyone but the initiated. 
 
4. Demise of Law French 
 
The use of Law French made the language of the English common law 
increasingly technical, abstract and detached from the common tongue. 
Particularly rich borrowings had been made from other languages, also 
including remnants of Old English and Middle English, as well as many 
words with Scandinavian etymologies.97 But the bulk came from Latin directly 
or indirectly through French or French sources. An 'addiction' to a 'grand 
mixture of languages', including deposits of Celtic and Norse, Latin and 
French has brought the warehouse of word material to overflowing, 
producing a number of phenomena, such as word doubling, bilingual 
synonyms, multiplying words etc.98 which contributed to the language of the 
law being wordy, opaque and unclear. Add to this the use of court hand, 
abbreviations and increased condensation by the printers,99 and it is not 
surprising that the reforms of the Commonwealth period included the 
language of the law, which had not been accessible to the ordinary literate 
layman for centuries and which the revolutionaries wanted to abolish in 
favour of a pocket book code in plain English. 
 
																																																								
95 W.M. Ormrod (2003) The Use of English: Language, Law and Political Culture in 
Fourteenth-Century England, in: Speculum 73, 3, 750-787, at p. 765 
96 D. Mellinkoff (1963) The Language of the Law, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., at p. 36 
97 The term ‘law’ came into Old English in about the year 1000 from the Old Norse, where in 
turn it had been derived from Old Icelandic words. 
98 D. Mellinkoff (1963) The Language of the Law, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., at pp. 120-122 
99 D. Mellinkoff (1963) The Language of the Law, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., at p. 86-88 
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During the Interregnum, an Act of Parliament100 attempted to abolish the use 
of any language other than English in all law writings and proceedings. It was 
a blanket ban and stipulated that: 
"[...] Report-Books of the Resolutions of Judges, and other Books of 
the Law of England, shall be Translated into the English tongue [...] all 
Reports-Books of the Resolutions of Judges and all other Books of the 
Law of England, which shall be Printed, shall be in the English tongue 
onely [...] all Writs, Proces and Returns thereof, and all Pleadings, 
Rules, Orders, Indictments, Inquisitions, Certificates; and all Patents, 
Commissions, Records, Judgements, Statutes, Recognizances, Rolls, 
Entries, and Proceedings of Courts Leet, Courts Baron, and 
Customary Courts, and all Proceedings whatsoever in any Courts of 
Justice within this Commonwealth, and which concerns the Law, and 
Administration of Justice, shall be in the English Tongue onely, and 
not in Latine or French, or any other Language then English [...]" 
 
This was greeted with little enthusiasm by the legal profession, who felt 
deprived of their privileged position and had little patience for what they 
perceived as an unprofessional break with tradition. William Style (1658), 
who saw himself forced to make his “reports speak English” from his Law 
French personal notes, 101  wrote in his introduction that he had obeyed 
authority, but that: 
“the part of the Common Law which is in English hath only occasioned 
the making of unquiet spirits contentiously knowing, and more apt to 
offend others, than to defend themselves.” 
 
Prior to the Rump Parliamant statutory reforms reportedly promoted by 
Bulstrode Whitelocke, only one set of printed common law reports102 was 
written in English, although the equity reports from the Chancery, first printed 
at that time were written in English from the 1590s. During the decade of the 
Interregnum, ten reports were published, of which only two were originally 
composed in English, while the others were written in French but immediately 																																																								
100 An Act for turning the Books of the Law, and all Proces and Proceedings in Courts of 
Justice, into English; November 1650 Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, His Majesty's 
Stationery Office, London 1911 at pp. 455-456 
101  W. Style (1658) Narrationes Modernae, London: Lee, Pakemen, Bedel, Adams, 
Introduction: "...taken by me in Law-french..." 
102 The Reports of that Learned Sir Henry Hobart (1641), London 
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translated into English by the publishers, as required by statute. With the 
restoration, some law reports were once again published in French and the 
pleading form reverted to Latin. Benloe, Jenkins and Yelverton (all in 1661), 
Latch (1663), Jones, Rolle and Savile (all in 1675), Palmer (1678), Siderfin 
(1683-84), Saunders (1686) all published their reports in French. But the 
clock could not be turned back. The English language had become a more 
integral part of the common law, e.g. Hardes (1693) reports are in English 
and after 1704 all reports were in that language.103 By that time, Law French 
had been totally absorbed by English and its use was banned in 1731 by 
statute,104 an instrument that confirmed an established situation rather than 
introduced a radical change. Its aim was to protect: 
"those who are summoned and impleaded having no knowledge or 
understanding of what is alleged for or against them in the pleadings 
of their lawyers and attornies, who use a character not legible to any 
but persons practising the law: To remedy these great mischiefs, and 
to protect the loves and fortunes of the subjects [...] more effectually 
than heretofore, from the peril of being ensnared or brought in danger 
by forms and proceedings in courts of justice, in an unknown 
language, be it enacted [... that] all proceeding whatsoever in any 
courts of justice [...] and which concern the law and administration of 
justice, shall be in the English tongue and language only, and not in 
Latin or French, or any other tongue and language whatsoever, and 
shall be written in such a common legible hand and character, as the 
acts of parliament are usually ingrossed in, and the lines and words of 
the same to be written at least as close as the said acts usually are, 
and not in any hand commonly called courts hand, and in words at 
length and not abbreviated [...]" 
 
The use of Law French had come irreversibly to an end. With the 1731 
Statute, the use of English was officially established in the law and all other 
languages banned. Yet two years later, it was necessary to enact further 
legislation105 to allow for expressions such as nisi prius, habeas corpus etc. 
to be used, which had become so entrenched in the legal vocabulary that it 
appeared impossible to anglicise them. Moreover, the legacy of Law French 																																																								
103 W.S. Holdsworth (1924) A History of English Law, vol. VI, London: Methuen, at pp. 552-
554 
104 Proceedings in Courts of Justice Act 1730, 4 Geo II. c. 26 
105 6 Geo. II, c. 14; 6 Geo II c. 6 
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even in today's common law English is undeniable. But the development of 
such a highly technical and precise legal language has also meant that a 
certain rigidity renders it incapable of the slightest change, with the inevitable 
result that “both the law and the language will tend to lose touch with 
common life.”106 Blackstone remarked very pertinently in his Commentaries 
of the purpose of the reforms to make the law more comprehensible for the 
common people: 
“I know not how well it has answered, but am apt to suspect that the 
people are now, after many years' experience, altogether as ignorant 
in matters of law as before.” 
 
The exclusive use of English for the common law from the 18th century 
coincided with more general developments in English law during that century, 
in particular in the fields of tort and contract, which moved the common law 
further away from its Anglo-Norman roots. English now played a similar role 
to the one of Law French during the times of Edward I as the linguistic 
vehicle for the reforms. Starting with Blackstone in the second half of the 18th 
century, a number of treatise writers sought to systemise the common law or 
certain aspects of it, using English as their language. Law French, which had 
once displaced Latin, had now itself been ousted by English: sic transit gloria 
mundi. 
 
******** 
 
Starting from the premise that the way meanings are encoded in spoken or 
written form depends on the contexts of culture and of situation, the present 
chapter has outlined these two parameters, by describing the general cultural 
and geo-political environment in which these texts occurred, as well as the 
cultural and linguistic landscape of multilingual England that are specific to 
medieval legal text production. Chapter VI will describe the terminology and 
semantic shifts of the language in (mainly) legal reports on the concept of 
consideration and legal enforceability of informal agreements. The 
methodology used to evaluate such linguistic evolutions, was a diachronic 																																																								
106 W.S. Holdsworth (1923) A History of English Law, vol. II, London: Methuen, at p. 482 
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linguistic and semantic analysis using corpus linguistics methodologies. This, 
in turn, informs the research on the concordance between the historical and 
conceptual development of consideration and the way the relevant terms 
have been used, changed and shifted throughout this evolution, most notably 
the increased abstraction of both the concept and the language. However, 
before going there, the following chapter will first discuss the origin and early 
development of the concept of legally enforceable informal agreements, its 
origins in the action of trespass on the case and debt, via the action of 
assumpsit, to the early 17th century doctrine of consideration. 
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Chapter V. The Origins of the Concept of Consideration 
 
 
Through the centuries, the doctrine of consideration has puzzled judges, 
lawyers and legal scholars. Those educated in the civil law tradition find 
themselves confused by the basic premise of the doctrine that is both similar 
and different to their own thinking as embodied in the doctrine of causa. 
English law has, in particular since the accession of the United Kingdom to 
the then European Communities, been confronted by the insularity of this 
doctrine and it has been one of the stumbling blocks in the many attempts to 
streamline contract law at European Union level. 
 
But legal historians are also puzzled by the diverse and sometimes 
contradictory historical explanations of the first ideas that consideration 
should be a prerequisite for the enforceability of an informal agreement and 
of its promotion to a fully-fledged legal doctrine central to contract law.1 The 
diversity of historical theories by so many eminent scholars shows that the 
concept actually emanated from a diversity of distinct legal sources and it 
would be a wild oversimplification to believe that the concept evolved along a 
single linear path. Baker outlines what he calls a ‘vexed subject’ as follows: 
																																																								
1 Examples of main works on consideration and its origins: 
A. Ames (1913) Lectures on Legal History and Miscellaneous Legal Essays, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, at p. 122-171; J. Baker (2013) Origins of the doctrine of 
consideration 1535-1585, in : J. Baker, Collected Papers on English Legal History, vol. III, 
Cambridge: CUP, at p. 1176-1201;  W.T. Barbour (1914) The History of Contract in Early 
English Equity, in : P. Vinogradoff (ed.) Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History, vol. IV, 
Oxford : Clarendon Press, at pp. 59-65; J.L. Barton (1969) The Early History of 
Consideration, in : 85 Law Quarterly Review, 382-383; W. S. Holdsworth (1903-1966) A 
History of English Law, London: Methuen, (1923) vol. II, at p. 82-87, (1923) vol. III, at p. 412-
454, (1925) vol. VIII, at p. 1-98; O.W. Holmes (1885) Early English Equity, Law Quarterly 
Review, 162-174; E. Lorenzen (1919) Causa and consideration in the law of contracts, in 28 
Yale Law Journal, 621-646; S.F.C. Milsom (1981) Historical Foundations of the Common 
Law, London: Butterworth, at pp. 356-360; T. Plucknett (1956) A Concise History of the 
Common Law, 5th ed., Boston: Little, Brown and Co., at p. 627-656; F. Pollock, F.W. 
Maitland (1895/1968) The History of English Law before the Time of Edward I, vol. I & II, 
Cambridge: CUP, at p. 184-239; B. Simpson (1975) A History of the Common Law of 
Contract : The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit, Oxford: Clarendon Press; B. Simpson (1975) 
Innovation in nineteenth century contract law, in: Law Quarterly Review, 91, 247-278; J. 
Salmond (1887) The History of Contract, in: Law Quarterly Review, 3, 166-178 
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“Was ‘consideration’ an unbroken development of a single idea from 
medieval times; or was there a break with medieval thought, and 
perhaps a combination of different ideas? Was it a wholly indigenous 
development; and, if so, was it an incidental consequence of the 
exigencies of the forms of action or a direct result of juristic 
speculation about contractual liability? Alternatively, was it something 
reflected or borrowed from the canon law or the Civil law? And, if so, 
was the influence brought to bear on the common law directly through 
Renaissance humanism, or indirectly by way of the canonist 
chancellors or ecclesiastical judges?”2 
 
Studying the case law, we can find evidence that various strands from 
different directions came together in the idea that informal promises should 
be enforceable. In other words, when this idea materialised, it originated from 
different legal issues, which is precisely why it is so complex to untangle the 
strands and understand the process. The case law added bits and pieces 
that were diverse because the facts of the various cases tended to be 
different: malfeasance, nonfeasance, trespass deceit, detriment, benefit/gain, 
forbearance etc. Every decision related to specific facts and was then 
extrapolated onto wider issues but in the absence of any attempts at 
developing an overall theory of contract formation. Today’s puzzlement about 
the historical evolution of consideration probably matches the lack of 
unanimous thinking among lawyers at the time when the concept 
materialised. 
 
This is also reflected in the language and terminology used throughout the 
16th century, in particular. Holdsworth contends that, as boundaries of 
traditional actions were being pushed and widened, it became 
“obvious that some word or expression was needed to differentiate the 
agreements which could be enforced […], from the agreements which 
could not.”3  
 
																																																								
2 J. Baker (2013) Collected Papers on English Legal History, vol. III, Cambridge: CUP, at p. 
1176 
3 W.S. Holdsworth(1925) History of English Law vol. VIII, London: Methuen, at p. 3 
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But the terminology settled only hesitantly, which may reflect a concordance 
between the complexity of the concept’s evolution and the terminology used 
to express it. This will be discussed in the following chapter. 
 
The forerunner of consideration – the writ 4  of assumpsit – arose in a 
medieval legal world that was governed by procedures that were complex 
and archaic at times. Between the 13th century and the reforms of the 19th 
century procedural formalities dominated the common law thinking. In its 
earlier stages, the common law must have been anterior to the forms, but the 
formulae through which justice was centralised and administered by the 
king’s court in the 12th and 13th centuries were ‘frozen’ as part of the due 
process of law guaranteed by the charters of liberties. This immutable 
formulary framework gave rise of a formalistic legal culture. There were two 
kinds of legal complaints in the early jurisdictions: the complaint of a wrong 
and the demand for a right.5 The law of obligations as we know it today has 
its early roots in the latter and in the writs that were in the praecipe form.  
“It was by argument based upon this elementary difference between 
the kinds of possible claim, rather than by unreasoned interplay 
between ‘forms of action’ seen as primeval entities, that the common 
law of obligations was hammered out.”6 
 
Rights and remedies were significant to the extent that relevant procedures 
gave them form. 7   But by pushing persistently against the procedural 
limitations of the writ system, it developed into a tool that met rising 
commercial needs in terms of contracts and quasi-contracts. It is one of the 
best “illustration of the flexibility and power of self-development of the 
Common law”8 because its evolution was more akin to organic shifts, than to 
large legislative changes; it worked within the adaptation of old rules and 																																																								
4 To commence proceedings in the Common Pleas and King’s Court, a plaintiff had to 
purchase a royal writ from the king’s Chancery. This was at first exceptional and a royal 
favour before it became a right gradually extended to all plaintiffs. 
5 S.F.C. Milsom (1981) Historical Foundations of the Common Law, London: Butterworth, at 
p. 243 
6 S.F.C. Milsom (1981) Historical Foundations of the Common Law, London: Butterworth, at 
p. 244 
7 J. Baker (2007) An Introduction to English Legal History, Oxford: OUP, at p. 53 
8 J.A. Ames (1913) Lectures on Legal History and Miscellaneous Legal Essays, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, at p. 166 
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principles to new circumstances and needs. The present chapter will 
describe the story of how the action of assumpsit and the concept of 
consideration arose and evolved between the late 15th and 17th centuries and 
again in the 18th century. Much has already been written on this topic and 
details can be read in the abundant literature produced by many eminent 
scholars. This chapter outlines the history of the concept with the aim of 
juxtaposing it to the evolution of its language and terminology. This will allow 
for the search for possible concordances between the two, which will reflect 
on the legal thinking and minds behind the court decisions. 
 
1. Transactional agreements – early notions 
 
Before 1066, English contract law was rather rudimentary. There were Anglo-
Saxon ordinances relating to trade and exchange and local courts exercised 
some limited jurisdiction based on customs, administered at local fairs, 
markets and ports. A sale was an executed contract and it is doubtful 
whether there was any elaborate notion of debt. There existed some rules 
aimed at preventing dealings in stolen goods 9  or dealing with vendor's 
warranty of title10 and quality11 of goods sold.  
 
The 12th century Justinian revival had a very limited impact on the 
development of English contract law, mainly because the way that traditional 
practices applied by the local courts were far removed from the ius commune 
doctrines. Prior to the 16th century, the enforcement of informal contracts was 
left as a matter of policy to the largely non-writ jurisdiction of the non-royal 
courts (county courts, hundred courts and seignorial court). The jurisdiction 
of the King’s Court, established in the latter part of the 12th century, was 
limited to the specific types of cases that were subject of standardised types 
of original writs, though causes and forms of action went on developing over 
the 13th and 14th centuries. Foreign influences could not easily get a foothold 																																																								
9 IV Edgar, 6-11 (962-963) 
10 II AEthelred, 8-9 (991) 
11 Oaths 7 in F. Liebermann (1903) Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen: hrsg. im Auftrage der 
Savigny-Stiftung, Halle an der Saale: Niemeyer at p.399 
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in the common law that “had already developed an inflexible system of 
procedure.” 12  Glanvil knew enough about the ius commune to correctly 
describe and define the Roman classification of contract, though apparently 
he did not feel himself bound by these definitions13. The treatise that bears 
Bracton’s name “endeavoured to express common law in Romanesque 
language.”14 But it was more concerned with criminal law and property law, 
than with principles of contract. 
 
The two common law actions from which the medieval law relating to 
transactions arose were the action of covenant and the action of debt. There 
were two further contractual remedies in English law: detinue 15  and 
account16, both of which were based on real contracts. It is important to 
stress that the word ‘contract’ in the early Year Books refers to a narrower 
sense than is understood today. Contract was seen in terms of real contracts 
covering the transactions where a duty arose from the passing of a quid-pro-
quo, such as a sale or a loan. The formal or speciality contracts were 
described as grants, obligations or covenants17. 
 
 
 
 																																																								
12 Th.F.T. Plucknett (1956) A Concise History of the Common Law, London: Butterworth, at 
p. 627 
13 R. de Glanvil (1187-89) Tractatus de legibus et consuetudinibus regni Anglie (The treatise 
on the laws and customs of the realm of England commonly called Glanvil), edited and 
translated by G. Hall, M. Clanchy (2002), Oxford: Clarendon Press,  x. 3. 
14 Th.F.T. Plucknett (1956), A Concise History of the Common Law, London: Butterworth, at 
p. 627 
15 Dating back to the 12th century, detinue is one of the oldest forms of action in common law 
and relied upon for the recovery of personal property or their value in money from a person 
who refuses to give it up. 
16 Dating back to the 13th century, account was less concerned with the obligation to pay a 
sum due (action of debt) and more with the prior obligation to enter into account in order to 
ascertain if and what was owed. Before 1300, it was a remedy mainly for the breach of 
obligations owed by fiduciaries, such as a bailiffs who owed to their lord of the manor. By the 
early 14th century, the scope of the action was much wider, it was extended to commercial 
relationships.  
17 “Chescun graunt et chescun demaunde par resound du graunt doit ester par especialté. 
Mès d’autre contracte com de baille, ou de apprest si puist homme demaunder par sute” 
(Every grant and every demand by reason of a grant ought to be by specialty. But as regards 
other contracts, as, for instance, bailment or loan, one can demand by suit), Frisk in Loveday 
v Ormesby, (1310) YB 3 Edw. II, 25, or 20 Selden Society at p. 191 
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1.1 Action of covenant 
 
By the time of Bracton, agreements made on the basis of delivering objects18 
as security or personal sureties19 faded in favour of other instruments. For 
important agreements, it was held best to formalise them in writing and as 
early as 1235, maybe also for reasons of widespread illiteracy, a seal was 
applied to written covenants by the parties as a sign of their 
acknowledgement of the written document. 
 
In Bracton the action of covenant is described, apparently unknown to 
Glanvil. For a contract to be enforceable it must either be real, that is money 
or chattels have passed, or formal which, according to Bracton, requires a 
deed under seal with the stipulatio. The strict requirement of the seal means 
that beyond it becoming 'a promise well-proven', it had become a promise 'of 
a distinct nature of which a distinct form of action was provided' 20 . It 
transpires from Bracton that there was no room, at that stage, for the notion 
of a consensual contract21.  
 
In the 13th century, and according to a statute of 128522, the variety of writs of 
covenant was infinite and the action was applicable on the face of it to all 
consensual agreements. But this seemingly comprehensive action soon 
played only a minor role in the history of contract: a covenant was an 
agreement and the deed was evidence of an agreements by the early 14th  
century.23 In other words, it was less a question of substantive law but rather 
one concerned with proof.24 Sealed contracts were enforceable on the mere 																																																								
18 The Anglo-Saxon wed, called gage after the Norman Conquest consisted of a valuable 
object (though its value could be of symbolic nature). 
19 The Anglo-Saxon borgh, called pledge after the Norman Conquest consisted of a person 
rather than a thing. 
20 O.W. Holmes cited by Th.F.T. Plucknett (1956) A Concise History of the Common Law, 
London: Butterworth, at p. 634 
21 W.S. Holdsworth (1923) A History of English Law, vol. II, at p. 277; vol. III, at p. 416 
22 Statute of Wales 1284, c. 10, in: J. Baker, S. Milsom (1999) Sources of English Legal 
History: Private Law to 1750, London: Butterworth, at p. 281 
23 Anon. (1304) in: J. Baker, S. Milsom (1999) Sources of English Legal History: Private Law 
to 1750, London: Butterworth, at p. 284 
24 S.F.C. Milsom (1981) Historical Foundations of the Common Law, London: Butterworth, at 
p. 247-248 
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basis that they were formal and to contend, as was said from the mid-16th 
century, that a 'seal imports consideration' has little to do with the doctrine of 
consideration as we know it today. It is only with the action of assumpsit that 
the idea grew of informal agreements as actions in their own right. 
 
Agreements to do something could not be enforced in the King’s Court 
without a sealed document. However, this rule did not apply to obligations to 
pay money or to deliver goods. Sealed documents were not always 
practicable in commercial undertakings. Therefore, actions of debt and 
detinue could be brought on the basis of a quid pro quo. 
 
1.2 Action of debt 
 
The authors of Glanvil and Bracton wrote about causa debendi25 (reason for 
owing) in the language of the ius commune. However, in the Year Books this 
was set out in terms of quid pro quo. The action of debt was applicable to 
formal contracts under seal specifying a sum (debt on an obligation) and to 
real contracts where a res had passed between the parties (debt on a 
contract). The latter was a way to protect creditors claiming on the basis of 
informal contracts, the premise being that the defendant had received 
something (a res) from the plaintiff and, hence, there had been a quid pro 
quo. Barton26 argues that the expression was not exclusively associated with 
the action of debt. Milsom27 has traced the development of the action of debt, 
also in its relation to quid pro quo. In an action from 1458, it was argued that 
debt will lie when there is a quid pro quo, and it was held, per Moyle and 
Davers, that something which was of no benefit to the defendant could 
constitute a quid pro quo, or be at least an equivalent.28 
 																																																								
25 The causae debendi listed in Glanvil are five examples of contracts in the ius commune:  
mutuum, commodatum, sale, lease and deposit (Glanvil, x. 3). 
26 J.L. Barton (1969) The Early History of Consideration, in : 85 Law Quarterly Review, 382-
383 
27 S.F.C Milsom (1961) Sale of Goods in the Fifteenth Century, 77 Law Quarterly Review, 
257-284 
28 “…il n’est un mere contract, uncore il est tant en effet: car l’accord fuit q il prendra la file a 
feme; en ql cas le def. ad Quid p quo…” in Y.B. 37 Mich. Hen VI, 8, 18, or LBEx. 
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At the early stages when a common law action was used to enforce informal 
contracts on the basis of debt (specific sums lent or otherwise owed) or 
detinue (chattels sold or lent), there was nothing resembling a general idea of 
civil obligation based on promise or agreement or some sort of consensual 
contract.29 The action of debt was based on a proprietary notion rather than 
promissory one. In other words, it evolved around the fiction that the lender 
was claiming what belonged to him, rather than what the object of the 
promise was. While the actions of debt and detinue constitute the earliest 
recognition of the enforceability of oral agreements, these are not as such 
the origin of modern contract law in relation to informal agreements. The 
action of debt was riddled with technicalities and procedural complexities that 
excluded many meritorious claims for enforcing informal agreements. The 
common law only recognised parol agreements that were based upon a quid 
pro quo, but it took a rather broad view of this concept. 
 
The common law courts, eager to expand their jurisdiction, began to develop 
tort30 actions in trespass based on a very flexible form of writ, 'actions on the 
case', that provided a remedy in the form of damages for the invasion of 
personal or property interests and could be used in many different situations. 
It was tried by jury, hence moving away from wager of law.31 Among the torts 
that were developed at that time, was an action in which the plaintiff alleged 
that the defendant had entered into an informal agreement with him and 
subsequently caused him some damage by a defective performance. That 
'trespass on the case' became known as assumpsit. 
 
 
																																																								
29 Mc Govern challenges that view: W. McGovern (1969) Contract in Medieval England: The 
Necessity for Quid Pro Quo And a Sum Certain, in: 13 American Journal of Legal History, 
173-201, at pp. 173-174 
30  The term 'tort' was first used in English in the legal context in the 1580s. The word is 
derived from Old French and Anglo-French tort (injury), which has its origin in the Medieval 
Latin tortum. The term was used in Law French well before then in phrases such as tort e 
force and de son tort demene. 
31 A wager of law was a medieval form of trial in which the defendant was required to 
produce a set number of witnesses who could swear to his or her innocence. 
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2. Making informal agreements actionable: assumpsit and its 
forerunner trespass on the case 
 
The medieval King's Courts, though aware of the ideas of contract, were not 
very pro-active in the development of notions and principles relating 
specifically to contract law as we know it today32. As explained above, the 
instruments most used were covenant and debt, but their development was 
hampered by technical rules: the insistence on a sealed document for the 
former and the application of the doctrine of quid pro quo for the latter.  
Milsom pointed out that with the rise of assumpsit, the term ‘covenant’ was 
disabled from its original function and was gradually replaced by the term 
‘contract’. However, the latter came with its own medieval meanings, which 
added to the confusion among historians.33 
 
The action of assumpsit became common at the beginning of the 16th 
century, and arose primarily from the action of trespass on the case, that is of 
a wrongful act directly causing harm or injury. It consisted in the recovery for 
the negligent performance of an undertaking. Actions in trespass providing a 
remedy in damages for the invasion of personal or property interests, 
developed long before there were actions on the case.34 There was a time 
when trespass was a broad enough category to include felony, criminal 
misdemeanour and disseisin, as well as those remedied by the actions of 
trespass and trespass on the case. Later, trespass stood for a large category 
of original writs, though none of these writs actually employed the word 
‘trespass’.35 But trespass are essentially actions of tort not contract, and 
liability only arose in a scenario where the plaintiff was passive and did not 
																																																								
32 A proper doctrinal system of contract law only materialised from the writings of the 
nineteenth century doctrinal writers, who borrowed extensively from the 17th and 18th century 
natural lawyers. 
33 S.F.C. Milsom (1981) Historical Foundations of the Common Law, London: Butterworth, at 
p. 249 
34 S. Milsom (1985) Studies in the History of the Common Law, London: The Hambledon 
Press, at pp. 1-90 
35 J. Baker (2007) An Introduction to English Legal History, Oxford: OUP, at pp. 60-61 
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participate in any way. It is the element of an assumpsit, of having made an 
undertaking, that would render such cases actionable. 
 
The term assumpsit has its origin in the Latin term assumere and, in the 
context of the law, was used within the phrase assumpsit et fideliter promisit. 
The defendant 'assumed and faithfully promised' to the plaintiff to do 
something. While the basis in a trespass action had been the occurrence of 
damage, in the case of assumpsit it became the breaking of a promise. The 
way the action of assumpsit crystallised and developed was a way of seeking 
a new form of action within the limits of what had already been established, 
such as in the action of covenant and debt, by gradually pushing the 
boundaries, but without making any major changes to the law. Ames qualifies 
it as: 
“hard to find a better illustration of the flexibility and power of self-
development of the Common Law. [...] In its origin an action of tort, 
[assumpsit] was soon transformed into an action of contract, becoming 
afterwards a remedy where there was neither tort nor contract. Based 
at first only upon an express promise, it was afterwards supported 
upon an implied promise, and even upon a fictitious promise. 
Introduced as a special manifestation of the action on the case, it soon 
acquired the dignity of a distinct form of action, which superseded 
debt, became concurrent with account, with case upon a bailment, a 
warranty, and bills of exchange, and competed with equity in the case 
of the essentially equitable quasi-contracts growing out of the principle 
of unjust enrichment.”36 
 
The rise of assumpsit does not take a linear path of evolution: the need to 
create some action making parol undertakings enforceable came from 
different quarters.  The account that follows is not to be taken as a linear 
description, but an attempt to describe the various strands of cases and legal 
thinking that led to the development of the concept of consideration. 
 
 
 
 																																																								
36 J.A. Ames (1913) Lectures on Legal History and Miscellaneous Legal Essays, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, at p. 166  
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2.1 Malfeasance 
 
Among the reports in the early Year Books that cover the first quarter of the 
14th century, two cases stand out as situations where money was exchanged 
for the making of a promise subsequently not honoured. In the Year Book of 
14 Edward II (1321), we find an early example of a surgeon’s negligence 
case: forty shillings were exchanged for the promise to cure a hand wound, 
but the hand was lost instead.37 It was held that there was a lack of speciality 
required for a covenant. During the Eyre of Northamptonshire of 1329-3038 a 
certain William Seymour took fees from two different gentlemen for the term 
of his life and promised to assist them rightfully or wrongfully. 39  It was 
claimed this was a customary thing to do. The case was held not to be one of 
conspiracy but of ambidexterity.40 In neither case, can we find the sort of 
language that will become characteristic for later trespass on the case or 
assumpsit actions. 
 
As we move into the second half of the 14th century, there are a number of 
cases where the resulting loss or damage or destruction of chattels were 
construed as quasi-trespasses – Milsom41 calls them ‘naturally trespassory’ – 
while, with today’s perspective, the nature of the situation was fundamentally 
more contractual, but could not be sustained as such back then for want of a 
covenant without deed. The common law had generally been more advanced 
in developing the notion and principles of tort rather than those relating to 
contract and a series of cases had served to “introduce the idea of contract 
into actions of trespass.”42 In other words, notions of trespass were being 
used to overcome outmoded and excessively technical pleading procedures 																																																								
37 “…ly promist de ly garrir de la play pur xl. S., et il resceut les xl. S. et il nad my garry, eynz 
par sa defaute il ad perdu sa mayn” (1321) 14 Edward II, or 85 Selden Society at 353 
38 (1329-1330) 3 & 4 Edward III, or 97 Selden Society at 237 
39 “…prist de lui argent e feez e lui promist de eyder a torte e a droit en mesme le plee” 
40 Ambidexterity here refers to jurors taking bribes from both sides for their verdict. 
Incidently, this is the earliest sense in English of the word, before it was used in the more 
general language sense. 
41 S.F.C. Milsom (1981) Historical Foundations of the Common Law, London: Butterworth, at 
p. 316 
42 Th.F.T. Plucknett (1956) A Concise History of the Common Law, London: Butterworth at p. 
637 
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in matters of contract. Milsom43 argues that, for example, in the Humber 
Ferry case44 the ferryman was not liable in covenant because the complaint 
was of damage actually caused, rather than of failure to fulfil a ‘contractual’ 
obligations. These cases were actions of trespass for wrongfully inflicted 
physical harm on persons, goods and land. Referring to the medieval notion 
of legal liability in tort, Ames argues that such actions could only be brought 
when the plaintiff did not participate in any way. In the words of Newton C.J.: 
“Perhaps he applied his medicines de son bon gré, and afterwards 
your horse died; now, since he did it de son bon gré, you shall not 
have an action.” 45 
 
These trespass cases did not fit squarely into the original notion of tort that 
the injury was caused by the negligent conduct of a stranger without the 
participation of the plaintiff, because the latter voluntarily allowed for the 
defendant to come into contact with his person/property. This authorisation 
meant that the plaintiff took upon himself the risk of injury/damage, unless 
the defendant undertook (assumpsit) to do something in accordance with his 
skills and professional status. In the words of Newton, C. J.: 
“If I have a sore on my hand, and he applies a medicine to my heel, by 
which negligence my hand is maimed, still I shall not have an action 
unless he undertook to cure me.”46 
 
Ames47 insists that in these early cases of recovering damages for injuries to 
person or property caused by the active misconduct of the defendant, the 
action was regarded as actions in tort, not contract, because the notion of 
negligence was at issue, not that of assumpsit. It is the element of an 
																																																								
43 S.F.C. Milsom (1981) Historical Foundations of the Common Law, London: Butterworth, at 
p. 317 
44 see below (Lib. Ass. 22 Edw. III Folio 94a-94b, pl.41, or LBEx.) 
45 Case against a horse-doctor mentioned by J.A. Ames (1913) Lectures on Legal History 
and Miscellaneous Legal Essays, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, at p. 131, ftn. 5. 
46 J.B. Ames (1913) Lectures on Legal History and Miscellaneous Legal Essays, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press,  at p.132 
47 J.B. Ames (1913) Lectures on Legal History and Miscellaneous Legal Essays, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press,  at p.130 
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assumpsit, of an express, unilateral undertaking, that rendered such cases 
against surgeons, carpenters and also bailees48 actionable. 
 
The first case usually associated with this development is the Humber Ferry 
Case or Bukton v Tounesende of 1348.49 Ferryman Tounesende undertook 
to carry Bukton’s mare over the river.50 The horse was lost in the process as 
Tounesende had overloaded his vessel.51 As the common law stood then, 
the plaintiff should have brought an action in contract/covenant. However, 
this required a sealed document and only applied to failure to perform 
agreements. Bukton would not have succeeded going down that road in his 
local court. A stroke of luck had it that the King's Court was sitting in York just 
at that time. They had developed the action of trespass for wrongfully 
inflicted physical harm on persons, goods and land. Yet, at that stage these 
actions still required proof of the use of vi et armis, or force and arms and a 
breach of the King's peace. Surprisingly, the King's Bench found in favour of 
the plaintiff's action of trespass to apply to the damage and loss caused by a 
badly-performed agreement.52 
 
This case has sometimes been hailed as landmark in the history of contract 
law and one of the "earliest cases in which an assumpsit was laid in the 
declaration"53. According to Holdsworth, it illustrated that "special variety of 
trespass or deceit on the case which came to be known as the action of 
assumpsit"54. However, Plucknett55 argues that although the report of the 
case includes the Law French words 'empris a carier' (undertake to carry), 																																																								
48 For a detailed discussion of actions on the case against bailees for negligence in the 
custody of the things intrusted to them, see J.A. Ames (1913) Lectures on Legal History and 
Miscellaneous Legal Essays, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, at pp. 132-136 
49 Lib. Ass. 22 Edw. III Folio 94a-94b, pl.41, or LBEx. 
50  “…avoit empris a carier sa jument pris en son bateau oustr l’eau de Humbr safe & sain…” 
Lib. Ass. 22 Edw. III Folio 94a-94b, pl.41, or LBEx 
51 “…per quel surcharge le jument perist, a tort…” Lib. Ass. 22 Edw. III Folio 94a-94b, pl.41, 
or LBEx 
52 “…Il semble que vous luy fistes tresp’ quant vous surcharge le bateau, p que sa jument 
perist…” Lib. Ass. 22 Edw. III Folio 94a-94b, pl.41, or LBEx 
53 J.B. Ames (1913) Lectures on Legal History and Miscellaneous Legal Essays, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, at p.130 
54 W.S. Holdsworth(1923) History of English Law vol. III, p. 430 
55 Th.F.T. Plucknett (1956) A Concise History of the Common Law, London: Butterworth, at 
pp. 441-442 
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there was no actual mention of an assumpsit. The action was not in case, 
which had not yet been developed, but in trespass. Plucknett contended that: 
“the proceedings were initiated, not by writ, but by the less formal bill 
or querela which still lingered in the provinces and which explains the 
anomaly of trespass successfully applied without any direct and 
unauthorised act of interference. The case, in short, was not a 
precedent but a freak.”56 
 
Kiralfy argues57 that since the action was for trespass without relying on vi et 
armis, the emphasis was not on the defendant's act but rather on his default. 
For Kiralfy, the fact that assumpsit was not mentioned was a main difference 
with later assumpsit actions but not an essential one in view of the fact that 
the formula mentioned on the original roll of this case resembles substantially 
the 'formulae' of subsequent assumpsit actions. Either way, once the action 
was admitted it “offered a fruitful soil for experiment”58. In 1370, just over 
twenty years later, the decision in Waldon v Marshall59 went the same way. 
The defendant, who undertook (manucepit) to cure the plaintiff's horse, had 
done so negligently (ita negligenter) and the animal died. 60  He argued 
unsuccessfully that the action rested upon an undertaking and thus a 
covenant requiring a deed. Plucknett 61  contends that all parties involved 
recognised a fundamentally contractual situation, but opted for “juggling with 
trespass because they felt unable to sustain an action in covenant without a 
deed”. The court found against the defendant on the grounds that his 
negligence had caused the plaintiff damage.62 
 
																																																								
56 Th.F.T. Plucknett (1956) A Concise History of the Common Law, London: Butterworth, at 
pp. 441-442 
57 A.K.R. Kiralfy (1951)The Action on the Case, London: Sweet & Maxwell, at p.53 
58 C.H.S. Fifoot (1949) History and Sources of the Common Law: Tort and Contract, London: 
Stevens, at p.331 
59 Y.B Mich. 43 Edw. III, 33, 38, or LBEx. 
60 “… quod praedictus Johannes manucepit equum praedicti Will’ de infirmitate, & postea 
praedictus John’ ita negligent’ curam suam fecit, quod equus suus interiit…” Y.B Mich. 43 
Edw. III, 33, 38, or LBEx 
61 Th.F.T. Plucknett (1956) A Concise History of the Common Law, London: Butterworth, at 
p. 632 
62 “… pcq vo fists vostre cure ita negl’, issint q le chival morust, p q il est reason de maint 
cest bre espec …” Y.B Mich. 43 Edw. III, 33, 38, or LBEx 
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These cases where plaintiffs seek to recover damages for physical injuries to 
person or property caused by the active misconduct of the defendant,63 
cannot be regarded as actions of contract but are more akin to claims in tort. 
Stating assumpsit played an increasingly essential part in the count, but any 
notion of consideration, as an element of return or detriment incurred, was of 
no relevance at that stage. Stating assumpsit was one of the elements that 
lead to the damage of person or property,64 but it was not the basis on which 
an action of contract could be brought. During the 15th century, this view 
continued to be held. It is eloquently set out by Newton65 in a trespass action 
on the case in 1436: 
“… if a carpenter makes a covenant to make a house good and strong 
and of a certain form, and he makes me a house which is weak and 
bad and of another form, I shall have an action of trespass on my 
case. So if a smith makes a covenant with me to shoe my horse well 
and properly, and he shoes him and lames him, I shall have a good 
action. So if a leech takes upon himself to cure me of my diseases66, 
and he gives me medicines, but does not cure me, I shall have an 
action on my case. So if a man makes a covenant with me to plough 
my land in seasonable time, and he ploughs in a time which is not 
seasonable, I shall have an action on my case. And the cause in all 
these cases that there is an undertaking and a matter in fact67 besides 
that which sounds merely in covenant … the plaintiff has suffered a 
wrong in all the aforementioned cases.” 
 
It is interesting to note that there is no use of the technical term ‘assumpsit’, 
the undertaking is still described in the vocabulary of general language. 
																																																								
63 Surgeons undertaking to cure the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s animals: Y.B. 43 Edw. III, 6, 11; 
11 Rich. II, Fitz. Abr. Act. on the Case, 37; Y.B. 3 Hen. 36, 33; Y.B. 19 Hen. VI, 49, 5; Y.B. 
11 Edw. IV, 6, 10; Powtuary v Walton, 1 Roll. Abr. 10,  5, Slater v Baker, 2 Wills. 359; Sears 
v Rentice, 8 East, 348; Prior v Rillesford, 17 Yorks. Arch. Soc, Rec. Ser., 78 
Blacksmith laming a horse while shoeing it: Y.B. 46 Edw. III, 19, 19; Y.B. 12 Edw. IV, 13, 9  
Carpenter who built house unskilfully: Y.B. 11 Hen. IV, 33, 60; Y.B. 3 Hen. VI, 36, 33; Y.B. 
20 Hen. VI, 24, 4; Y.B. 21 Hen. VI, 55, 12; 18 Hen. VII, Keilw. 50, 4; 21 Hen. VII, Keilw. 77, 
25; Y.B. 21 Hen. VII, 41, 66; Coggs v Bernard, 2 Ld. Ray. 909, 920; Elsee v Gatward, 5 T.R. 
143; Benden v Manning, 2 N.H. 289 
64 The defendant undertook to do something and did it badly. Consequently, the plaintiff who 
relied upon the undertaking, suffered damages. 
65 Y.B. 14 Hen. VI, 18, 58, or LBEx 
66 “…enprend sur luy a me sainer de mes maladies…” Y.B. 14 Hen. VI, 18, 58, or LBEx 
67 “…un empris & un matier en fait…” Y.B. 14 Hen. VI, 18, 58, or LBEx 
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While it is an action of trespass on the case and, hence, a claim in tort, the 
repeated use of the term covenant, cannot deny a link to contractual thinking. 
 
2.2 Nonfeasance 
 
So much for the malfeasance of an express undertaking that results in 
damages for the plaintiff. An altogether different scenario was failing to act on 
an undertaking, which arose from situations of nonfeasance. Cases brought 
on nonfeasance at the beginning of the 15th century were unsuccessful.68 In 
Watton v Brinth69, one of the carpenter cases of a house, begun but not 
finished, the issue of negligence was mentioned70 but not discussed, and the 
case was dismissed for want of a deed in an action of covenant. From the 
discussion of the 1436 case mentioned above, it appears no distinction was 
made between misfeasance and nonfeasance, it was all just a question of 
covenant.71 The basic idea of trespass/quasi-trespass was not helpful to the 
nonfeasance scenario and this lay at the heart of the difficulty of bringing 
nonfeasance cases under the misfeasance type of assumpsit action. A new 
legal principle was needed, and it was found in the notion that breaching an 
undertaking amounts to a deceit.72 
 
The original writ of deceit goes back to the beginning of the 13th century and, 
like the bill of deceit at that time, these were essentially penal in nature 
concerned with abuse of legal procedure.73 In the late 14th century, the action 
of deceit was used to render express warranties of the quality of goods sold 
enforceable. From coupling express warranty with deceit, it was only a small 																																																								
68 Entries for assumpsit for nonfeasance can be found in the plea rolls in 1370, though no 
reported cases in the Year Books before 1400. See S.F.C. Milsom (1981) Historical 
Foundations of the Common Law, London: Butterworth, at p. 323, footnote 1 & 2 
69 Case of 1400 in Y.B. 2 Hen. IV, 3, 9, or in LBEx 
70 “…le chose ust ester commence, & puis p negligence nient fait…” Y.B. 2 Hen. IV, 3, 9, or 
in LBEx  
71 “…car la nul tort est sup q le fesance dun chose, eins le non fesance dun chose, le quell 
sonne seulemt en un covenant…” Y.B. 14 Hen. VI, 18, 58, or in LBEx 
72 Th.F.T. Plucknett (1956) A Concise History of the Common Law, London: Butterworth, at 
p. 640; in his discussion on deceit Ames also deals with false warranty: J.A. Ames (1913) 
Lectures on Legal History and Miscellaneous Legal Essays, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, at p. 136 
73 Th.F.T. Plucknett (1956) A Concise History of the Common Law, London: Butterworth, at 
p. 640, in particular footnotes 7, 8 and 9 
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step of imagination to use it in cases of a breach of an express assumpsit, 
which in turn offered a solution to the issue of nonfeasance. In 1428, a 
plaintiff brings an unsuccessful claim of nonfeasance on the basis of a writ of 
deceit.74 In the Somerton’s Case75 (1433), the defendant, as legal counsel for 
the plaintiff, undertook the duties to purchase or lease a manor. But instead 
he became someone else’s counsel and negotiated the lease for that 
person.76 The legal argument evolved around issues of covenant, but there 
was a mention that issues of covenant may be transformed into deceits by 
subsequent events.77 The facts in this case do not relate strictly speaking to 
nonfeasance because the defendant, by making the lease with someone 
else, acted in a way that made it impossible for his undertaking to be 
honoured. Similar arguments based on similar facts were voiced in the 
Doige’s Case 78 , where the case was adjourned. But Brooke in his 
abridgement of that case makes a distinction between the action of deceit, in 
which the defendant disables himself, from that of an action on the case for 
nonfeasance.79 Milsom80 argues that Doige’s Case was not an attempt to 
obtain a remedy in tort for the failure to perform a promise, it was not a test 
case aimed at liberalising contract law. The decision was whether the claim 
of deceit was sufficiently separate from covenant, although the latter would 
not have succeeded for want of a sealed document.  In 1476, an action of 
'deceit on the case'81 was successfully upheld against the defendant, who 
had been paid the purchase price for some land and enfeoffed another. 																																																								
74 “Un hom port un br sur son Case n natur de br de Deceit.”  Y.B. 7 Hen. VI, 1, 3, or LBEx. 
The action failed for want of a quid pro quo, hence lacking a bargain. 
75 Original writ: Y.B. 11 Pasch. Hen. VI, 1, 25, or LBEx.; arguments should be read in the 
following order: Y.B. 11 Hen. VI Trin., 55, 26; ibid., Hil., 18, 10; ibid., Pasch., 24, 1, or LBEx 
76 “…le dit W. assumpsit … il fauremt & en deceit de luy ad disco ve son consel’, & fuit 
devenu Consel’ ove u R. a luy fait achet l’dit man…”  Y.B. 11 Trin. Hen. VI, 55, 26, or LBEx 
77 “…il duit av’ acc d Covenant, mes s’il discove s consel, & deviant del’ Consail un aut a 
purchaser cest man a luy, or c’est un deceit de ql j’aurai acc sur mon cas…c’ê un deceit & 
changer tout cest q fuit devant forse covenant entr les parties, des ql deceit il aura…”  Hil. 
Hen. VI, 18, 10, or LBEx 
78 (1442) Y.B. 20 Trin. Hen.VI, 34, 4, or LBEx 
79 “… ou home pmise per un consideration de fair act, et ne fait, que action sur le cas gyst, 
mes ou home fayte son promise faucement, que donque action de dyscept gyst…” in: R. 
Brooke (1573) La Graunde Abridgement, Disceit, no. 4 
80 S.F.C. Milsom (1981) Historical Foundations of the Common Law, London: Butterworth, at 
p. 330 
81 “En un action de Disceit s son case…” in Y.B. 16 Pasch. Edw. IV, 9, 7, or LBEx 
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Nonfeasance of undertakings made for money was finally recognised as 
actionable in 1504.82 It is important to note that equity was ahead of the 
common law courts in providing relief to purchaser who had paid but had not 
delivered, a particularly aggravated sort of deceit because the plaintiff's loss 
enriched the defendant.83  
 
The next stage in the evolution of consideration came when, during the 16th 
century, this was extended to cases where the defendant enjoyed no benefit 
from the deceit that caused loss or damage to the plaintiff. In 1520, an action 
was successfully brought on a sale made by the plaintiff to a third person on 
the strength of the defendant’s promise that the price should be paid.84 No 
benefit to the defendant arose from the declaration nor from its breach, but 
the deceit meant a loss for the plaintiff. The point was taken up by St 
German:85 
“if he to whom the promise is made have a charge by reason of the 
promise … he shall have an action … though he that made the 
promise had no worldly profit by it.” 
 
This was a definite signpost that points to the recognition of parol agreement 
and a stepping stone for the next stage in the development: that of the 
recognition of mutual promises. The basis of assumpsit had gradually moved 
from the 'end of the story' - deception of the plaintiff - to the 'beginning of the 
story' - the assumpsit and hence matters were discussed in terms of 
promises (contract) rather than deceits (tort).86 Thus opening the door to the 
concept of mutual promises was the ultimate springboard allowing for the 
leap from tort (deceit) to contract (promise) to be completed. In Norwood v 																																																								
82 “…si jeo covenant p argent de fair un mese p tiel jour, & jeo ne fay, Acc sur le cas gist p le 
non fes…”; “…Et pofito que jeo covenant denfeoffer un home de un acre pcel’ de mon man, 
& jeo vens tout le man a un autr; icy Action sur le cas gist p cest deceit…”  Y.B. 20 Mich. 
Hen. VII, 8, 18, or LBEx 
83 Th.F.T. Plucknett (1956) A Concise History of the Common Law, London: Butterworth, at 
p. 642 
84 Y.B. 12 Mich. Hen. VIII, 11, 3, or LBEx: “…le testat dit a luy, s’il ne paie a vous, jeo vous 
paier, s ql promes le pl’ deliv les bns a le dit J.N. & le dit J.N. devint niet d paier le pl…” 
85 Ch. St. German (1518/1974), Doctor and Student, Second Dialogue, Chapter 24, edited 
by Th.F.T. Plucknett, J. Barton (1974) for the Selden Society, vol. 91  
86 Th.F.T. Plucknett (1956) A Concise History of the Common Law, London: Butterworth, at 
p. 643 
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Reed (1558)87 it was said that “every contract executory is an assumpsit in 
itself” and in Strangborough v Warner (1589)88 it was acknowledged that “a 
promise against a promise will maintain an action upon the case”. 
 
2.3 Indebitatus assumpsit 
 
In the middle of the 16th century the action of indebitatus assumpsit 
materialised, which was primarily a new form of procedure, rather than the 
creation of a substantive new right. Two elements, hitherto established, came 
together in this new action: debt and deceit. Since the 12th century, the action 
of debt was not based on any promissory element but on the presence of a 
quid pro quo (e.g. a res had passed). Indebitatus assumpsit arose from 
situations where the indebted (indebitatus) defendant (expressly) undertook 
(assumpsit) to pay a particular sum of the debt by a certain date. It is 
possible to argue that in such situations, the plaintiff has a classic action in 
debt, but also one in assumpsit on the subsequent promise to pay, if he was 
deceived by the defendant who was not fulfilling his undertaking. For a while, 
the distinction between the two actions was upheld, and thereby the 
boundary between debt/contract and trespass/deceit/tort. This was spelt out 
in a case of 1535: a plaintiff could only have an action in debt if there was 
quid pro quo. Alternatively, an agreement could be actionable under 
covenant if there was speciality. In the absence of either of these elements, 
an action on the case was possible by virtue of an assumpsit.89 Brooke,90 in 
his Graunde Abridgement mentions the same case by drawing, nevertheless, 
a sharper distinction between debt and promise: 
“…home est endetted a moy et il promise de payer devant Michelmas 
ieo puis aver accion de dett sur le contract ou accion del case sur le 																																																								
87 (1558) 1 Plowd. 180, or 75 Eng. Rep. 277 
88 (1589) 4 Leonard 3, or 74 Eng. Rep. 686 
89 “…car jeo enten que on n’aura br de Det mes ou un contract est, car le defendant n’ad 
quid pro quo, mes l’action est solemt fonde s l’assumpsit, q sonne meremt in covenat: & s’il 
fuit p especialte, le pl’ aura cc d Covenat, mes etat q il n’ad espec, ceo me see, il n’ad auc 
remedy si no Action sur son cas… car l’agréement le pl’ apres fait ceo un assumpstion a luy 
in Ley…come me semble il n’aura acc de Det: car icy n’est asc contract, ni le def.,’ad quid 
pro quo; purq il n’ad auc remedy sino Acc sur son cas…”  Y.B. 27 Mich. Hen.VIII, 24, 3, or 
LBEx  
90 R. Brooke (1573) La Graunde Abridgement, Action sur le cas, pl. 5 
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promise et issint ceo est in divers respectes, car sur le promise ne gist 
acc de dett…” 
 
It is interesting to note the absence of the word promise in the original 
reports, almost as though it needed these few more years between the Year 
Book report and Brooke’s Abridgement for the promissory element to be 
named in more definite terms. 
 
For these early indebitatus assumpsit cases to succeed, it was necessary to 
show an express promise which was subsequent to the debt – quod postea 
assumpsit – because if the undertaking was made at the time of the contract, 
debt would lie and not assumpsit.91 Debt based on a simple contract required 
a quid pro quo, words of agreement were said in creating the debt. An action 
of assumpsit had to be distinguished from the initial debt and demanded, 
therefore, a new promise made subsequent to the debt. But as actions of 
assumpsit became more commonplace throughout the 16th century, it was 
getting increasingly more complex to distinguish between promises to pay 
money and promises to do other things. 
 
The next stage in the development of the action of assumpsit may have less 
to do with fine minds wanting to advance legal thinking, but more with the 
rivalry and power struggle between the courts. Assumpsit, considered as a 
form of trespass, could be brought in both the King’s Bench and in the 
Common Pleas. Actions of debt, however, were restricted to the Common 
Pleas. In an attempt to gain the upper hand in the fierce competition for 
jurisdiction between the courts, the King's Bench began to allow for 
assumpsit to be used in actions to recover specific sums of money, instead 
of insisting on an action of debt, which was outside its jurisdiction. 
Consequently, the King's Bench was keen to make indebitatus assumpsit 
equivalent to debt: where a debt existed, a subsequent assumpsit was 
																																																								
91 “…il duist av dit quod postea Assumpsit, car sil Assumpsit al temps del contract donqs det 
gist sur ceo & nemy Assumpsit mes si apres le contract il assume, tunc action gist sur 
lassump autermt nemy…” (1572) in Dalison 84, 35, or 123 Eng. Rep. 293 
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presumed in law.92 This brought considerable business to the King’s Bench, 
as the process was swifter and litigants could use barristers instead of the 
costly serjeants. 
 
In its rivalry with the Common Pleas, which continued diligently to make the 
distinction outlined above, the King’s Bench decisions tended to be reversed 
by the Exchequer Chambers93 that consisted only of Common Pleas judges. 
This wrangling came to a head and was settled in the final instalment of the 
Slade’s Case in 160294, in which Coke appeared for the plaintiff and Bacon 
for the defendant. Slade had bargained and sold wheat and rye to the 
defendant who promised to pay a sum of money at a fixed date in the future. 
He failed to honour this undertaking and pleaded non assumpsit modo et 
forma. It was held that the case could lie upon simple contract as well as an 
action of debt. There must have been reluctance amongst the members of 
the Exchequer Chamber, but it was Coke’s report of the case that came to 
matter.95 Indebitatus assumpsit became an alternative to debt at the plaintiff's 
choice, and the plaintiff could recover damages as well as the original debt, 
but such a recovery would be a bar to an action of debt. If the debt was one 
of instalments, assumpsit could be brought on the first default, while debt 
could only be brought when all payment deadlines had passed. Holding that 																																																								
92 Edwards v Burre (1573) Dalison 104, 45, or 123 Eng. Rep. 310 
93 The Exchequer was the oldest of the three common-law courts. It has a complex story of 
divisions into various different institutions. The Court of Exchequer Chamber at the time of 
Slade’s Case referred to here is the appellate court for common law civil actions which heard 
references from the King’s Bench, the Court of Exchequer and, from 1830, the Court of 
Common Pleas. 
94 Slade v Morley, 4 Co Rep. 92 a or 76 Eng. Rep. 1074; literature on Slade’s Case: J. Baker 
(1971) New Light on Slade’s Case, Part I in: Cambridge Law Journal 29 (1), 51-67, Part II in: 
Cambridge Law Journal 29 (2), 213-236; D. Ibbetson (1984) Sixteenth Century Contract 
Law: Slade’s Case in context, in: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 4 (3), 295-317; H. Lücke 
(1965/1966) Slade’s Case and the origin of the common counts, in: 81 Law Quarterly 
Review, Part I: 422-538, Part II: 539-561, Part III in: 81 Law Quarterly Review 81-96; S. 
Milsom (1981) Historical Foundations of the Common Law, London: Butterworth, at pp. 346-
356; Th. Plucknett (1956) A Concise History of the Common Law, London: Butterworth, at 
pp. 637-656; B. Simpson (1958) The place of Slade’s Case in the history of contract, in 74 
Law Quarterly Review, 381-396; B. Simpson (1975) A History of the Common Law of 
Contract: The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit, Oxford: Clarendon Press, at pp. 281-299; S. 
Stoljar (1975) A History of Contract at Common Law, Canberra: Australian National 
University Press, at pp. 76-82; 
95 S.F.C. Milsom (1981) Historical Foundations of the Common Law, London: Butterworth, at 
p. 353 
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the mutual executory agreement of both parties imports in itself action upon 
the case, as well as action of debt, and that every executory contract 
imported in itself an assumpsit, meant that the assumpsit need not be proved 
but would be assumed. Having thus made indebitatus assumpsit equivalent 
to debt meant that the distinctions between debt/contract and deceit/tort 
became blurred and the scheme of forms of actions was less clear and 
certain. In Edgcomb v Dee96  the Slade decision was described as an: 
“illegal resolution … grounded upon reasons not fit for a declamation, 
much less for a decision of law… And that which is so commonly now 
received, that every contract executory implies a promise, is a false 
gloss, thereby to turn actions of debt into actions on the case: for 
contracts of debts are reciprocal grants.”97  
 
Having moved from assumpsit brought upon explicit undertakings, then 
allowing indebitatus assumpsit to lie upon a subsequent promise, to the 
possibility of bringing an action based on the original contract rather than on 
the subsequent assumpsit, the next step was to also imply a contract, 
because if assumpsit can be implied, it follows that contract can be implied. 
By extending the legal presumption of an assumpsit to that of contracts, the 
possibility was created for a large variety of implied contracts and eventually 
quasi-contracts to be remedied by the action of assumpsit. The decision of 
Warbrook v Griffin98 in favour of allowing ‘an implied promise of every part’ 
confirmed this shift in legal thinking. It became rapidly clear that the 
potentially open-ended scope of the action of assumpsit would need a 
controlling element to ring-fence promises that show genuine undertakings 
because not every promise made can be deemed enforceable. A detriment 
or debt for which the promise was made, would be such an indicative 
element that distinguished enforceable promises from a bare promise. 
 
******** 
 																																																								
96 (1670) Vaughan, 101, or 124 Eng. Rep. 984 
97 The decision was also criticised because the new procedure meant that wager of law was 
no longer a part of it. For some (more conservative) it was a sort of constitutional right of the 
English, the loss of which compromised a valuable safeguard. 
98 (1610) 2 Brownl. & Golds. 254, or 123 Eng. Rep. 927 
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We have travelled a long way from the original trespass cases against 
surgeons and carpenters, where it was necessary to show the making of an 
undertaking. It is from these original uses of assumpsit to enforce an 
undertaking made by the defendant that the technical action of special 
assumpsit eventually emerged, which was more akin to a contractual action 
but retained elements of the tort action of deceit. 
 
With the notion of (informal) promises, comes the question of their 
enforceability and, as we have seen so far, a corpus of doctrine had 
developed during the 16th century, to delimit the actionability of informal 
promises. It is in this context that we can find (some of) the roots of the idea 
of consideration such as the circumstances in which a promise was made 
and as the motivation for making a promise enforceable. The question that 
now required resolution related to the underlying reason for the promise. This 
may appear as akin to quid pro quo, but that particular concept was originally 
rooted in proprietary thinking, in the recovery of a res. Approaching the issue 
from the angle of why a promise was made, appeals to a promissory 
concept. It may also appear to relate to the civil law doctrine of causa, yet 
continental legal thinking tended to theorise entire legal constructs and 
contractual doctrines, which was rather foreign to the English common law 
lawyer, whose formulary system was not equipped to consider the field in its 
entirety. Contracts were not perceived as an overreaching construct but 
compartmentalised according to specific forms of actions. 
 
2.4 Causa as a romano-canonical import 
 
Lorenzen99 contends that the common law doctrine of consideration evolved 
and remained outside the influences of the ius commune, and all that was 
borrowed was the phrase ex nudo pacto non oritur actio, which incidentally 
																																																								
99 E. Lorenzen (1919) Causa and consideration in the law of contracts, in 28 Yale Law 
Journal, 621-646, at p. 636 
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described something very different in English law than it did in the ius 
commune. In Rann v Hughes100 the court said: 
“It is equally true that the law of this country supplied no means nor 
affords any remedy to compel the performance of an agreement made 
without sufficient considerations. Such agreement is nudum pactum ex 
quo non oritur actio; and whatsoever may be the sense of this maxim 
in the civil law, it is in the last-mentioned sense only that it is to be 
understood in our law.” 
 
In the substantial bulk of assumpsit/consideration case law we find a 
relatively frequent occurrence of the word ‘cause’ often used interchangeably 
with ‘consideration’. As late as 1574, consideration was defined as “cause or 
meritorious occasion”.101 But this usage can be attributable mainly to the fact 
that the word ‘cause’, imported from French, was much used in the language 
of legal actions and in a specific technical way. The use of the word ’cause’ 
was wide-spread in the legal jargon well before the rise of assumpsit. 
Adopting this word later in the context of consideration need not point to any 
Roman origin of either word or concept. The ius commune division of 
contracts/enforceable pacts and nude pacts found no corresponding 
distinction in the common law. Not all common law agreements based upon 
good consideration would be recognised as contracts or vested pacts in the 
ius commune. In addition, a common law agreement without consideration 
may be enforceable in the ius commune if it was a mandatum, constitutum or 
an agreement to make a gift (donation). 
 
The influence the canon law doctrine of causa, used by the ecclesiastical 
Chancellors during the late 15th century, may have had on the development 
of the concept of consideration is unclear. In his very comprehensive account 
of contract in equity, Barbour concluded, though with “considerable hesitancy 
[...] to make any generalisations” and after having studied the chancery 
proceedings:  
																																																								
100 C.H.S. Fifoot (1949) History and Sources of the Common Law : Tort and Contract, 
London : Steven & Sons, at p. 430 ; pleadings and arguments : 4 Brown, P.C. 27, or 2 Eng. 
Rep. 18 ; judgement of Skynner, L.C.B. in 7 T.R. 350, note 
101 Calthorpe’s Case (1574) 3 Dyer 334b, or 73 Eng. Rep. 756 
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“The chancellor held that one might make a valid promise to do 
anything which was reasonable and possible, and that the obligation 
resulting from such a promise ought to be performed because the 
promisor had deliberately and intentionally assumed the obligation. By 
this I do not mean that the chancellor enforced any and all promises. 
But in his analysis of parol contract he did not require as an essential 
condition to a right of action that the promise should have been 
deceived or that the promisor should have been benefited. Rather did 
he enquire whether the enforcement of a particular promise would 
further some general interest. If the promisor has led the promise to 
alter his position on the strength of the promise, there lies upon him a 
moral duty to fulfil that promise. It is desirable, in the interests of the 
community at large, that such promises should be enforced. […] I  
believe that such a promise [of money for a marriage] was enforced 
because of the purpose of which it was given.” 102  
 
Barbour’s explanation shows clearly that, at a time when the common law 
still considered primarily the promisee and whether he sustained damages 
due to a malfeasance or nonfeasance/deceit, chancery examined the 
position of the promisor and the circumstances and purposes for which the 
promise was made. Questions of detriment to the promisee and benefit to 
promisor were of secondary importance. Barbour continues: 
“… I do believe that all these cases [in equity] can be explained from 
the principles of canon law. Therein seems to me the only adequate 
and reasonable explanation. It is very probable that the chancellor as 
a judge in the chancery did not proceed to the same lengths as he 
would have done in the ecclesiastical court. But when confronted with 
a new situation in chancery he did apply so far as possible the 
principles of that system in which as a churchman he was trained. This 
indirect reception is not demonstrable with mathematical precision; it 
seems to me, however, that the whole line of decision in equity points 
unequivocally towards the canon law.”103 
 
In other words, it appears that the canon law principle of cause was applied 
in equity and that was a known fact. In 1414, the Commons complained that 																																																								
102 W.T. Barbour (1914) The History of Contract in Early English Equity, in : P. Vinogradoff 
(ed.) Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History, vol. IV, Oxford : Clarendon Press, at pp. 
166-167 
103 W.T. Barbour (1914) The History of Contract in Early English Equity, in : P. Vinogradoff 
(ed.)Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History, vol. IV, Oxford : Clarendon Press, at pp. 
167-168 
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the Chancery was undermining the common law with romano-canonical 
imports. 104  But there is no hard evidence as to any reception into the 
common law, though some cross-fertilisation cannot be excluded.  
 
A comparison between the concept of consideration and the civil doctrine of 
causa reveals a more narrow interpretation of what constitutes good 
consideration by the English courts. Most agreements supported by good 
consideration and actionable in the common law would also be valid 
according the broader doctrine of causa. However, the opposite is not true.105 
Lord Wright106 contends that the cause as a precondition for the validity of a 
contract, written into the French Civil Code  (Articles 1108 and 1131) is even 
wider “than what used to be described as moral consideration […] it would, it 
seems, include the motive or impulse of charity or generosity” 
 
The influence the civil law doctrine of causa had on Lord Mansfield and some 
of his colleagues, in particular in relation to the notion of a moral obligation 
inherent in the making of a promise, and the concept they developed of 
moral consideration to support a contract, will be discussed in section 4 of 
this chapter. 
 
It is from the context of the motivations for a promise that the use of the 
phrase in consideratione emerged, namely to describe precisely these 
underlying reasons for the existence of the promise. Once assumpsit was 
presumed, it was the matter fixed in the consideration clause that pointed to 
the defendant’s obligation, independently of whether he had subsequently 
acknowledged the obligation. Here lies the immediate (though not only) origin 
of the consideration clause and terminology. 																																																								
104 4 Rot. Parl. 84, no. 46 
105 Lorenzen discusses such cases, e.g. a written guarantee without valuable consideration 
nor with any intention to make a donation, but made with a desire to act fairly and 
generously in the execution of a contract previously entered into, would fail under common 
law for want of good consideration but would be seen as sufficient causa for the guarantee in 
a civil law tradition; in: E. Lorenzen (1919) Causa and consideration in the law of contracts, 
in 28 Yale Law Journal, 621-646, at p.639 
106 R. Wright (1936) Ought the doctrine of consideration to be abolished from the Common 
Law? in: 49 Harvard Law Review, 1225-1253, at p.1237 
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3. Concept of consideration 
 
3.1 Terminology 
 
As we saw earlier, from the moment that an undertaking to carry out a 
bargain began to be separated from the principle bargain during the 16th 
century, it became necessary to find some word or phrase that would link the 
recital of the principal bargain to the subsequent assumpsit clause in order to 
explain the motivation of the undertaking. Otherwise, and as the Student told 
the Doctor,107 the undertaking was held to be without a cause and hence 
unenforceable because it must be considered as nudum pactum. Here lies 
the origin of the ‘in consideration of’ clause, but at that early stage its 
semantic content did not go beyond expressing a technical requirement for 
an action on the case upon a promise - it was still a long way off being a 
principle in its own right. 
 
Anyone reading the substantial bulk of assumpsit/consideration case law, is 
struck by the relatively frequent occurrence of the word ‘cause’ often used 
interchangeably with ‘consideration’. But this was mainly attributable to the 
fact that the word ‘cause’, imported from French,108 was much used in the 
language of legal actions and in a specific technical way. When reading, for 
example, the Edward I and Edward II Year Books in the original French 
language, the use of the word ‘cause’ is very prominent. Some were general 
language usages, and these were generally translated by non-
contemporaneous translators with ‘reason’ or ‘motive’. But the bulk of the 
occurrences were in a technical legal context, often embedded in a 
description of legal procedure, such as for example: 
																																																								
107 Ch. St. German (1518/1974), Doctor and Student, Second Dialogue, Chapter 24, edited 
by T. Plucknett, J. Barton (1974) for the Selden Society, vol. 91   
108 The medieval Latin causa, caussa migrated into the living languages as Italian and 
Spanish and Provinçal cosa, Old Northern French cose, but also the French chose, in the 
sense of matter or thing, which is the sense of causa to be found in the Salic Law, in 
Gregory of Tours and the Capitularies. From the 13th century, the Latin causa could be found 
in the French of the law courts in the form of causa or cause, or encheson, meaning cause 
or by the reason of. 
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- cause de forfeture (cause of forfeiture)109 
- cause accioun (cause of action)110 
- cause del doun (cause of the gift)111 
- qil est cause de la garde (he is the cause of the wardship)112 
- la cause de ceti bref fut accepte de la Chancerie (the cause of this 
writ was entertained by the Chancery)113 
Or bound up with some legal procedure, such as for example: 
- responet a la cause (answer to the cause, which was the leasing of tenements 
on consideration of marriage)114 
- quidez vous par ceste cause aver seisine (do you think for this cause to 
have seisin)115 
- ceo est la cause del abatement de vostre bref (it is the cause of the 
abatement of your writ)116 
- le tenant par cause fit remuer la parole par un recordari (the tenant, for 
a cause, removed the plea by a Recordari)117 
The use of the word ‘cause’ was widespread in the legal jargon well before 
the rise of assumpsit. Adopting this word later in the context of consideration 
need not point to any ius commune origin of either word or concept. Nor does 
it exclude that there may have been a link. 
 
In the late 15th and early 16th century, quid pro quo was frequently mentioned 
in the same breath as consideration, or at least as the element that makes a 
parol agreement enforceable. Holmes118 famously said that: 
“the requirement of consideration in all parol contracts is simply a 
modified generalization of quid pro quo to raise a debt by parol.” 
 
																																																								
109 (1304) 4 YB Hil. 32 Edw. I, in: Year Books of the Reign of King Edward the First, Selden 
Society Publications and the History of Early English Law (www.heinonline.org), at p. 37 
110 (1304) 4 YB Hil. 32 Edw. I, ibid at p. 37 
111 (1303) 3 YB Mich. 31 Edw. I, ibid at p. 389 
112 (1305) 5 YB Mich. 33 Edw. I, ibid at p. 39 
113 (1304) 4 YB Mich. 32 Edw. I, ibid at p. 341 
114 (1294) 2 YB Mich. 22 Edw. I, ibid at p. 499 
115 (1307) 5 YB 35 Edw. I, ibid at p. 439 
116 (1294) 2 YB Mich. 22 Edw. I, ibid at p. 349 
117 (1306) 5 YB  Hil. 34 Edw. I, ibid at p. 153 
118 O.W. Holmes (1885) Early English Equity, Law Quarterly Review, 162-174 
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Quid pro quo was traditionally associated with debt, but as Barton119 and 
Milsom120 have shown, the concept of reciprocity expressed by quid pro quo 
has also appeared in actions other than debt and did not always apply to just 
proprietary exchanges. It included a situation where something that was of 
no direct benefit to the defendant could be considered as quid pro quo or at 
least equivalent to one.121 While the action of debt was still in use, a sharp 
distinction between quid pro quo and consideration was not always made. 
For example, in Bret v J.S.122 the term quid pro quo was used to distinguish a 
valuable consideration (a mother’s love for her son) from one that consisted 
of an element given in return (the son’s continued board). 
 
Since the times of Glanvill, a sale was executed by delivery123 - detinue for 
the goods could be brought by the buyer once the money was paid, while the 
seller could bring debt for the price once the goods had been delivered; it 
followed that if neither party performed there was no action. Writs were 
phrased in the simplest of terms to reflect such a notion of reciprocity: 
‘whereas, in return for a sum of [pro] money agreed or paid beforehand, A 
had undertaken to do X for B…’ The action arose either through nonfeasance 
or misfeasance, viz A failed to carry out his undertaking. The resemblance to 
the ‘in consideration of’ clause does not escape today’s reader, but during 
the 15th century, we are still firmly within a proprietary notion of exchange 
and reciprocity. During the 16th century, the undertaking to carry out a 
bargain began to be separated from the principle bargain. Baker 124  has 
called this a ‘verbal divorce’, designed to circumvent the technical problems 
of overlapping remedies. The pro-clause was re-phrased: ‘whereas, for a 
sum of money agreed or paid, A had agreed to do X for B [= bargain], and A 
had agreed to do X within a certain time [= undertaking]’. Here, it is difficult to 																																																								
119 J.L. Barton (1969) The Early History of Consideration, in : 85 Law Quarterly Review, 382-
383 
120 S.F.C Milsom (1961) Sale of Goods in the Fifteenth Century, 77 Law Quarterly Review, 
257-284 
121 “… uncore il est tant en effet …” in Y.B. 37 Mich. Hen. VI, 8, 18, or LBEx 
122 (1600) Cro. Eliz 755, or 78 Eng. Rep. 987 
123  Glanvil x. 14; Bracton f. 62, Fleta, ii. 58, §8 
124 J Baker (2013) Origins of the doctrine of consideration 1535-1585, in : J. Baker, Collected 
Papers on English Legal History, vol III., Cambridge : CUP, at p.1179 
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justify the undertaking in terms of a sum of money paid, the word ‘and’ being 
the only element that links it to the principle bargain. This has meant that the 
action either lies on the bargain or covenant, or on the mutual promise. In the 
case of the former it would fail on procedural and evidential grounds, in case 
of the latter, it was necessary to show that the promise is actionable 
independently. Baker125 cites Marler v Wilmer126, an unreported King’s Bench 
case of 1539, as an example for this type of dilemma. One of the points 
discussed was: 
“that it does not appear in the declaration for what cause [quam ob 
causam] he made the aforesaid undertaking, either for money paid 
beforehand, or receipt of part of the aforesaid goods, and so ex nudo 
pacto non oritur actio’. 
 
This confirms what the Student had told the Doctor: that an undertaking 
without a causa is unenforceable because it is nudum pactum.127 It became 
necessary to find some word or phrase that would link the recital of the 
principal bargain to the subsequent assumpsit clause in order to explain the 
motivation of the undertaking. Here lies the origin of the ‘in consideration of’ 
clause, but at that early stage its semantic content did not go beyond 
expressing a technical requirement for an action on the case upon a promise. 
 
On examining the King’s Bench Rolls, Baker 128  found that the in 
consideratione clause appeared for the first time in 1539, then again the next 
year and at least thirty-two times until 1550, but he found little uniformity in 
their form or function. Sometimes the phrase was combined with the word 
pro, other times a mere alternative or when it was more apt and elegant to 
use it. The phrase could, however, also express something more akin to 
reason/motivation, as can be found in the general form pro diversis aliis 
																																																								
125 J. Baker (2013) Origins of the doctrine of consideration 1535-1585, in : J. Baker, 
Collected Papers on English Legal History, vol III., Cambridge : CUP, at p.1180 
126 KB 27/1111, m. 64, see Baker (2013) at p. 1180, footnote 11 
127 Ch. St. German (1518/1974), Doctor and Student, Second Dialogue, Chapter 24, edited 
by T. Plucknett, J. Barton (1974) for the Selden Society, vol. 91   
128 J. Baker (2013) Origins of the doctrine of consideration 1535-1585, in : J. Baker, 
Collected Papers on English Legal History, vol III., Cambridge : CUP, at pp.1181-1182 
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causis et considerationibus ipsum E adtunc et ibidem moventibus.129 This 
relates to the concept of causa and it can be argued130 that the consideration 
clause combines the quid pro quo and causa notion, which may be an 
important element why that phrase finally triumphed over its terminological 
rivals and was widely adopted from the mid-16th century. 
 
On the question of terminology, Holdsworth131 contends that, at first, words 
such as 'cause' and 'occasion' were used in a general sense,132 as it became 
“obvious that some word or expression was needed to differentiate the 
agreements which could be enforced […], from the agreements which could 
not.”133 In chapter 24 of St. German’s Second Dialogue, where the student 
explains what a nude contract or naked promise is and whether any action 
may lie thereupon, we find in a text of 2589 word tokens only one occurrence 
of the term quid pro quo, 3 uses of ‘consideration’, 7 of ‘cause’ and 7 of 
‘recompense’. The word ‘promise’ occurs 74 times, but the discussion 
surrounding the issue is hardly matched by settled vocabulary. As late as 
1579, Rastell134 makes an entry for a bare or naked contract, which does not 
include the word consideration, but rather 'recompense'. He defines contract 
in terms of bargain and covenant (contracte est vn bargeine ou couenaunt 
per enter ii. parties) and equates consideration with quid pro quo or "one 
thing given for another" (vn chose est done pur auter que est appelle quid 
pro quo [...]en consideration de [...] que vous dones a moy ceux font bone 																																																								
129 Newman v Gybbe (1549) KB 27/1152, m. 135, see J. Baker (2013) Origins of the doctrine 
of consideration 1535-1585, in : J. Baker, Collected Papers on English Legal History, vol III., 
Cambridge : CUP, at p.1182, footnote 21 
130 J. Baker (2013) Origins of the doctrine of consideration 1535-1585, in : J. Baker, 
Collected Papers on English Legal History, vol III., Cambridge : CUP, at p.1181 
131 W.S. Holdsworth(1925) History of English Law vol. VIII, London: Methuen, at pp. 3-4 
132 “par lescrit qil mest avant il suppose qe il nous fra certein services les queux sont la 
cause de sa demande..." Y.B. 6, 7 Edw. II, or 36 Selden Society at 83 per Westcot arg.; 
"dont del hure qe ceste annuite fu grante issint pur les services issint les services sont 
loccasion…" in: (1312) Y.B. 5 Edw. II, or 33 Selden Society at 2, per Herle arg. 
133 see definition of consideration as “cause or meritorious occasion” in Calthorpe’s Case 
(1574) 3 Dyer 334b, or 73 Eng. Rep. 756. A keyword search of ‘occasion’ in the corpora 
constituted for this research does not confirm a frequent use of the word in assumpsit cases. 
134 W. Rastell (1579) Exposition of Certaine Difficult and Obscure Wordes and Termes of the 
Lawes of This Realme, Newly Set Fourth & Augmented, Both in French and English, for the 
Helpe of Such Younge Studentes as Are Desirous to Attaine the Knowledge for the Same. 
Whereunto Are Also Added the Olde Tenures, 1 v., London: In adibus Richardi Totelli, 
www.heinonlin.org - Selden Society Publications and the History of Early English Law 
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contractes, pur ceo que il ad vn chose pur auter). There is no separate entry 
for ‘consideration’. But over fifty years later, a contract is defined as “a 
covenant or agreement with a lawful consideration or cause” in Cowell's 
Interpreter 135 . It is interesting to note that way into the 17th century 
‘consideration’ and ‘cause’ are still used as synonyms, but this definition 
demonstrates a move away from the notion of bargain towards something 
more akin to a meeting of minds and the use of the word 'lawful' gives us to 
understand that there is a legal definition of 'consideration', which is given 
separately as the “material cause of a contract, without the which, no 
contract bindeth.” In Sharington v Strotton 136  a familiar friend and 
acquaintance was considered as: 
“no sufficient cause for the payment […] as is requisite in contracts, 
and also in covenants upon consideration.” 
 
A more general description of ‘consideration’ can be found in Calthorpe’s 
Case137: 
“A consideration is a cause or meritorious occasion, requiring a mutual 
recompense, in fact or in law. Contracts and bargains have a quid pro 
quo.” 
 
From these examples it appears that the terminology used in discussing the 
concept of consideration was not settled. But there are also cases where the 
use of the consideration clause was more in line with the later terminology 
when the concept was well established: 
“In an action upon the case, the plaintiff declared, that the defendant, 
assumed and promised to pay to him …”138 
 
By the end of the 16th century, the use of the consideration clause became 
more common place, signposting the facts which were relied upon to make 
the contentious promise enforceable by assumpsit. In Whorwood v 
																																																								
135 J. Cowell (1637) Interpreter: Or Booke, Containing the Signification of Words, London: 
Printed for William Sheares, , www.heinonlin.org - Selden Society Publications and the 
History of Early English Law 
136 (1564) 1 Plowden 298, at 302, or 75 Eng. Rep. 460 
137 (1574) 3 Dyer, 334b at 337a, or 73 Eng. Rep. 756, at 759 
138 Joscelin v. Shelton (1557) 3 Leo. 4, or 74 Eng. Rep. 503 
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Gybbons139 it was the opinion of the whole court that (my emphasis): 
“insomuch as the proviso was made by him by whom the debt was 
due, that it is a good consideration, and that it is a common course in 
actions upon the case against him by whom a debt is due, to declare 
without any words in consideratione.” 
 
Similarly, in the Sidenham and Worlington’s Case 140  it was said (my 
emphasis): 
“if there be a moving cause or consideration precedent; for which 
cause or consideration the promise was made; and such is the 
common practice at this day: for in an action upon the case, upon a 
promise, the defendant, for, and in consideration of 20l. to him paid, 
(postea scil.) that is to say, at a day after super se assumspit, and that 
is good…” 
 
But in many of these cases, including the last one just mentioned, the words 
‘cause’ and ‘consideration’ still frequently appear side by side as synonyms. 
 
3.2 The concept of consideration 
 
As discussed previously, the concept of consideration emanated from a 
diversity of legal sources and this may in part be a reason why its 
terminology settled only hesitantly. The use of terms such as for example 
‘cause’ and ‘quid pro quo’ would inevitably have intertextual connotations that 
may have interfered, at times, with the new emerging legal thinking. In 
Manwood v Burston141, Chief Baron of the Exchequer Manwood mentions 
three “manners of considerations upon which an assumpsit may be 
grounded”. Subsequently, this was often considered as a definition of 
consideration, but the plural form points to a list, rather than a doctrine. Yet, 
such a ‘list’ of conditions under which actions of assumpsit would lie is an 
important step for establishing that “compendious word” 142  which would 
differentiate the promises that could be enforced from those that could not. 
 
																																																								
139 (1587) Gouldsborough 48, or 75 Eng. Rep. 986  (my emphasis) 
140 (1585) 2 Leonard, 224, at 225, or 74 Eng. Rep. 497, at 498; (my emphasis) 
141 (1587) 2 Leonard 203, or 74 Eng. Rep. 479 
142 W.S. Holdsworth(1925) History of English Law vol. VIII, London: Sweet & Maxwell, at p. 7 
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In his lectures on legal history, Ames143 identifies three theories advanced by 
different legal scholars on the origins of the concept of consideration. Holmes 
believes consideration to be a ‘modified generalisation’ of quid pro quo. 
Salmond sees consideration as originating from the ius commune principle of 
causa, introduced into the common law via equity. Finally, Hare traces a 
straight line back to the action on the case for deceit, making the plaintiff’s 
detriment a forerunner of the consideration of all parol contracts. Whatever 
the merits of these theories, it reveals that it is impossible to link 
consideration to just one single source, which is also Ames’ conclusion. This 
takes us back to the introductory paragraphs of this chapter, namely that the 
rise of assumpsit and the development of the concept of consideration did 
not take a linear path of evolution, because the need for an action that makes 
parol undertakings enforceable came from different quarters originating in a 
diversity of distinct legal issues and situations. 
 
We have seen how the element of loss to the promisee due to a deceit of the 
promisor, was a part of the original nature of the action of assumpsit. This led 
to what was then generally known as special assumpsit and can be found in 
today’s theory on consideration as detriment to the plaintiff. Another source 
was the action of debt, when some actions of debt began to be absorbed 
within the more general field of contract, though the development of 
indebitatus assumpsit and consideration became a way of demonstrating the 
motivation for making a promise. In addition, mutual promises in consensual 
contracts also developed the notion that a promise could be the 
consideration for a counter-promise. This constitutes what we would call 
today a bilateral contract and it enables either side to sue for breach 
unilaterally without averring performance. The extent of the influence the 
canon law doctrine of causa had on the development of the concept of 
consideration has not clearly been demonstrated. 
 
																																																								
143 J.A. Ames (1913) Lectures on Legal History and Miscellaneous Legal Essays, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, at p. 129, see also footnote 2, 3 and 4. 
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During the late 16th and 17th centuries, the notion that a promise can only lie 
if the motivation of the undertaking can be demonstrated was gradually being 
kneaded into a doctrine, pushing the limitations of established actions and 
procedures by degrees. But the diversity of the legal ideas from which that 
concept sprang has led to contradictory rulings, sometimes based on rather 
similar facts. There appeared no general will to forge any general principles 
that may underlie the application of the concept and courts took their 
decisions, each following their own agenda of their particular locality raised 
by the facts of the specific cases at hand. It is, therefore, difficult to offer a 
strictly linear and chronological account of how the concept of consideration 
evolved during that period. We will, therefore, discuss the development of the 
concept of consideration by following how certain principles originally raised 
by the application of special assumpsit or indebitatus assumpsit evolved in 
the subsequent case law. Re-tracing the path consideration took from 
concept to doctrine goes hand in hand with comprehending the evolution of 
what constituted consideration. Originally, it arose from the need for an 
element to ring-fence the enforceability of parol undertakings. The extent and 
effect of the concept was decided gradually through case law. 
 
Some have made attempts to define what consideration meant. In Sidenham 
v Worlington144 Periam, J. called it: 
“…a moving cause or consideration precedent, for which cause or 
consideration the promise was made.” 
 
In an earlier case,145 the type of consideration that would impose liability was 
described as: 
“…a cause or occasion meritorious, requiring a mutual recompense in 
fact or law.” 
 
Also relevant to this were notions such as the benefit/detriment analysis and 
quid pro quo was never very far away. These criteria will be discussed in 
greater detail below. 
 																																																								
144 (1585) 2 Leonard 224, or 74 Eng. Rep. 497 
145 Calthorpe’s Case (1574) 3 Dyer 334b, or 73 Eng. Rep. 756 
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Adequate consideration 
 
One issue raised by different sets of facts was the question of what 
constituted adequate consideration. The English commercial mind has never 
been much preoccupied with the value of what was given in an exchange. If 
people are foolish enough to accept inadequate consideration in return for 
lavish promises, this will not be interfered with by the courts. In the words of 
Hobbes: 
“The value of all things contracted for, is measured by the appetite of 
the contractors: and therefore the just value, is that which they be 
contended to give.”146 
 
This is also reflected in the common law decisions. In Sturlyn v Albany147 the 
court adjudged for the plaintiff “for when a thing is to be done by the plaintiff, 
be it never so small, this is a sufficient consideration to ground an action.” 
 
But the question of adequacy is bound up with whether consideration is seen 
in the causa sense, in which case it touches on motivation that may extend 
its span to past and continuing events. If consideration is taken in the quid 
pro quo sense, the focus remains on the reciprocal exchange promised or 
done. Adequacy in a quid pro quo scenario can, in theory, only be properly 
evaluated in relation to some sort of reciprocal exchange and remuneration. 
But such inadequacy of consideration has never been recognised as a 
defence in the medieval common law. 148  This would suggest that the 
essence of the concept of consideration lies indeed in the notion of whether 
there is good reason for the promise, other than material/value reciprocity, 
which is treated as legally insignificant. An exception to this would be if the 
promise and consideration could be valued in precise monetary terms. The 
action in Richards v Bartlett149 raised precisely that point, but it was decided, 
not on the absence, but rather on the inadequacy of the consideration. The 																																																								
146 Th. Hobbes (1651/1996) Leviathan, Oxford : OUP ; Part I, chapter 15, paragraph 14, at  
p. 100 (p.75 in the original 1651 edition) 
147 (1587) Cro. Eliza. 67, or 78 Eng. Rep. 327 
148 B. Simpson (1975) A History of the Common Law of Contract : The Rise of the Action of 
Assumpsit, Oxford : Clarendon Press, at p. 456 
149 (1584) 1 Leonard 19, or 74 Eng. Rep. 17 
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disparity of monetary value was thought relevant because it showed the lack 
of consideration. 
 
Consideration in time 
 
Simpson 150  has listed four elements of time as important for evaluating 
consideration: 
- past or executed consideration 
- continuous consideration 
- present consideration 
- future or executory consideration. 
Consideration that is executed and past at the time of the promise is not 
good consideration. This was first implied by the Student in his dialogue with 
the Doctor when he argued that only contracts involving imminent or future 
mutual exchanges can be enforced.151 In common law this principle was laid 
down in Hunt v Bate152 when it was held that (my emphasis): 
“there is no consideration wherefore the defendant should be charged 
for the debt of his servant, unless the master had first promised to 
discharge the plaintiff before the enlargement and mainprize made of 
his servant, for the master did never make request to the plaintiff to do 
so much, but he did it off his own head.”  
 
In the second case reported under that name a distinction was made for 
cases where marriage was the consideration, which was held as: 
“good cause, although the marriage was executed and past before the 
undertaking and promise, because the marriage ensued the request of 
the defendant.” 
 
The rule established in Hunt v Bate was subsequently followed in many 
cases.153 																																																								
150 B. Simpson (1975) A History of the Common Law of Contract : The Rise of the Action of 
Assumpsit, Oxford : Clarendon Press, at pp. 452-465 
151 Ch. St. German (1518/1974), Doctor and Student, Second Dialogue, Chapter 24, edited 
by Th.F.T. Plucknett, J. Barton (1974) for the Selden Society, vol. 91 
152 (1568) Dyer 272, or 73 Eng. Rep. 605  
153 Sydenham v Worlington (1584) Godbolt 31, 2 Leon. 224 or 74 Eng. Rep. 497; Moore v 
Williams (1574) Moore K.B. 200, 72 Eng. Rep. 542; Pearl v Unger (1587) Cro. Eliz. 94, 78 
Eng. Rep. 353; Jeremy v Goochman (1594) Cro. Eliz. 442, 78 Eng. Rep. 683; Rigges v 
Bullingham (1598) Cro. Eliz. 715, 78 Eng. Rep. 949; Bosden v Thinne (1603) Yelverton 40, 
80 Eng. Rep. 29; Jones v Clarke (1613) 2 Bulstrode 73, 80 Eng. Rep. 969;  Cotton v 
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The notion of ‘continuous’ consideration was raised in a case also involving 
marriage. In Marsh v Rainsford154: 
“the father’s natural affection doth continue, and her advancement is 
sufficient cause of the promise.” 
 
The continuity of the father’s affection made the fact that there had been no 
request irrelevant. Thus a continuous consideration was seen as a present 
consideration. This also allowed for a debt precedent to be held as good 
consideration for a subsequent promise to pay a debt: “The debt here always 
continues, and no charge can be made of this, but by payment of it.”155 
 
Accepting future or executory consideration appears an obvious premise and 
it was frequently raised in relation to marriage agreements. But the assertion 
of future or executory consideration must be distinguished from cases where 
a promise was averred as consideration.156 This distinction between present 
promise to perform an act and future act was made in Fuller’s Case.157 If the 
plaintiff is to rely on a future act rather than a promise to perform an act as 
consideration, he needs to show performance. Because the defendant could 
not have sued if the act had not been performed. If, on the other hand, the 
plaintiff alleges a promise as consideration, an action by the defendant would 
be allowed without having to show performance. This was set-out nicely in 
the subsequent case of Lampleigh v Braithwaite158: 
“For wheresoever I build my promise upon a thing done at my request, 
the execution of the act must pursue the request, for it is like a case of 
commission for this purpose […] But if it be executory, as in 
consideration, that you shall serve me a year, I will give you ten 																																																																																																																																																													
Westcott (1616) 1 Rolle 381, 81 Eng. Rep. 549; Townsend v Hunt (1635) Cro. Car. 409, 82 
Eng. Rep. 710 
154 reported as Marsh v Kavenford (1587) in Cro. Eliz. 59, or 78 Eng. Rep. 319; as Marsh 
and Rainsford’s Case (1588) in 2 Leonard 111, or 74 Eng. Rep. 400 
155 Hodge v Vavisour (1616) 3 Bulstrode 222, or 81 Eng. Rep. 188 
156 B. Simpson (1975) A History of the Common Law of Contract : The Rise of the Action of 
Assumpsit, Oxford : Clarendon Press, at p. 458 ; see also Joscelin v Shelton (1557) 3 
Leonard 4, or 74 Eng. Rep. 503; Pecke v Redman (1556) 2 Dyer 113a, or 73 Eng. Rep. 
248 ; Simmes v Westcott (1588) 1 Leonard 299, or 74 Eng. Rep. 273; Applethwait and 
Nertleys Case (1590) 4 Leonard 56, or 74 Eng. Rep. 727 
157 (1586) Godbolt 95, or 78 Eng. Rep. 58 
158 (1616) Hob 105, or 80 Eng. Rep. 255 
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pounds; here you cannot bring your action ‘till the service performed. 
But if it were a promise on either side executory, it needs not to aver 
performance, for it is the counter-promise, and not the performance, 
that makes the consideration…” 
 
The distinction between promise and future act as consideration was also 
made indirectly in cases dealing with mutual promises as consideration. It is 
clearly set out in the passage from Lampleigh v Braithwaite quoted above. 
But the issue was dealt with much earlier in West v Stowell 159  when a 
promise to pay £10 was made against the promise to win an archery match. 
The decision was not reported, but the argument in favour of holding that 
mutual promises is good consideration was argued by Mounson J.: 
“…the consideration is sufficient, for here this counter promise is a 
reciprocal promise, and so a good consideration, for all the 
communication ought to be taken together.” 
 
Manwood J. objected on the grounds that the bettor was not a party to the 
archery match and such consideration could only hold if both promising 
parties were also both involved in the match. The principle to recognise 
mutual promises as good consideration can be found in many subsequent 
cases.160 
 
3.3 Types of consideration – some examples 
 
From the early common law premise that a promise was actionable if it was 
given in return for a payment or some sort of recompense (i.e. the concept of 
																																																								
159 (1577) 2 Leonard 154, or 74 Eng. Rep. 437 
160 Sackford v Phillips (1593) Owen 109 ; Moore K.B. 690, 72 Eng. Rep. 842; Gower v 
Capper (1596) Cro. Eliz. 543 78 Eng. Rep. 842; Metcalfe’s Case (1597) Moore K.B. 549, 72 
Eng. Rep. 750; Wichals v Johns (1599) Cro. Eliz. 703, Moore K.B. 574, 78 Eng. Rep. 938; 
Lea v Exelby (1602) Cro. Eliz. 888, 78 Eng. Rep. 1112; Bettisworth v Campion (1609) 
Yelverton 133, 80 Eng. Rep. 90; Nichols v Raynbred (1615) Hob. 88, 80 Eng. Rep. 238; 
Spanish Ambassador v Gifford (1616) 1 Rolle Rep. 336, 81 Eng. Rep. 526; Lampleigh v 
Braithwaite (1616) Hob. 105, 80 Eng. Rep. 255; Harleton v Webb (1626) Benloe 150; 
Browne v Downing (1620) 2 Rolle 194, 81 Eng. Rep. 745; Bibble v Cunningham (1628) 
Hetley 89, 124 Eng. Rep. 365; Shann v Bilby (1651) Style 280, 83 Eng. Rep. 710; Ernely v 
Lord Falkland (1655) Hard. 103 ; Bennett v Astell (1660) 1 Lev. 20, 83 Eng. Rep. 276; Anon. 
(1662) 1 Lev. 87, 83 Eng. Rep. 311; Peters v Opie (1671) 1 Vent. 177, 86 Eng. Rep. 120; 
Smith v Shilbury (1675) Freemen 165 
Chapter	V:	The	Origins	of	the	Concept	of	Consideration	108	
bargain as a two-sided agreement)161 emerged the idea that promises made 
for considerations other than money or recompense could also be 
enforceable. In the Golding’s Case, Egerton said that: 
“In every action upon the case upon a promise, there are three things 
considerable, consideration, promise and breach of promise.”162 
 
Recompense - benefit/detriment 
 
Beyond the notion of recompense as consideration emanated the more 
general principle that a benefit to the promisor constitutes good 
consideration. Actions involving marriage as consideration (see below) are 
good examples for this line of thinking. Also relevant in this context are cases 
where the plaintiff has performed some service of the promisor.163 The rule 
that a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee can constitute 
good consideration was set out by Coke in Stone v Wythipol164: 
 “..no consideration can be good, if not, that it touch either the charge 
of the plaintiff, or the benefit of the defendant, and none of them is in 
our case, for the plaintiff is not at any charge, for which the defendant 
can have any benefit, for it is but the forbearance of the debt, which 
she was not compellable to pay…” 
 
A series of cases brought in the Elizabethan courts have adopted this 
principle165 and these are the best evidence to refute the premise that the 
concept of consideration emanates from the single source of quid pro quo. 
 
While the facts in many cases can be seen in terms of both benefit to the 
promisor and detriment to the promise, there are situations when an actual 																																																								
161 “…a bargain and sale is, when a recompense is given by both parties; as if a man 
bargains his land to another for money, here the land is a recompense to the one for the 
money, and the money is a recompense to the other for the land, and thus is properly a 
bargain and sale.” Sharington v Strotton (1564) 1 Plowden 298 at 303, or 75 Eng. Rep. 454 
at 461 
162 (1586) 2 Leonard 72, or 74 Eng. Rep. 367 
163 (1572) Rogers v Snow, Dalison 94, or 123 Eng. Rep. 301; also Onely v Earl of Kent 
(1577) Dyer 355b, or 73 Eng Rep. 797; Webb’s Case (1577) 4 Leonard 110, or 74 Eng. Rep. 
763; West v Stowell (1577) 2 Leonard 154, or 74 Eng. Rep. 437 
164 (1588) 1 Leonard 113, or 78 Eng. Rep. 106, or (1593) Cro. Eliz. 126, or 78 Eng. Rep. 
383 ; see also Richards v Bartlet  (1584) 1 Leonard 19, or 74 Eng. Rep. 17 
165 Webb’s Case (1576) 4 Leonard 110, or 74 Eng. Rep. 763; Gill v Harewood (1586) 1 
Leonard 61, or 74 Eng. Rep. 57; Preston v Tooley (1587) Cro. Eliz. 74, or 78 Eng. Rep. 334; 
Foster v Scarlett (1587) Cro Eliz. 70, or 78 Eng. Rep. 330 ; Wichals v Johns (1599) Cro. Eliz. 
703, or 78 Eng. Rep. 938   
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benefit is non-existent, such as for example in cases of gratuitous contracts 
of bailment or loan which lacked an element of remuneration. 166  In St. 
German the student says: 
“…if I promise to another to keep him such certain goods safely to, 
such a time, and after I refuse to take them, there lies no action 
against me for it. But if I take them, and after they be lost or impaired 
through my negligent keeping, there an action lies.”167 
 
This may also include situations when work that was requested was 
performed without the success hoped for and thus without benefit to the 
promisor, as was the case in Lampleigh v Braithwaite168 where the plaintiff 
did not obtain the pardon from the King that the defendant had asked him to 
secure. Here the promisor enjoyed no benefit but the promisee, having relied 
on the promise for payment, had to bear the detriment of having journeyed at 
his own expenses to see the King.  
 
Forbearance 
 
Linked to the benefit/detriment debate is another scenario, namely that of an 
act of forbearance and whether it could constitute sufficient consideration to 
uphold an agreement. Holdsworth169 identifies three types of cases where an 
act of forbearance is at issue: 
 
(i) when the promise was made in consideration of a forbearance to 
prosecute a groundless claim: in Stone v Wythipol 170  it was held that 
forbearance to prosecute an invalid claim was no consideration. While a 
																																																								
166 e.g. Fooly v Preston (1586) 1 Leonard 297, or 74 Eng. Rep. 270 ; Byne v Playne (1590) 1 
Leonard 220, or 74 Eng. Rep. 202 ; Riches v Briggs (1602) Yelverton 4, or 80 Eng. Rep. 4, 
or Cro. Eliz 883, or 78 Eng. Rep. 1108 : this decision was reversed in the Exchequer 
Chamber, the reversal was commented as erroneous in : Game v Harvie (1604) Yelverton 
50, or 80 Eng. Rep. 36 ; Pickas v Guile (1608) Yelverton 128, or 80 Eng. Rep. 86 ; Wheatley 
v Low (1623) Cro Jac. 668, or 79 Eng. Rep. 578 
167 Ch. St. German (1518/1974), Doctor and Student, Second Dialogue, Chapter 24, edited 
by T. Plucknett, J. Barton (1974) for the Selden Society, vol. 91 
168 (1616) Hob 105, or 80 Eng. Rep. 255 
169 W.S. Holdsworth(1925) History of English Law vol. VIII, London: Sweet & Maxwell at pp. 
18-25; see also J.B. Ames (1899) Two theories of Consideration, in: 12 Harvard Law 
Review, 515-539 and 13 Harvard Law Review, 29-42 
170  (1588) 1 Leonard 113, or 78 Eng. Rep. 106, or (1593) Cro. Eliz. 126, or 78 Eng. Rep. 
383  
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case171 three centuries later confirmed this rule, forbearance to prosecuting a 
bona fide claim did amount to good consideration. 
 
(ii) when a promise was made by a creditor to his debtor that, in 
consideration that the debtor would pay or promise to pay his debt wholly or 
in part, the creditor would release him: in Pinnel’s Case172 a rule which had 
already been voiced in previous cases, was confirmed that: 
“…the payment of a lesser sum on the day in satisfaction of a greater, 
cannot be any satisfaction for the whole, because it appears to the 
judges that by no possibility, a lesser sum can be satisfaction to the 
plaintiff for a greater sum…” 
 
This was about the discharge of an agreement and the rule laid down that 
the payment of the whole or a part cannot constitute a discharge nor can it 
be a consideration for an agreement to discharge a contract. However, in 
another line of cases, the court held that obtaining a speedy, though only 
partial payment but without a legal action was good consideration for a 
promise to release a debt because of the benefit derived from such part-
payment by the promisor. In Reynolds v Pinhowe:173 
“all the court held that it to be well enough; for it is a benefit unto him 
to have it without suit or charge.” 
 
This was confirmed in subsequent cases174 until the matter was finally settled 
in the 19th century: a part payment by a debtor to his creditor cannot be good 
consideration for a promise by the creditor to release his debtor.175 
 
(iii) when a promise was made by a third party that he would do something 
for one of the parties to a subsisting valid contract, if that party would perform 
or promise to perform his duty under the contract: this situation arose 
rarely 176  and is reminiscent of a promise-in-consideration-of-a-promise 
scenario where consideration has been recognised as valid. But the courts 																																																								
171 Callisher v Bischoffsheim (1870) L.R. 5 Q.B. 449 
172 (1602) 5 Co. Rep. 117a, or 77 Eng. Rep. 237 
173 (1595) Cro. Eliz. 429, or 78 Eng. Rep. 669 
174 e.g. Bagge v Slade (1613) 3 Bulstrode 162, or 81 Eng. Rep. 137; Flight v Crasden (1625) 
Cro. Car. 8, or 79 Eng. Rep. 612; Johnson v Astell (1667) 1 Lev. 198, or 83 Eng. Rep. 367; 
175 Foakes v Beer (1884) 9 A.C. 605 
176 Sherwood v Woodward (1600) Cro. Eliz. 700, or 78 Eng Rep. 935; Bagge v Slade (1613) 
3 Bulstrode 162, or 81 Eng. Rep. 137 
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went further in these cases by stressing that the receipt of payment was a 
benefit to the creditor and this was the main reason for them to hold the 
consideration as valid. 
 
Charitable promises 
 
The rule that promises failing to provide a benefit to the promisor should also 
be actionable is reiterated by the Student in his dialogue with the Doctor: 
“all promises shall be taken in this manner: that is to say, if he to 
whom the promise is made have a charge by reason of the promise, 
which he has also performed, then in that case he shall have an action 
for that thing that was promised, though he that made the promise 
have no worldly profit by it.”177 
 
If this applies to ‘all’ promises that should also include charitable promises 
and those made for the benefit of third parties. This may involve promises to 
pay school/tuition fees for a youngster or to pay a medical doctor to cure a 
poor man etc. The common element in these scenarios is the lack of direct 
benefit for the promisor. This is reminiscent of the many cases involving 
promises of payment in consideration of a marriage, but as described below, 
the account of marriage was distinguished from other charitable promises on 
the grounds that the father enjoyed the pleasure of the advancement of his 
daughter. Injurious reliance without benefit to the promisor was at issue in 
Lord Grey’s Case 178  which explicitly approved an earlier decision. 179 
Simpson180 recounts the discussions from a number of further cases, some 
of which were inconclusive but, as he points out, in none of them was there 
explicit reference to the charitable nature of the promises in question. But he 
believes it was likely that the demands of Christian charity may have swayed 
the courts to allow gratuitous promises to be actionable in assumpsit. 
																																																								
177 Ch. St. German (1518/1974), Doctor and Student, Second Dialogue, Chapter 24, edited 
by T. Plucknett, J. Barton (1974) for the Selden Society, vol. 91  
178 (1567)  reported in: J.Baker & S.F.C.Milsom (1986) Sources of English Legal History. 
Private Law to 1750, London : Butterworth, at p. 492 
179 Jordan’s or Tatam’s Case (1535) Y.B. 27 Mich. Hen. VIII, 24, 3 or LBEx. 
180  B. Simpson (1975) A History of the Common Law of Contract : The Rise of the Action of 
Assumpsit, Oxford : Clarendon Press, at pp. 430-431 
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However, it would be erroneous to conclude that the element of detriment 
was seen as consideration for the promise. Simpson181 argues that: 
“the natural requirement derived from a theory of injurious reliance is 
that the detriment must be induced by the promisor, not that it should 
be the motive for the promise, and the difference, though nice, is not 
always unimportant.” 
 
Friendship, love and natural affection 
 
The area most associated with the causa/motivation outlook was that of 
natural love and affection. The consideration clause has been used 
prominently in the context of marriage. Anyone systematically reading 
assumpsit/consideration cases will be struck by the relatively high proportion 
of actions where marriage is at issue. This is also borne out by examining the 
‘consideration’ corpus (ECc) that was constituted for this research from 
volumes 72, 73 and 123 of the English Reports and where we find the word 
marriage 61 times in a proximity span of twenty words to the left and to the 
right of ‘consideration’. The same search methodology on the same corpus 
found consideration 51 times in proximity of 'covenant', 25 instances of 
'assumpsit', 20 instances of 'promise' and 13 instances of 'debt' but again 
only twice in the proximity of 'contract'. 
 
Friendship and affection (outside the family/marriage) was held to be 
insufficient consideration.182 Though temporarily questioned in Lord Grey’s 
Case 183  by linking friendship to benefit consideration, the principle 
established in Hunt v Bate prevailed. The case law provides a more complex 
answer to the question of whether love and affection within the family 
constitutes consideration. In Sharington v Strotton184 several aspects of love 
and natural affection as consideration were discussed and Plowden argued 
that the continuance of male heirs constituted good consideration because: 																																																								
181 B. Simpson (1975) A History of the Common Law of Contract : The Rise of the Action of 
Assumpsit, Oxford : Clarendon Press, at p. 432 
182 Hunt v Bate  (1568) Dyer 272, or 73 Eng. Rep. 605 :  “…promises for this friendship to 
save him…”  
183 (1567) reported in J.H. Baker & S.F.C. Milsom (1986) Sources of English Legal History. 
Private Law to 1750, London: Butterworth, at p. 492  
184 (1564) 1 Plowden 298, or 75 Eng. Rep. 454 
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“men are for the greatest part more reasonable than women, and have 
more discretion to guide and manage things than women have, for to 
govern and direct is more suitable to the capacity of the male than of 
the female.” 
 
Also, excluding female heirs in favour of men, ensured a continuance of the 
name. It must be stressed that the central issue in this case was whether a 
use would lie. The argument against allowing this consideration was clearly 
grounded in a quid pro quo approach, arguing that brotherly love and long 
acquaintance constituted no monetary value: 
“…the consideration ought to be to him that is seized of the land, for if 
he has no recompence, there is not cause why the use of his land 
should pass; And none of the considerations contain a recompence 
here, for the continuance of the land in his blood and name of B. is no 
recompence to him, nor cause worthy to raise a use; no more is the 
brotherly love and favour which he bore to E.B., or to his other 
brothers, for although these causes induce affection, yet every 
affection is not sufficient cause to alter the use. For if a man grants to 
J.S. that in consideration of their long acquaintance, or of their great 
familiarity, or of their being scholars together in their youth, or upon 
such like considerations, he will stand seized of his land to his use, 
this will not change the use, for such considerations are not looked 
upon in the law as worthy to raise a use, because they don’t import 
any value or recompense […]” 
 
The counter-argument favoured looking beyond purely monetary value at the 
wider motivation for an undertaking: 
“If I make a contract with another, that if he will take my daughter to 
wife, I will give him £20, in this case if he takes her to wife, he shall 
have an action of debt for the £20 […] and yet I have nothing for it, 
and if it was not out of regard to nature, this should be called a nude 
contract, et ex nudo pacto non oritur actio. But, Sir, my daughter is 
advanced by the marriage, which is a sufficient consideration to me for 
the £20. So that a consideration proceeding from nature is a sufficient 
consideration in our law. And from these reasons and cases it is 
manifest that things proceeding from nature are respected not only in 
philosophy, but also in our law, and are of great force and operation in 
our law, and therefore are esteemed to be good and sufficient 
considerations. From whence it follows that the consideration of A.B., 
here expressed for the provision of his heirs males is a sufficient 
consideration to raise a use in the land […] 
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[…] the continuance of the land in the name of B. […] seems to be a 
good consideration to raise a use […] here A.B. deserves to be 
praised and commended for his gratuity by all those of the name of B. 
And therefore for these reasons there is a sufficient consideration in 
the limitation of the name to raise a use. […] the continuance of the 
land in his brothers and others of his blood, it is also founded upon 
nature. […] From whence we see that by the law of nature, and by the 
law of the realm, and by the law of God (which in intent approves them 
both) brotherly love and advancement of one’s blood is taken to be of 
great effect, and seems to be a sufficient consideration to raise a use 
in land […]” 
 
In 1588185, the decision went the other way (this was partly also because the 
consideration was past): 
“Love is not a consideration, upon which an action can be grounded; 
the like of friendship…” 
 
But maybe more important for the debate was that in cases where 
love/affection was declared as consideration to pass a use, it was held as 
constituting good consideration. It appears that when passing a use the wider 
underlying motivation, namely to strengthen family settlements in particular in 
relation to landed property, was given more prominence. This can also be 
traced back to actions where marriage was considered good consideration to 
support a covenant to pass a use186 and to the recognition of consideration in 
equity.187  
 
Cases involving marriage as consideration offer yet another scenario. In the 
second case reported under Hunt v Bate,188 a definite distinction was made 
between cases involving friendship as consideration and those where 
marriage was the consideration. In cases of the latter sort, the promise and 																																																								
185 Harford and Gardiner’s Case (1588) 2 Leonard 30, or 74 Eng. Rep. 332 
186 Assaby v Lady Manners (1516) Dyer 335a, or 73 Eng Rep. 520 
187 Discussing the equitable doctrine of consideration is beyond the scope of this paper ; for 
this and contract in equity in general see, for example, W.T. Barbour (1914) The History of 
Contract in Early English Equity, in : P. Vinogradoff Oxford Studies in Social and Legal 
History, Oxford : Clarendon, at pp. 66- 169 ; H. Barlow (1793) Treatise on Equity, vol. I, 
Dublin : Byrne, Moore, Jones, Lynch and Watts, at pp. 326-379 ; B. Simpson (1975) A 
History of the Common Law of Contract : The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit, Oxford : 
Clarendon Press, at p. 455 
188 Hunt v Bate (1568) Dyer 272, or 73 Eng. Rep. 605  
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consideration were frequently not contemporaneous, but love and natural 
affection was seen as constituting continuous consideration, even in cases 
that did not involve a use. In Sidenham v Worlington189 Anderson said that 
“marriage is always a present consideration.” This was confirmed in Marsh v 
Rainsford190 where Wrey, J. held that: 
“here the natural affection of the father to his daughter, is sufficient 
matter of consideration.” 
 
In other words, love and natural affection in the context of family and 
marriage is continuous, precisely because of the family/marriage bond and, 
as part of a wider principle, it should be upheld as good consideration. In 
Browne v Garborough, 191  Shuttleworth appears to confirm the family 
restriction by arguing that the woman at the centre of a marriage deal: 
“was a mere stranger to the defendant; and there was no reason for 
him to give her one hundred pounds in marriage.” 
 
In the event, the court found that a family link between the woman and the 
defendant did exist and the issue was therefore not discussed further. 
 
Barker v Halifax 192  was also about past consideration, but assumpsit in 
consideration of a marriage was held as good “for the affection and 
consideration always continues.” The element of continuity was also 
accepted in Brett v. J.S. and his Wife193 where natural affection of a mother 
for her son was not accepted as a sufficient consideration to ground an 
action without an express quid pro quo, which was the son’s continued board 
in this case: 
“… But it is here good, because it is not only in consideration of 
affection, but that her son should afterwards continue at his table, 
which is good as well for the money due before, as for what should 
afterwards become due…” 
 
Similarly, in Townsend v Hunt194 per Berkley J.: 																																																								
189 (1585) 2 Leonard 224, or 74 Eng. Rep. 497 
190 (1586) 2 Leonard 111, or 74 Eng. Rep. 400 
191 (1587) Cro. Eliz. 64, or 78 Eng. Rep. 324 
192 (1599) Cro. Eliz 741, or 78 Eng. Rep. 974 
193 (1600) Cro. Eliz. 756, or 78 Eng. Rep. 987 
194 (1635) Cro. Car. 408, or 79 Eng. Rep. 955 
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“it had been a consideration continuing, as in consideration of 
marrying his daughter or cousin, which is a gift in frank-marriage, it 
had been good…” 
 
From this line of cases, it can be concluded that love and natural affection in 
the context of family/marriage constitutes an exception to the general 
principle that past consideration is not enforceable, because the 
family/marriage link renders the consideration continuous. In other words, 
while love and natural affection does not, as such, constitute consideration in 
assumpsit, a promise made in consideration of love and natural affection and 
in consideration of a past act could be actionable. 
 
******** 
 
From the discussion so far it is striking to observe that the (mainly) 16th 
century case law concerned itself with exploring the issue of when a 
breached promise was actionable rather than laying down what constitutes a 
binding promise. This can be explained in part by the evolution from the 
refusal (13th/14th c.) to enforce any agreement wanting a seal or quid pro 
quo, stretching actions of trespass to include misfeasance and later non-
feasance during the late 14th and 15th centuries, to allowing certain 
undertakings and informal promises to become legally enforceable in the late 
15th and 16th centuries. With this last step came the inevitable necessity to 
ring-fence the possibility of bringing an action for a breached promise. In the 
words of Plowden reporting Sharington v Strotton: 
“And, Sir, by the law of this land there are two ways of making 
contracts or agreements for lands or chattels. The one is, by words, 
which is the inferior method; the other is, by writing, which is the 
superior. And because words are oftentimes spoken by men 
unadvisedly and without deliberation, the law has provided that a 
contract by words shall not bind without consideration.”195 
 
In other words, consideration was used to check the floodgates from opening 
too wide, and to limit assumpsit action to those where the promise was 
supported by consideration. It was not devised as part of an overall doctrine 
																																																								
195 (1564) 1 Plowden 298 at 308, or 75 Eng. Rep. 460 at 470 
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of contract law. Indeed, there was no general common law theory of contract 
law at the time - that would be initiated only in the 18th century by Blackstone 
and his treatise-writing contemporaries. Today’s contract law doctrine of offer 
and acceptance as the moment when a promise becomes binding, was 
unknown then and there was no requirement, as there is in modern contract 
law, for the plaintiff to show that a contract had been made. Instead, it had to 
be demonstrated that a promise had been made for good consideration but 
had not been honoured. In the words of Houghton, J.: 
“A contract by parole on good consideration is as strong (binding) as a 
covenant by deed…”196 
 
The rules about what type of consideration could be legally enforced evolved 
rather haphazardly, as we have seen from the description of the case law 
above. But as Simpson197 points out, it would be inappropriate to view these 
rules as revealing some underlying reality in terms of social conditions or 
ideas. 
 
4. Consideration as a moral obligation – the concept in the 18th 
century 
 
Towards the end of the 17th century, the language and terminology used in 
cases involving consideration had settled and evolved into technical jargon. 
But the underlying concept, though much more ascertainable by then, had 
developed in a piecemeal fashion. It was only from the mid-18th century that 
treatise writers began to voice the need to search for a more general theory 
of contract, no doubt encouraged by the very comprehensive writings of 
Pothier on the subject. 198  An 1806 English translation of the Traité des 
obligations was widely known in both England and America, though some 																																																								
196 Winter v Foweracres (1618) 2 Rolle 39, or 81 Eng. Rep. 645 
197 B. Simpson (1975) A History of the Common Law of Contract : The Rise of the Action of 
Assumpsit, Oxford : Clarendon Press, at pp. 487-488 
198 Traité des obligations, selon les règles tant du for la conscience, que du for extérieur, was 
first published in France in 1761-1764; a first American translation was published by F.X. 
Martin in 1802: A Treatise on Obligations considered in a Moral and Legal View, Newburn, 
NC: Martin & Ogden; an English translation followed in 1806 by Sir William Evans: A 
Treatise on the Law of Obligations, Or Contracts (republished in Philadelphia in 1826, 1839 
and 1853) 
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may have already read it in its French original, and it had a major influence 
on a great many Anglo-American writers on contract. 
 
On a more general level, the late 17th and 18th centuries saw considerable 
shifts in socio-political thinking shaping Western societies and England was 
no exception to these influences of the Enlightenment, although as Fifoot 
interjects: 
“England […] had not yet abandoned the defects or privileges of 
insularity. Her contact with the Continent was precarious, and it was 
not surprising that an intellectual movement, European in essence, 
should be translated into terms at once less magical and less 
drastic…”199 
 
But the basic premise was similar, namely the rejection of extrinsic authority 
in favour of the voice of reason and natural law. A figure at the centre of 
these changes and a leader in wanting to move the law away from the land-
centred outlook and rigid professional traditions and procedures was William 
Murray, 1st Earl of Mansfield. Of Scottish descent, he acquired, as a student 
at Oxford and in Lincoln’s Inn, a broad legal knowledge that went well 
beyond the confines of the English legal system. He was well-read in French, 
Dutch and Scottish law and legal writings, and was particularly interested in a 
comparative approach, which served him well when he set about correcting 
the insularity of English law. He was a child of the century that followed the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688, when the political system was no longer 
grounded in authority but based on reason.200 He is generally known for his 
contributions to the area of commercial and maritime law, aiming to make 
international commercial law an integral part of both the common law and 
equity. Relying on his knowledge of other systems of law, he went beyond 
the traditional thinking of established categories and models and his 
comparative outlook allowed him to find solutions by breaking away from 
rigid professional traditions and procedures. His understanding of the 
learning of continental lawyers allowed him, on the one hand, to view 																																																								
199 C.H.S.Fifoot (1977/reprint of 1936 edition) Lord Mansfield, Aalen: Scientia Verlag, at p. 1 
200 N. Poser (2013) Lord Mansfield. Justice in the Age of Reason, Montreal & Kingston : 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, at pp. 3-10 
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critically the law and procedures he was confronted with, and on the other 
hand, he was able to adapt continental rules to the English legal system to 
modernise its workings. However, he was not advocating large legislative 
changes to the law; rather he worked towards an adaptation of old rules and 
principles to the new circumstances and needs of modern times. And by 
delving into his knowledge of continental systems of law and writings, he was 
able to ground his decisions on underlying principles that were acceptable to 
both the English and continental lawyers. His basic premise was that cases 
should always be interpreted in view of underlying principles. While he 
acknowledged that the workings of precedents cannot allow rules of law to 
be overturned, “the cases must if possible be so interpreted as to bring them 
into conformity with those principles.”201 This is reminiscent of Scottish law 
where:  
“the search was not for the appropriate form of writ, but for the legal 
principle involved […] The formulary system and the fictions of the 
English common law, the outcome of pure empiricism, find no 
counterpart in the history of the law of Scotland.”202 
 
It is also from Scottish law that Mansfield imported a theory of consideration 
he thought more appropriate than the concept that had been worked out in 
the English courts hitherto. His basic premise was to prevent unjust 
enrichment203 and he developed this idea in Moses v Macferlan when he said 
that: 
“If the defendant be under an obligation, from the ties of natural justice 
to refund; the law implies a debt, and gives this action, founded in the 
equity of the plaintiff’s case, as it were upon a contract (“quasi ex 
contractu,” as the Roman law expresses it).” 204 
The first attempt to actively reform consideration can be found in his ruling of 
Pillans and Rose v Van Mierop and Hopkins,205 a merchant law case in 																																																								
201 W. Holdsworth (1938/1966 reprint) Some Makers of English Law, Cambridge: CUP, at 
pp.166-167 
202 H.P. Macmillan (1932) Scots Law as a subject of comparative study, in 48 Law Quarterly 
Review, 477- 487, at p. 482 
203 M. Lobban (2010) Contract, in W. Cornish, S. Anderson, R. Cocks, M. Lobban, P. Polden, 
K. Smith (eds.) The Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol. XII (1820-1314), Oxford: 
OUP, at pp. 361-366 
204 (1760) 2 Burr. 1005, or 97 Eng. Rep. 676, at p. 678 
205 (1765) 3 Burr. 1663, or 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 
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which the defendant’s promise lacked consideration in any technical sense. It 
is a case well known for a number of innovative propositions, one of which 
was his equation of consideration with mere evidence of an agreement: 
“I take it, that the ancient notion about the want of consideration was 
for the sake of evidence only: for when it is reduced into writing, as in 
covenants, specialties, bonds &c. there was no objection to the want 
of consideration.” 
 
He also affirmed that the law of merchants and the law of the land were the 
same and that the concept of nudum pactum did not exist in the usage and 
law of merchants. He concluded that: 
“in commercial cases amongst merchants, the want of consideration is 
not an objection.” 
 
Mansfield’s point was historically justifiable to the extent that consideration 
had been seen as part of the toolbox that ring-fenced agreements to 
distinguish enforceable and non-enforceable promises. Hence, consideration 
was part of a ‘list’ of technical conditions under which actions of assumpsit 
would lie. The question of evidence had been addressed by the 1677 Statute 
of Frauds 206  imposing the written form for certain types of agreements. 
Mansfield concluded that the statute replaced the older requirement of 
considerations.207 This decision brought English law momentarily closer to 
continental laws by sketching deliberate intention as the test of a binding 
contract. 
 
However, this attempt at reforming consideration was reversed in 1778 by 
the House of Lords’ ruling in Rann v Hughes: 
“…the present case did not afford a pretext of any benefit or 
indulgence stipulated for by the defendant, or anything to be done or 
omitted by the plaintiffs, as a consideration for the promise stated to 
have been made by the defendant…”208 
 																																																								
206 An Act for prevention of Frauds and Perjuryes, Statute of the Realm: vol. 5: 1628-90, at 
pp. 839-842; originally published by Great Britain Record Commission, s.l, 1819; 
www.british-history.ac.uk 
207 “And the Statute of Frauds proceeded upon the same principle.” (1765) 3 Burr. 1663 at 
1669, or 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 at 1038 
208 (1778) 4 Bro. P.C. 27, or 2 Eng. Rep. 18, or 7 T.R. 350 
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This reversal did not prevent Mansfield from pursuing his reforms of the law 
relating to consideration. It led to his attempt to introduce the concept of 
moral consideration to support a contract. This was based on the notion that 
a moral obligation is inherent in the making of a contract and it was an 
attempt to import into the doctrine of consideration his own view that the 
basic function of a contract was to implement the intentions of the parties. If 
the basis of moral obligation could be accepted, it would allow for the 
distinction between written and oral agreements to become obsolete. 
Mansfield’s efforts to reform the English law was a less glorious chapter, 
because although supported and propagated by several of his colleagues, 
the reforms did not last. 
 
But to view moral obligations as the primary factor that makes a promise 
actionable, was not just an inspiration from across the Scottish border. The 
equitable conception of consideration had allowed for an exception to the 
rule that consideration must move from the promise. Furthermore, traces of 
the notion of moral consideration could already be found to a certain extent in 
the action of indebitatus assumpsit. The decision in the Slade’s Case209 had 
established that the existence of a preceding debt imports a promise and 
assumpsit will lie despite the fact that there had been no express promise to 
pay. In 1697, a defendant was held bound to a debt incurred during his 
minority210 and a couple of years later a promise to pay a debt bared by the 
Statute of Limitation was enforceable.211 In both cases, indebitatus assumpsit 
was brought on a preceding debt that had incurred but was not enforceable. 
The last two cases were used by Mansfield as precedent to support his view 
in Hawkes v Saunders.212 But in contrast to the earlier cases, the Mansfield’s 
reasoning relied entirely on equitable considerations, which weakens 
considerably the link to the earlier cases as precedents. 
In Hawkes Mansfield started by discussing: 
																																																								
209 (1602) 4 Co. Rep. 92a 
210 Ball v Hesketh (1697), Comb. 381, or 90 Eng. Rep. 541 
211 Hyleing v Hastings (1699) 1 Ld. Raym. 389 
212 (1782) 1 Cowp. 289, or 98 Eng. Rep. 1091 
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“…whether the defendant having assets sufficient to pay all the debts 
and legacies, is, or is not sufficient consideration for her to make a 
promise to pay the legacy in question? As to that point, the rules laid 
down at the Bar, as to what is or is not a good consideration in law, 
goes upon a very narrow ground indeed; namely, that to make a 
consideration to support an assumpsit, there must be either an 
immediate benefit to the party promising, or a loss to the person to 
whom the promise was made. I cannot agree to that being the only 
ground of consideration sufficient to raise an assumpsit. Where a man 
is under a legal or equitable obligation to pay, the law implies a 
promise, though none was ever actually made. A fortiori, a legal or 
equitable duty is a sufficient consideration for an actual promise. 
Where a man is under a moral obligation, which no Court of Law or 
Equity can inforce, and promise, the honesty and rectitude of the thing 
is a consideration.” 
 
Referring to Hyleing v Hastings and Ball v Hesketh, he continues: 
“As if a man promise to pay a just debt, the recovery of which is barred 
by the Statute of Limitations: or if a man, after he comes of age, 
promises to pay a meritorious debt contracted during his minority, but 
not for necessaries […] In such and many other instances, though the 
promise gives a compulsory remedy, where there was none before 
either in law or equity; yet as the promise is only to do what an honest 
man ought to do, the ties of conscience upon an upright mind are a 
sufficient consideration.” 
 
In Atkins v Hill,213 Mansfield talks about “obligations which would otherwise 
only bind a man’s conscience.” Similarly, in Trueman v Fenton214 Mansfield 
relied on arguments akin to equitable principles, rather than the more 
restrictive common law view that the existence of a precedent debt is good 
consideration: 
“The debts of a bankrupt are due in conscience, notwithstanding he 
has obtained his certificate; and there is no honest man who does not 
discharge them…” 
 
The concept of moral consideration survived Mansfield for a few decades 
and was adopted by a number of his colleagues. As Holdsworth point out, 
Mansfield’s appeals to moral and natural law were: 																																																								
213 (1775) 1 Cowp. 284, or 98 Eng. Rep. 1088  
214 (1777) 2 Cowp. 544, or 98 Eng. Rep. 1232 
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“attractive to the minds of the lawyers of his day; and so the idea that 
a conscientious obligation could be consideration for a promise was 
speedily taken up.”215 
 
It had almost become an accepted doctrine. Twenty years after Mansfield’s 
death, references to his idea of moral consideration were made in Lee v 
Muggeridge: 
“Lord Mansfield C.J. thought the rule of nudum pactum was too strict, 
and that it was competent for parties to make their own agreement on 
deliberation, and if they did so think fit to make them, that they must 
be subject to them. It is now fully recognised in the law, that if there 
be, even in the strictest morality, the foundation for a promise, and the 
promise be accordingly made, it is binding. It is a new ligamen, though 
not a new consideration; for if there were a new consideration, it would 
be clearly good.”216 
 
In Atkins v Banwell217 Lord Ellenborough C.J. said that “a moral obligation is 
a good consideration for an express promise.” He confirmed this in Wing v 
Mill 218  with the words: “In this case both the legal and moral obligation 
obtain.” As late as 1863, we can find Pollock C.B. referring to the concept of 
moral consideration, although this was perhaps more a linguistic expression 
lingering from the past than a discussion of the underlying concept. One of 
the questions under consideration was: 
“…whether an advance of money under such circumstances as to 
create no legal obligation at the time to repay it can constitute a good 
consideration for an express promise to do so. Such consideration has 
been sometimes called a moral consideration…”219 
 
But the concept had its critics well before then. In a note appended to their 
report of Wendall v Adney220 Bosanquet and Puller attempted to limit the idea 
of allowing an express promise founded simply on an antecedent moral 
obligation to be sufficient to support an assumpsit. They argued that the 
																																																								
215 W.S. Holdsworth(1925) History of English Law vol. VIII, London: Sweet & Maxwell, at p. 
27 
216 (1813) 5 Taunt. 36, or 128 Eng. Rep. 599 
217 (1802) 2 East 505, or 102 Eng. Rep. 462 
218 (1817) 1 B. & Ald. 104, or 106 Eng. Rep. 39 
219 Flight v Reed (1863) 1 H. & C. 703, or 158 Eng. Rep. 1067 at 1072 
220 (1803) 3 Bos. & P., 247 at 250, or 127 Eng. Rep. 137 at 138-141 
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expression of this concept as used by Mansfield may appear of a general 
nature at first, but: 
“…yet the instances adduced by him as illustrative of the rule of law, 
do not carry that rule beyond what the older authorities seem to 
recognise as its proper limits; for in each instance the party bound by 
the promise had received a benefit previous to the promise […] Lord 
Mansfield appears to have used the term moral obligation not as 
expressive of any vague and undefined claim arising from nearness of 
relationship, but of those imperative duties which would be 
enforceable by law, were it not for some positive rule, which, with a 
view to general benefit, exempt the party in that particular instance 
from legal liability […] An express promise, therefore, as it should 
seem, can only revive a precedent good consideration, which might 
have been enforced at law through the medium of an implied promise, 
had it not been suspended by some positive rule of law, but can give 
no original right of action if the obligation on which it is founded never 
could have been enforced at law, though not barred by any legal 
maxim or statute provision.” 
 
This was an attempt to argue for a more restricted reading of the case law 
and that ‘moral consideration’ could not be reconciled with old cases. It was, 
however, not adopted in subsequent actions such as Lee v Muggeridge. 
 
Eventually, in Eastwood v Kenyon 221  the court (per Lord Denman C.J.) 
returned to a more technically strict reading of consideration by putting aside 
the concept of moral consideration, saying that: 
“the doctrine would annihilate the necessity for any consideration at 
all, inasmuch as the mere fact of giving a promise creates a moral 
obligation to perform it.” 
 
The Mansfield episode in the history of consideration is not only interesting 
from the point of view of legal theory, doctrinal developments and legal 
history, but also from the linguistics and terminological angle. The era of the 
Enlightenment comes not only with new ideas but also innovations in 
terminology and shifts in semantic contents. This will be explored in further 
detail in the following chapter.  
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Chapter VI. Corpus linguistic analysis 
 
 
In the previous chapters, we became acquainted with the cultural and 
linguistic landscape of multilingual England and its specific situation of 
medieval legal text production, as well as with the origins and historical 
evolution of the concept of consideration. From our 21st century perspective, 
this doctrine may appear carved in stone: as far back as the legal mind can 
remember, we see the concept and the language used to describe it as long-
standing and well-established companions. Yet, from the discussion in the 
previous chapter, we can observe that the path taken has been a tortuous 
mountain climb rather than a straight run on a stretch of Autobahn. The 
concept originated in a variety of legal issues and one needs to untangle the 
different strands to understand the process. It is, of course, in the nature of 
the common law, especially in its early stages, to evolve in a more organic 
fashion, pushing boundaries without making major changes to the law. 
Ames 1  believed that the action of assumpsit and later the concept of 
consideration was a picture book example of this. 
 
In the context of the customary set-up of the common law, the twists and 
turns the concept of consideration went through can be examined by 
studying the case law, which can be found in the Year Books and Law 
Reports. These  are neither systematic, nor official, nor standardised but 
scant and personal at times, but still offer us plenty of insight into this 
development. In a second step, reported in the present chapter, these same 
sources were exploited for examining the language describing the concept of 
consideration. The terminology was analysed diachronically to reveal the 
evolution of the conceptual perception, on the one hand, and the 
corresponding semantic shifts, on the other. The aim was to evaluate the 
concordance between the historical and conceptual development of 
‘consideration’ and the way the relevant terms and vocabulary were used, 																																																								
1 J.A. Ames (1913) Lectures on Legal History and Miscellaneous Legal Essays, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, at p. 166 
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changed and shifted throughout this evolution, most notably the increased 
abstraction and technicality of both the concept and the language. 
 
The underlying premise for this approach is the deep-level and intrinsic link 
between language and law, as law cannot be imagined without the use of 
language and, in particular, without the use of written language. The account 
of language that is most appropriate to adopt is one which emphasises 
usage, communicative function and social contexts. A study of language as it 
is used in actual social situations and is concerned with meaning, 
communicative functionality and rhetorical purposes2. The function that is of 
particular interest to this research is the representational aspect, which 
encodes our experience of the world and thus conveys a picture of reality. 
Considering the vocabulary used in relation to the concept of making informal 
agreements enforceable by looking beyond the traditional grammar 
classification of the words in question and examining the function they play, 
we can get a more complete and in-depth picture of the evolution of that 
vocabulary. This is best done by undertaking a diachronic linguistic and 
semantic analysis using corpus linguistics methodologies. It is important to 
stress that corpus linguistic work not only provides an empirical basis for 
examining the language, but it has also a heuristic function to the extent that 
the analysis of the material systematized in a corpus generates new 
knowledge. The researcher may find him/herself confronted with results that 
were unexpected. The theoretical framework and methodological choices 
were set out in chapter III above. 
 
1. Methodology 
 
This chapter describes the process used to constitute the corpora that 
formed the basis for the study. Furthermore, it deals with the linguistic 
analysis and will describe the (statistical) results in detail. 
 																																																								
2 On systemic functional linguistics see Chapter III above; also C. Laske (2012) Translators 
and Legal Comparatists as Objective Mediators between Cultures?, in: J. Husa, M. Van 
Hoecke (eds.) Objectivity in Law and Legal Reasoning, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 213-227 
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1.1. Sources 
 
The sources from which the documents were drawn for constituting the 
corpora can be divided into six groups. The full bibliographical information is 
listed in annex 1 and 2: 
 
• Anglo-Norman source texts available on the Anglo-Norman On-Line 
Hub. It includes 76 texts in electronic form, containing more than 5 
million tokens and covering all registers of Anglo-Norman usage. The 
majority of the sources are from the second half of the 14th century, 
though a few date from the mid-13th century. The majority of these 
documents can be dated and localised, which offers greater certainty 
that they come from the said periods and have not been subsequently 
rewritten. The corpus material consists, among others, of 
correspondence, chronicles in both prose and verse, government 
statutes and treatises, ordinances, romance and epic texts, religious 
and devotional prose, texts on hagiography, language pedagogy and 
philosophy etc. It is not a specifically legal corpus, though it includes 
legal texts. The corpus that was constituted from these sources is 
referred to as ANC (Anglo-Norman corpus). 
 
• The very early legal sources, before informal contracts were 
enforceable, but trespass on the case actions began to materialise, 
the quasi-trespasses nature of which being of a fundamentally 
contractual nature; this covers the 14th century and includes sources 
such as the Year Books of the reigns of Edward II, Edward III and 
Richard II. The corpus that was constituted from these sources is 
referred to as ESC (Early sources corpus).  
 
• The York and early Tudor sources, spanning about 150 years from the 
15th century, during which the action of assumpsit materialised and 
with it the shift from primarily proprietary thinking to that of promissory 
exchange. The corpus that was constituted from these sources is 
referred to as SSC (Selden Society corpus). 
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• The Elizabethan and early Stuart sources that can mainly be found in 
volumes 71, 73 and 123 of the English Reports Full Reprint, an era 
that saw the establishment of the concept of consideration as an 
element vital for the enforceability of promises and informal contracts. 
The corpus that was constituted from these sources is referred to as 
EC (Elizabethan corpus). 
 
• The Stuart sources that can be found in volume 81 of the English 
Reports Full Reprint. By that time, the concept of consideration was 
well established. The corpus that was constituted from these sources 
is referred to as  SC (Stuart Corpus). 
 
• The Mansfield sources have been drawn from a variety of reports. It is  
a collection of cases decided by Lord Mansfield and his colleagues, in 
which the idea of consideration as moral obligation was defended. 
These date from the mid-18th to the early 19th century. The corpus that 
was constituted from these sources is referred to as MC (Mansfield 
corpus). 
 
The size of the sources, in terms of word tokens, was only ascertainable for 
the Anglo-Norman texts. The sources from the HeinOnline database do not 
offer the possibility of counting the word tokens. Therefore, statistical 
analysis such as relative frequencies of search terms cannot be undertaken 
in the conventional way. This issue will be discussed in greater detail in 
section 1.3. below. 
 
The sources are presented in both their original language (Latin, Anglo-
French, Middle/Early Modern English) and an English translation undertaken 
by the editor at the time of the publication of the material. Most texts were 
written in two, sometimes three languages (Anglo-French, Middle/Early 
Modern English, Latin) though one language usually dominated. The earlier 
texts had many Latin passages or were entirely in Latin; these were not 
taken into account. The majority of the original language sources are in Law 
French and passages in Middle/Early Modern English tend to be transcripts 
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of declarations made by one of the parties to the action.  All lexical and 
proximity searches were undertaken only on the main original language body 
of texts from the Anglo-French and Middle/Early Modern English sources; all 
(English) translations, editors' footnotes and introduction, or other editorial 
explanations etc. were disregarded. The searches took into account the 
different Anglo-French and Middle/Early Modern English spellings and the 
technique for covering all varieties had to be adapted to each document.3 
 
1.2. Corpora 
 
A corpus is usually defined as a systematic collection of naturally occurring 
texts of both written and spoken language4 that has been computerised. It 
offers the empirical basis for carrying out linguistic investigations. The 
collection of texts is ‘systematic’ because the content and structure of the 
corpus is built according to extra-linguistic principles, in particular in relation 
to the way texts are chosen and sampled. The theoretical question relating to 
corpus design and its representativeness was discussed in chapter III above. 
The corpus for this research was purpose-built, adapting traditional corpus 
linguistics methodologies to the specific situation of multilingual, medieval 
legal texts. The process of constructing the corpus was the result of trial and 
error, very much in the vein of what Biber 5  described as the cyclical 
movement of continuously revising the design following empirical research 
carried out on the initial pilot corpus in order to adjust the design parameters. 
 
A detailed list of the corpora constituted from these sources can be found in 
annex 3. The corpora in text form are accessible via the drop-box set up for 
this project. All details for accessing and using the drop-box are described in 
annex 4. The documents used to constitute the corpora are electronically 
accessible through the following databases: 																																																								
3 The spellings that were taken into account when constituting the corpora and undertaking 
the linguistic analysis are listed in annex 3. 
4 Naturally occurring language is language that has evolved naturally, is hereditary and in 
extended use. 
5 D. Biber (1993) Representativeness in Corpus Design, in: Literary and Linguistic 
Computing, Vol. 8, No. 4, 243-257 
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(i) www.anglo-norman.net - The Anglo-Norman On-Line Hub: 
• Anglo-Norman textbase 
 
(ii) www.heinonline.org - Selden Society Publications and the History of Early 
English Law:  
• Ames Foundation Publications  
• Selden Society (Annual) Series 
• English Legal History Classics  
 
(iii) www.heinonline.org - English Reports: 
• English Reports – Full Reprint (1220-1867) 
 
The material is electronically searchable, though due to constraints of 
copyright, it could not be downloaded in bulk. Therefore, it was decided to 
constitute the corpora on the basis of the occurrence of specific search 
terms. In other words, the source texts (e.g. volumes 72, 73, 123 of the 
English Reports – Full Reprint) were searched for keywords that would 
typically occur in the context of discussing informal agreements (e.g. 
consideration). All texts in which the search term occurred were downloaded 
as extracts. Texts were chosen because they contained the search terms. No 
discrimination was made on the basis of legal content or importance of the 
legal decision in question: land mark cases were included as much as 
unimportant ones. The criteria for selection were lexical not legal. 
 
Every downloaded document had to be reformatted in .txt form, so as to 
make it compatible with the linguistic software. The documents were 
subsequently put together in one of the subcorpora according to specific 
criteria.  In view of the variety of medieval spellings, in particular in the Anglo-
French texts, the searches had to take the form of a fuzzy6 or wildcard7 
query. In some documents, the spelling was so chaotic that a combination of 
several search techniques had to be applied, to make sure nothing was 
missed. 																																																								
6 The ‘fuzzy’ search function is based on an ‘edit distance’ algorithm that search for terms 
similar in spelling. 
7 In a ‘wildcard’ search an asterisk is used to replace one or more characters in a search 
term at its beginning or its end. A wildcard search is helpful in locating variations of a 
particular word, e.g. searching for considera* would include all words that begin with these 
none letters but may end differently, including considerations, considered, considerable etc. 
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The result was a series of purpose-built corpora that were constituted in a 
way and according to criteria unusual for classic corpus linguistics 
methodologies. The following twelve corpora/subcorpora were 
constituted/used: 
 
The Anglo-Norman corpus (ANC) 
The database was used as corpus. 
 
The early sources corpus (ESC) 
Three early Year Book corpora based on the following search terms: 
• assumpsit (ESCa) 
• consideration (ESCc) 
• promise (ESCp). 
 
The Selden Society corpus (SSC)  
Three late York and early Tudor corpora based on the following search 
terms: 
• assumpsit (SSCa) 
• consideration (SSCc) 
• promise (SSCp). 
 
The Elizabethan corpus (EC) 
Three Elizabethan corpora based on the following search terms: 
• assumpsit (ECa) 
• consideration (ECc) 
• promise (ECp). 
 
The Stuart corpus (SC) 
One corpus based on the search term ‘consideration’ (SCc). 
 
The Mansfield corpus (MC) 
Two 18th/19th century corpora drawn from Mansfield’s case law and based on 
the search term ‘consideration’ (MC). 
 
The subcorpora were not constituted systematically on the basis of the same 
search terms, except for ‘consideration’. This was, in part, due to time 
constraints and hence a question of producing the most effective results by 
searching the various time periods with the most relevant terminology. The 
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choice of search terms was guided by the doctrinal evolution of the concept 
of consideration. For example, it made more sense to use the term 
‘assumpsit’ as the basis for a 16th century corpus, which corresponded to the 
‘golden age’ of that particular action, rather than for a 18th/19th century corpus 
when the action had become obsolete. The reason the sources up to the 17th 
century were searched for more terms than the later sources is that the 
15th/16th centuries were a pivotal time in the evolution of the concept. 
Changes in the use of terminology and semantic meanings were most likely 
to be found during that time. 
 
The 18th century Mansfield corpus (MCc) was compiled in a different way 
from the one covering the earlier centuries. For the Selden Society, the 
Elizabethan corpora and the Stuart corpora, texts for inclusion in the corpus 
were chosen on the basis that a specific search term occurred in the 
documents from which the text extracts were drawn – ‘assumpsit’, ‘promise’ 
and ‘consideration’. Case reports were singled out, not on the basis of 
content or whether this was primarily a contract/consideration case, but on 
the presence of the search term(s). In other words, the approach was to 
‘follow’ specific terms, independent of the legal context in which these 
occurred. The opposite approach was adopted for the Mansfield corpus: the 
case reports were selected on the basis of their content and whether these 
were a part of the corpus of cases stipulating Mansfield’s doctrine of 
consideration as moral obligation. 
 
1.3. Size of sources and corpora 
 
To ascertain the size of the source texts, in terms of word tokens, was a 
major difficulty in the methodology for this study. The Anglo-Norman On-Line 
Hub textbase provides the user with the information of how many word 
tokens it contains, as is usual for a database constituted for linguistic 
purposes. However, HeinOnline is a tool for lawyers and legal scholars, and 
it does not prioritise defining the number of word tokens in a document. This 
complicates some statistical analysis, such as relative frequencies of search 
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terms, as these cannot be undertaken in the conventional way. The 
frequency of a term is only of significance if we can put this in proportion by 
juxtaposing it to the total number of tokens in the original text. If we cannot 
ascertain the number of word tokens in the source texts used for the 
linguistic analysis, we lack a common denominator on the basis of which to 
make comparative analysis between the different texts. 
 
It was considered that the next best common denominator to word token is a 
page count for every source document. Although this will not provide a very 
precise basis as documents tend to have different lay-out etc., it is still an 
indication of the length of a text. In the case of the sources used for this 
study, the evaluation of the length of texts on the basis of page count rather 
than word count, provides a suggestion, if not an exact indication, of the 
length of the sources texts. 
 
 
 
Chart 1: size (number of pages) of the sources from which the corpora SSC, EC, SC and 
MC were constituted. The block representing the Selden Society sources do not include the 
Year Books of Edward II and III, which represent 6,450 pages and which were searched 
separately as part of the early sources 
 
A corpus constituted on the basis of, for example, the term ‘consideration’ 
reflects the frequency of that term in the original sources. In the absence of 
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word token statistics for the sources, the page count has been used to 
calculate that relative frequency. Examples for a relative frequency 
calculation: there are 102 instances of ‘consideration’ in the Selden Society 
sources and 465 in the Stuart sources. Their relative frequencies will be 
calculated as follows: 
for the SS sources: 102 : 4109 = 0,0248 
for the S sources: 465 : 941 = 0,4942 
This means we have, on average, 0,025 instances of ‘consideration’ for 
every page in the Selden Society sources and 0,494 instances for every 
page in the Stuart sources. While these are not exact figures, the trend is 
undeniable. 
 
As explained above, the source texts were used to constitute a series of 
corpora by selecting text extracts surrounding the occurrence of specific 
search terms. But the size of each corpus is no reflection of the size of the 
sources from which they were drawn. By using the concordance tool 
Antconc, it was possible to ascertain the word tokens for each corpus. If we 
take the consideration subcorpora as example, we can see from the chart 
below that these subcorpora are very different in size from the sources from 
which they were constituted. The reason for this is easy to explain: the fewer 
occurrences we have for a search term in the sources, the fewer text extracts 
will be downloaded. As the term ‘consideration’ occurred considerably less in 
the vast Selden Society publication sources, the corpus that was constituted 
from these sources is rather small, but that is less a reflection of the size of 
the sources and more one of the relative scarcity of the term.  
 
Any searches of the specific ‘consideration’ corpus for other terms, such as 
for example ‘contract’ or ‘covenant’ will show frequencies in relation to the 
size of that particular corpus but not in relation to the size of the original 
sources. This has meant that it was only possible to ascertain a comparative 
proportional trend of the terms on which the various corpora were 
constituted, namely ‘assumpsit’, ‘promise’ and ‘consideration’. Due to 
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constraints in time, it was impossible to compile more corpora based on other 
search terms. 
 
 
 
Chart 2: size (word tokens) of the ‘consideration’ corpora SSCc, ECc, SCc and MC  
 
With these figures and explanations in mind, we conclude that it would make 
no sense to use the token count of the different corpora as a basis to show 
comparative quantitative analysis and relative frequencies. It would reflect 
the opposite of what can actually be observed. It was therefore decided that 
for this type of analysis a page count was a more representative common 
denominator: even if less precise, it still reflects an approximate evaluation of 
the length of the source texts. 
 
1.4. Linguistic analysis 
 
The linguistics software used for this study is the AntConc8 concordance 
program, which is fully Unicode compliant, meaning that it can handle data in 																																																								
8 AntConc is a concordance program developed  by Laurence Anthony, Director of the 
Centre of English Language Education at the Waseda University in Japan. There are 
versions available for Windows, Mac & Linux. The particular version used for this research 
is: AntConc 3.4.4m (2014). The program can be downloaded at the following pages, which 
also includes links to online guides and video tutorials: 
http://www.antlab.sci.waseda.ac.jp/antconc_index.html  
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any language, including all European and Asian languages. Therefore, the 
multilingual nature of the corpus used for this research did not cause a 
problem. However, the diversity in medieval spelling could not be smoothed 
over by the software. 
 
AntConc allows us to create word lists and search the text files for words, 
phrases and patterns, though not all the tools it offers are relevant to this 
study. Once a corpus is uploaded into the software, we can obtain the figures 
for the number of words the corpus contains (word tokens) and the number 
of unique word forms - as opposed to total numbers - that can be found in 
that corpus. We must be aware that the statistics for the word tokens/forms 
may be skewed by the spelling variations as the software does not recognise 
two different spellings of the same word as one word token. 
 
By far the greatest challenge of the linguistic analysis was the varying 
spellings or grammatical forms typical of medieval text production. While the 
HeinOnline database has a fuzzy search function that searches for terms 
similar in spelling, the linguistic software does not have this facility. It has 
meant that certain search functions had to be done several times, once for 
each spelling variation, which could be half a dozen times for each search 
term. It is also likely that some freak spellings were not picked up. Proximity 
searches became exponential because every spelling of every term had to 
be tried in combination. At times this issue can be overcome by wildcard 
searches, which allow for a special character to replace one or more 
characters at the beginning or end of a search term. This is, however, not 
always appropriate nor did it always deliver satisfactory results.  
 
The corpus was usually first searched with the term on the basis of which it 
was constituted. In other words, if I have constituted a corpus by searching 
the sources for the word ‘consideration’, and its various spelling variants, I 
will search the corpus I have uploaded into the concordance tool for the word 
consideration and its various spelling variants. The search window size for 
this search in this study will always be set at 100. The results were displayed 
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in the so-called pre-set KWIC format, which is the most common way to 
show concordance lines. ‘Key Word In Context’ shows the search term in its 
context as found in the original text. These can then be sorted according to 
the words to the left and right of the search term and, hence, provide an 
excellent overview of the type of contexts in which the search terms occur. 
All KWIC tables used for this research can be found in the drop-box. In the 
table below we have an example of ten KWIC lines from the corpus extracted 
from volume 72 of the English Report on the basis of the search term 
‘consideration’ and its various spelling variants. The lines are cited here 
merely to illustrate the methodology. They were sorted according to 
alphabetical order of the word that precedes the search term.9 This was 
adopted for all the KWIC tables used for this research. It facilitates looking for 
a particular terminological construction. By grouping these together it also 
gives us a precise idea of their numbers of occurrence. These few lines are 
also a good illustration of the spelling variations, some of which can be quite 
unpredictable. 
 
, upon full hearing whereof, and due and  advised  consideration had of the said Conveyance, and of a 
  le case hors del court fuit referre al consideration des 2 Chiefe Justices  Popham &amp; 
  tiel proviso no sont pties queux ont asci5 considerae~n pur raiser lour estates. Et del auter 
eclare sur  estate execute, que ne besoigne ascun consideraen: mes si fuisset use declare sur  coven 
sont mise en 1' endenture ils ne sont available considera-  csns, car les pols sont q ils ove 
  cestuy que vie; lc reason est default  de consideracin en cestuy que vie de jinder, si come 
  pur 24. ans est void estate pur fault de consideracon en les covenantees,  & donq le pchein 
, quia n'est expss que el covenant en consideration dadvanceibt ou pferiiIt des  issues 
le fait que le covenant est fait en consideration dadvancer les issues de son corps, 
devant marriage Pson single nosme sans expsser en consideracin  de marriage ; en quel case ne fuit a 
 
Table 1: KWIC lines (extract) for ‘considera*’, vol. 72 of the English Report 
 
Besides the keyword search and KWIC display function, AntConc also offers 
the possibility of an ‘advanced search’ with more complex possibilities. It 
enables the search of KWIC lines with a second search term or set of search 
terms, either by typing them in one per line, or by uploading a list of search 
terms from another file. It is further possible to define the parameters for the 																																																								
9 Level 1: 1L; Level 2: 1R; Level 3: 0 
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context words and a word span which within the second (set of) search 
term(s) must appear. For example, a corpus is searched for the main search 
term ‘consideration’, which produces a number of KWIC lines. These lines 
can then be advanced searched with a number of other terms, for example 
‘promise’ or ‘contract’. The word span adopted for this research is the widest 
possible context window that AntConc offers, namely 20 words to the left and 
20 words to the right of the main search term – ‘consideration’ in this 
example. If, in our example, we find the word ‘promise’ to appear significantly 
more often than the word ‘contract’, we may conclude that the concept of 
consideration is more frequently discussed in a context of promise-making 
than in a context of contract. 
 
The choice of secondary search term(s) to be used in specific advanced 
searches was guided by the doctrinal development of the concept of 
consideration. In view of the diversity of medieval spellings, these searches 
could be very time-consuming, hence it was a matter of producing the most 
effective results by searching the various time periods with the most relevant 
terminology. 
 
Another possibility, searching for words or patterns that cluster together with 
the words immediately to the right or the left of the search term, is offered by 
the software’s so-called clusters tool. The results can be ranked by 
frequency, range and probability. The cluster minimum and maximum size 
can be defined. For this study it was always set at minimum 2 and maximum 
5. Below are a few examples selected from the ‘consideration’ corpus of 
volume 72 English Reports. The column ‘range’ refers to the number of 
documents in which a particular cluster could be found. 
rank freq. range cluster (search term on left) 
1 17 13 consideration de 
4 10 8 consideration que le 
8 4 2 consideracon de marriage 
11 4 3 consideracon que e pl 
22 3 3 consideration ne fuit sufficient 
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rank freq. range cluster (search term on right) 
1 27 16 en consideration 
2 12 10 le consideration 
6 5 5 bone consideration 
9 4 2 available considerac 
15 3 1 auters bone considerations 
 
Table 2: clusters of ‘consideration’ in vol. 72 of the English Report 
 
Furthermore, the collocate tool was used in this study. It offers information on 
the sequence of words or terms that co-occur with the search term more 
often than would be expected by chance. The window span can be 
determined to the left and right of the search term. For this study it was 
always set at 10 words to the right and left of the search term. The results 
can be sorted by total frequency, frequency on the left or right of the search 
terms, or the start or end of the word, or by the value of a statistical measure 
between the search term and the collocate. Below are a few selected lines 
from the same corpus by way of illustration: (window: 10L, 10R) 
 
rank freq. freq (L) freq (R) collocate 
1 223 124 99 le 
2 132 96 36 en 
7 82 41 42 fuit 
8 72 42 30 est 
16 45 14 31 marriage 
27 29 21 8 covenant 
 
Table 3: collocates of ‘consideration’ in vol. 72 of the English Report 
 
The instability of spelling and grammatical forms in medieval texts meant that 
the results of these various linguistic search tools, could only be seen as 
indications rather than exact statistical information. Moreover, it is important 
to stress that the information obtained by using these various linguistics 
tools, is linguistic/lexico-grammatical information, rather than legal 
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information. We are, at this stage, less concerned with content and more with 
lexical and grammatical choices, with linguistic form and function that were 
used to realise meaning and convey a picture of reality as it was then in the 
legal minds.  
 
Besides applying these automated linguistic tools, the analysis will also 
consider the language that provides the context in the concordance lines for 
the search term (mainly promise and consideration). For these purposes, the 
language in the KWIC lines resulting from the various concordance searches 
has been grouped into three main types of language uses for the purpose of 
this study:  
(i) general language meaning/use: 
This is language comprehensible to the ordinary man. 
e.g.: “The court’s decision was made in consideration of all the facts.” 
(ii) general language meaning but use in a legal context: 
This is also comprehensible to all, but the legal context in which this 
language occurs adds legal meanings that may only be picked up by those 
with some legal training. 
e.g.: “The payment was promised in consideration of the marriage to his 
daughter.” 
(iii) specialist/technical/abstract meaning and use: 
This language is abstract to a point that its meaning can no longer be 
understood by a non-specialist. 
e.g.: “The instrument imported a prima facie consideration.” 
The main pointers to the use of technical language can be observed in the 
interaction between the lexical and grammatical patterning, because every 
meaning of a specific word will tend to have different patterns. Firth 10 
famously said: “You shall know a word by the company it keeps.” Grammar 
and lexis do not operate independently and as separate systems, but 
																																																								
10 J.R. Firth (1957) A synopsis of linguistics theory 1930-1955, in: Studies in Linguistic 
Analysis, Oxford: Philological Society, 1-32, at p. 11 
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together as a single system 11 . Words with technical meanings ‘behave’ 
differently from the same words in general language contexts. In our example 
(iii) above we find ‘consideration’ as a full noun, rather than in the causal link 
phrase of ‘in consideration of’ that is typical for general language usages. 
 
We need to add the Latin uses. This does not refer to the Latin texts or 
passages, which have usually been disregarded altogether, but to the 
occurrences where the search term was embedded in a legal Latin phrase in 
an otherwise Anglo-French or Middle/Early Modern English text. 
 
There is, no doubt, some overlap between the different groups and the 
categorisation may appear somewhat artificial at times, but for the purpose of 
this study, it is essential to group concordance lines together for evaluation. 
 
The rest of this chapter discussing the results of the various linguistic studies, 
is structured chronologically, starting with the earliest actions of trespass on 
the case that predated the concept of consideration and ending on 
Mansfield’s idea of consideration as a moral obligation. In addition, the 
chapter is subdivided into separate sections for each item of terminology. 
 
2. General language register 
 
Before turning to the sources that are at the centre of this research, namely 
the Year Books and Law Reports, it may be of interest to take a brief look at 
texts in registers other than the legal one. This is to observe how the main 
lexical item in this study – consideration – is used in mainly non-legal texts 
during the 15th century. 
 
																																																								
11 J. Sinclair (1991) Corpus Concordance Collocation. Oxford : OUP at 103; see also A. 
Goldberg (1995) Constructions: A Construction Grammar Approach to Argument Structure, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press; S. T. Gries, D. Divjak (2009) Behavioral profiles: A 
corpus-based approach towards cognitive semantic analysis, in: V. Evand, S. Pourcel (eds.) 
New Directions in Cognitive Linguistics, Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins 
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To start with, a look at the definition in today’s online Oxford English 
Dictionary shows 'consideration' to have manifold meanings. These can be 
divided into three groups: 
- four of the eight definitions describe consideration in terms of careful 
thought/contemplation, viewing, observing typically over a period of time, 
taking into account, motives/reasons, deliberation/opinion/conclusion; 
- two definitions deal with the notion of kindness/thoughtfulness for 
another and esteem, importance, consequences among men and for things; 
- two definitions present consideration as payment or reward and as the 
promise/object of a contract. 
In the English language, the beginning of the use of 'consideration' dates 
back to the Middle English of the 14th century (consideracoun, 
consideracioun, consideracion), with its etymological root in the Latin word 
considerationem (nom.: consideratio and the noun of the action from the past 
participle stem of considerare meaning to examine) and the Old French 12th 
century term of consideracion.  
 
The definition in Anglo-Norman French of the word 'consideration'12 that can 
be found in the Anglo-Norman Dictionary13 is divided into four usages: 
1. examination, reflection, study, contemplation; 
2. opinion, conclusion; 
3. idea, motive; 
4. legal decision, purchase. 
The Anglo-Norman On-Line Hub also includes an electronically available 
corpus of 76 original language source texts, as described above in section 
1.1. Searching that corpus for the terms 'consideration' in its various Anglo-
Norman spellings, we obtained 62 hits, as follows: 
- 32 hits for "consideracion" 
- 1 hit for "consideratione" 
- 17 hits for "consideracioun" 																																																								
12 The word can be found in following spelling variations: consideracion, consideracione, 
consideracioun, consideraciun, consideration. 
13 Anglo-Norman Dictionary on the Anglo-Norman On-Line Hub www. anglo-norman.net 
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- 2 hits for "consideraciun" 
- 10 hits for "consideration" 
The majority of the sources are from the second half of the 14th century and a 
few date from the mid-13th century. 
 
None of the results showed the use of the term in the legal sense, such as 
for the purposes of purchase/debt or in the context of a promise, agreement 
or exchange. The sense was always pertained to the general language 
register. In the majority of the cases, the meanings were: taking into account, 
having regard for, with regard to, in view of, etc. In two occurrences, the 
search term appeared in the sense of contemplation/meditation and in both 
cases the source text was of a religious nature. 
 
A collocates analysis with a span of 10 words to the right and 10 to the left of 
the search term, revealed the following: 
 
- 15 hits for "priere", all of which occurred in the Anglo-Norman Letters and 
Petitions documents and not in specifically religious sources. The word was 
always a part of the same structure: 
"considera*14 de ma/noz/nostre/susdites priere". It leads to the reasonable 
conclusion that it is probably a standard form in the register of petitions. 
 
- 10 hits for "regard", all except 2 following the pattern of: 
"considera*et regard". These all occurred in the same source, the Foedera, 
conventiones, litterae; et cujuscunque generis acta publica, inter regis 
Angliae, ab ingressu Gulielmi I. in Angliam, A.D. 1066. It may be reasonable 
to conclude that this is a part of the register of this sort of text. 
 
- 10 hits for "bon/bone", in 3 cases bon* was found before considera*, in 7 
cases it was placed after the search term, in 3 of which it occurred in the 
same phrase: 
"consideration a ce qui/q'a/que, a l'effect que bone accorde". 
 
																																																								
14 Wildcard search: the asterisk is used to replace one or more other characters in a search 
term at its beginning or its end. It is used in the so-called wildcard searches, which are 
especially helpful in locating variations of a particular word. 
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An advanced proximity search of the Anglo-Norman Hub sources texts with a 
span of 20 words to the right and 20 to the left of the search term, confirmed 
that ‘consideration’ was not associated with typical contract words such as 
promise, covenant, contract or agreement. There were no proximity hits for 
any of the four terms, despite the fact that these terms occurred in the 
corpus: 
 
- 443 hits for the various spellings of the word ‘promise’ (promess, promès, 
promese, promis, promisse, pramesse, pramez, premés, premesse, premis); 
 
- 89 hits for the various spellings of the word ‘contract’ (contract, contracte, 
contrait, contraite, contrat, contret); 
 
- 256 hits for the various spellings of the word ‘covenant’ (covenant, 
covenand, covenaunt, covenaunte); 
 
- 3 hits with the various spellings of the word ‘agreement’ (agreement, 
agrément, engrément). 
 
The proximity search with words that are particularly associated with 
medieval informal agreements, such as debt and trespass, showed no 
proximity hits between the word consideration and words like debt and 
trespass, although these terms occurred in the corpus: 
 
- 462 hits with the various spellings of the word ‘debt’ (dette, det, dete, debt, 
debte, depte, deite, deitte, debit, decte, doite, duite, duyte, decies, dectes, 
dettus) 
 
- 743 hits with the various spellings of the word ‘trespass’ (trespas, trespaas, 
trespace, trespase, trespass, trespasse, trespaz, trepas, trepaas, trepace, 
trepase, trespass, trepaz, treppas, tresspas) 
 
However, a proximity search between ‘contract’ and ‘covenant’ and other 
terms typically associated with informal agreements, showed the following 
results15: 
 																																																								
15 All the various spelling variations listed above have been respected in the search, which 
was carried out for every combination for spelling between both the search term and the 
proximity term. 
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Search 
term 
hits proximity (20L, 20R) 
contract covenant debt promise trespass agreement 
contract 89 - 19 15 1 11 0 
covenant 256 19 - 17 6 14 0 
 
Table 4: ‘contract’ and ‘covenant’ as terms/proximity to other terms in the 
Anglo-Norman On-line Hub corpus 
 
All quantitative information has been summarised in the table below 
(proximity search of 20 words to left and right): 
 
 
 
search term hits prox. of 
consideration 
prox. of 
contract 
prox. of 
covenant 
consideration 62 - 0 0 
promise 443 0 1 6 
contract 89 0 - 19 
covenant 256 0 19 - 
agreement 3 0 0 0 
debt 462 0 15 17 
trespass 743 0 11 14 
 
Table 5: search terms/proximity to ‘consideration’, ‘contract’, ‘covenant’ in the 
Anglo-Norman On-line Hub corpus 
 
The Anglo-Norman Hub is not a specifically legal source and despite the fact 
that it is relatively small and limited16 corpus material, it is reasonable to 
conclude that in the second half of the 14th century, the term consideration 
tended to occur in general language meanings, such as examination, 
reflection, study, contemplation, opinion, conclusion, motive. It could not be 
found, as yet, in a general context of making promises or concluding 
agreements, contracts or covenants, nor in situations of debt or trespass, 																																																								
16 Limited in particular in relation to register. In view of wide-spread illiteracy, written texts 
were not very common and reflected the learned man's mind and vocabulary rather than 
those of the masses. The corpus includes 76 texts in electronic form, containing more than 5 
million tokens and covering all periods and registers of Anglo-Norman usage. 
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though admittedly the Anglo-Norman Hub includes very few specific legal 
texts. 
 
3. Law reporting 
 
The Year Books and Law Reports were at the centre of this study, though for 
comparison’s sake, abridgements and lexicons were also studied (see 
sections 4 and 5). 
 
This section on law reporting is divided into three main parts, one for each of 
the following search terms: assumpsit, promise and consideration. Each of 
these subsections will be introduced with a chronological overview for every 
term, followed by a detailed quantitative linguistic analysis using AntConc, on 
the basis of the corpora constituted for the study. 
 
3.1 Assumpsit and its forerunner Trespass on the case 
 
As briefly explained in the previous chapter, the concept of consideration was 
born from the action of assumpsit, the essence of which was the notion of 
making an undertaking to do something. Assumpsit materialised in the 15th 
century and arose primarily from the action of trespass on the case (13th 
century), that is of a wrongful act directly causing harm or injury and 
consisting in the recovery for the negligent performance of an undertaking. It 
is, therefore, also interesting to examine the language used in the formulation 
of this new action as the forerunner to the later evolving concept of 
consideration. 
 
The 14th & 15th centuries Year Books and Reports 
 
When considering the 14th century law reporting material from the reign of 
Edward II, Edward III and Richard II 17  we find no references to any 
conceptual thinking that informal promises may be enforceable. Any cases 
that could be considered as forerunners for the actions of assumpsit are all 																																																								
17 Detailed references for these Year Books can be found in annex 2 (iii) and (iv). 
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classified as trespass on the case actions. They are about making an 
undertaking, but were construed as quasi-trespasses because, although 
fundamentally of a contractual nature, procedurally speaking an action of 
covenant would not have succeeded for lack of deed under seal. While in the 
first half of the 14th century, we find very little evidence of such actions, they 
became more prominent in the latter part of that century.  
 
The lack of references to the enforceability of informal promises is reflected 
in the lack of vocabulary that may express any such discussions. In the 
Edward II and Edward III Year Books, half a dozen uses of ‘consideration’ 
are all in the general sense of ‘taking into consideration/having considered’. 
One mention of ‘assumpsit’ can be found in a Latin language context18 and 
another, similar one, in the Anglo-French text.19 Furthermore, we have 7 
references to ‘promise’ in the original Law French text, four of which were 
part of declarative statements promising to undertake duties graciously, and 
that gifts and promises would not distract men from carrying out their duty to 
the best of their abilities.20 Among the case reports of these early Year Books 
that cover the first third of the 14th century, two cases stand out as situations 
where money was exchanged for the making of a promise subsequently not 
honoured.21 However, in neither case can we find the sort of language that 
will become characteristic of later trespass on the case or assumpsit actions. 
 
Once we move into the second half of the 14th century, we come across 
actions like the Humber Ferry case22, which many considered the first action 
of taking the law into a new direction23. This was later disputed, among 																																																								
18 “…illam conclusionem assumpsit” ; in: (1310) 3 & 4 Edward II, or 22 Selden Society at 118 
19 “…de pus qe le baron ad assume la tenaunce en sa persone par son plee” ; in : (1329-
1330) 3 & 4 Edward III, or 98 Selden Society at 598 
20 For example : “En le comencement del eyre nous vous promismes de faire grace de ceo 
qe a nous appendoit” ; in : (1329-1330) 3 & 4 Edward III at 97, or 98 Selden Society at 195 ; 
“…et ceo ne levrai pur doun ne pur promesse ne pur amur ne pur haungre ne pur nul ren qe 
issi ne servirai a moun power”  ; in : (1321) 14 Edward II, or 85 Selden Society at 12 
21 (1321) 14 Edward II, or 85 Selden Society at 353; (1329-1330) 3 & 4 Edward III, or 97 
Selden Society at 237 These cases are discussed in greater detail in chapter V, p. 76-77 
22 Bukton v Tounesende (1348) Lib. Ass. 22 Edw III Folio 94a-94b, pl. 41, or LBEx 
23 J.B. Ames (1913) Lectures on Legal History and Miscellaneous Legal Essays, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, at p.130: “earliest cases in which an assumpsit was laid in the 
declaration”; W.S. Holdsworth(1923) History of English Law vol. III, at p. 430: “special variety 
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others by Plucknett, who considered that the case ‘was not a precedent but a 
freak’ 24.  Yet, once the action was admitted it ‘offered a fruitful soil for 
experiment’25. And with the decision in Waldon v Marshall26, just over twenty 
years later, we can safely say that the new action and its novel thinking were 
gaining definite ground. Admittedly, both reports are very short, but the 
language in both bears little resemblance to the linguistics expressions of the 
later assumpsit cases: 
In the 7 lines of the Humber Ferry Case (1348), the main key words are: 
avoit emprist a 
 a tort 
 nul tort 
covenant 
trespass 
 
In the 17 lines of Waldon v Marshall (1369), we have the main key words: 
manucepit 
emprist 
contra pacem 
peace 
covenant 
negligence 
 
Following those cases and in the YB 40-50 Edward III (1366-1377), we find 
an extensive use of the term ‘trespass’, frequently collocating with vi & 
armis27, which was a precondition in these early cases: proof was required of 
the use of force and arms and a breach of the King's peace for such trespass 
action to succeed. This was a remnant of criminal law from which these 
actions originated. Beside the typical trespass vocabulary, such as maliciosè 
fixit, damages, tort, diligence and guarantee, we increasingly come across 
terms that describe the making of undertakings, mainly in the form of il 
																																																																																																																																																													
of trespass or deceit on the case which came to be known as the action of assumpsit”. For 
more detailed discussion of this point, see chapter V above. 
24 Th.F.T. Plucknett (1956) A Concise History of the Common Law, 5th ed., Boston: Little, 
Brown and Co., at pp.441-442 
25 C.H.S. Fifoot (1949) History and Sources of the Common Law: Tort and Contract, London: 
Stevens, at p.331 
26 Y.B Mich. 43 Ed. III, 33, 38, or LBEx 
27 e.g. YB 46 Edw. III, 19b, or LBEx (“Trespass port devers un Ferrer, de ceo q il enclowe 
son chival”) 
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emprist/imprist (he undertakes). In Waldon v Marshall28 the action is worded 
in Latin with manucepit as the term to signal the undertaking made. In a 
surgeon’s negligence case of 137429 we find, in the 43 lines, 12 uses of 
emprist (or variants) to describe the action. We find 5 uses of emprist (and 
variants) in the 36 line report. In the 7 volumes of the Richard II Year Books30  
we have no match for the key word search of assumpsit.  
 
As we come to the 15th century sources, we find a continued use of the 
trespass vocabulary, as well as emprist often in a context of covenant. For 
example: Emprise de faire at pl’ un novel meason deins un certain temps … 
my fait le meason a tort.31 During Henry VI’s reign (1422-1461), actions on 
the case dealt increasingly with the notion of deceit. These arose from facts, 
not of mal-feasance, but of non-feasance. Hence, the notion of trespass or 
quasi-trespass was no longer appropriate and a new principle was needed: 
the breach of an undertaking became considered as deceit. In cases where 
the plaintiff’s loss enriched the defendant, it was seen as aggravated deceit. 
The use of the word emprist gave way to a frequent use of assumpsit in Latin 
phrases32 together with an increased occurrence of terms such as deceit, 
bargain, covenant, quid pro quo and. In the discussion of some of these 
cases, the judges allude to past cases or hypothetical scenarios, but again 
the terms used are usually dominated by bargain and covenant, rather than 
emprist : for example: “… le covenant le def. fuit; jeo face covenant ove un 
carpend pur me fair un meason; face covenant ove moy a fair etc…”33 
 
 																																																								
28 YB 43 Edw. III, 33, 38, or LBEx 
29 YB 48 Edw. III, 6, 11, or LBEx (“Action sur le case vers Surgeon, que emprist de curer 
home del plague, & luy mahim”) 
30 Detailed references in annex 2 (iii), electronically accessible on HeinOnline 
31 YB 11 Hen. IV, 33, 60, or LBEx (“Action sur le case vers carpenter pur non feasant de 
meason”) 
32 Action on the case examples : 7 Hen.VI,1, 3, or LBEx : deceit, bargain, quid pro quo ; 9 
Hen. VI, 53, 37, or LBEx : deceit sur le cas, bargain ; 11 Hen. VI, 18, 24, or LBEx: extensive 
Latin use of assumpsit and Anglo-French use of assumpc, assumer, assumption ; 14 Hen. 
VI, 18, 58, or LBEx: extensive use of covenant ; 20 Hen. VI, 34, 4, or LBEx: deceit, bargain, 
covenant. 
33 14 Hen. VI,18, 58 ; see also : 26 Hen. VI, 55, 12, or LBEx 
Chapter	VI:	Corpus	Linguistic	Analysis	150	
The 16th century Year Books and Reports 
 
In the 16th century reports we find a timid use of the term assumpsit or 
similar. Assumpsit cases were still not labelled as such in the early 16th 
century. Many were categorised in the Index of Subjects by the (modern) 
editor as such, but the word 'assumpsit' did not often appear in the reports. It 
was the nature of the case that attracted the label. In other words, while the 
new action was increasingly becoming a legal reality, the textual evidence 
did not shown the term assumpsit as an established legal technical term or 
category. The key words in the actual case reports tended to be: 
undertaking, condition, obligation and the legal vocabulary is covenant, debt, 
contract, trespass. These assumpsit cases were often reported by 
paraphrasing, in conditional clauses, what one of the parties is alleged to 
have said or promised:  
- "... Si jeo baile biens a un home a garder savement, et il emprent a ceo 
faire ..." 34 
(If I bail goods to someone to keep safely, and he undertakes to do this) 
- "... le testatour dit a luy, si il ne paya vous jeo voile payer, sur quel 
promesse le pleintife delyver lez bienz ..." 35 
(the testator said to him, 'If he does not pay you, I will pay'; upon which promise the plaintiff 
delivered the goods) 
- "Si home assume sur luy a moy a arrer et seminer ma terre ..." 36 
(If a man undertakes for me to plough and sow my land ...) 
- "... home assume sur luy de paier ..." 37 
(A man took upon himself to pay) 
 
In the Caryll Reports, the editor lists five reports as dealing with assumpsit, 
three of which actually contain the word assumpsit, as well as 
emprist/emprent (undertook/undertakes). In these cases, ‘assumpsit’ tends to 
be a part of a Latin phrase, rather than integrated into the Anglo-French text 
																																																								
34 Hayden v Raggeldon, CP 40/992, m. 451, in Caryll Reports, or 116 Selden Society at 608 
35 Cleymond v Vyncent, YB Trin. 27 Hen. VIII, 23, 21, or 119 Selden Society at 46-47 
36 From BL MS. Hargrave 322, 13v, in Dyer Lost Notebooks, or 110 Selden Society at 466 
37 Lord Zouche v Digby, in Dyer Lost Notebooks, or 110 Selden Society at 416 
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as it was later.  The key words in the other two are trespass, debt and 
covenant. 
In Johnson v Baker38 (1493) "... le deffendant de ceo [fair] accordant super 
se assumpsit [...] A que le deffendant dit que non assumpsit modo et forma 
[...] le pleintiffe ad alledge que emprist le charge sur luy [...]ceo fuit le chose 
que covient estre traverse et nemy quod non assumpsit ..."; 
 (... the defendant took upon himself (super se assumpsit) to do this accordingly [...] To this 
the defendant said Non assumpsit modo et forma [...] the plaintiff has alleged that the 
defendant undertook the charge [...] and that was the thing which ought to have been 
traversed (not Non assumpsit) ...). 
In Orwell v Mortoft39 (1505) "..., quel chose a faire le defendant super se 
assumpsit [...] 
[...] et luy chargera per cest parol 'super se assumpsit' ..."; 
(...the defendant took upon himself to do this [...] and charge him by the words 'took upon 
himself (super se assumpsit). 
In Hayden v Raggeldond40 (1510) "... Si jeo baile biens a un home a garder 
savement, et il emprent a ceo faire ..." ; 
(... If I bail goods to someone to keep safely, and he undertakes to do this ...) 
 
In the Selden Society edition of the Year Books 12-14 Henry VIII (1520-
1523), the Index of Subjects lists the action of assumpsit as relevant in two 
cases. Yet the word does not appear in the reports. The key words that 
describe the actions are 'promise' and 'damage' 41 , 'covenant', 'contract', 
'grant', 'condition' and favour42. Similarly, in the English translation of the 
Dalison reports (1552-1558), we find the 'assumpsit' twice to describe the 
type of action at hand43, but the action is not described as such in the French 
original text. 
 
In the second volume of the Dyer Lost Notebooks (second half of 16th c.), six 
cases come under the category of assumpsit, the reports of which show 																																																								
38 C.P., Hil. 1493. Record CP 40/914, m. 104, in: 115 Selden Society at 135 
39 CP, Mich. 1505, in: 116 Selden Society at 494 
40 CP 40/992, m. 451, in: 116 Selden Society at 608 
41 Cleymond v Vyncent (King's Bench 1520), in: 119 Selden Society, at 46 
42 Southwall v Huddelston and Reynolds (Common Pleas 1523), in: 119 Selden Society, at 
139 
43 Benger v Pert (1552 King’s Bench) KB 27/1162, mm. 89, 134; Rolf v Aucher (1557 King’s 
Bench) KB 27/1182, mm. 40,156, 169, 186 
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more extensive use of the word 'assumpsit' (7 hits in the six reports), as well 
as other synonyms, such as assume/assuma (4 hits) and assumption (5 
hits). All were translated by Baker with 'undertake/undertaking', which 
underlines that we are well within the ambit of meaning that is fundamental to 
an action of assumpsit - someone undertaking to do something. Staying with 
this Dyer Lost Notebook for the moment, we can observe that the act of 
making an undertaking can be expressed using the verb form, such as : 
"... home assume sur luy de paier ..."44 (a man took upon himself to pay) 
“Si home assume sur luy a moy a arrer et seminer ma terre…”45 (If a man 
undertakes for me to plough and sow my land) 
We also find uses of the noun form in specifically legal phrases: 
“… In evidence sur lissue Non assumpsit modo et forma, fuit agree per 
curiam …”46 (In evidence upon the issue Non assumpsit modo et forma, it was by the 
court…) 
“Action sur le case sur assumption/assumpsit” 47  (action on the case of an 
undertaking/assumpsit) 
The remaining noun form uses, accompanied by an article or adjective, are 
more akin to abstract concepts or discussions thereof. For example, in a 
case48 from the Northampton assizes on the autumn circuit of 1571, we can 
read: "... Lassumpsit covient estre all plaintife mesme, ou al ascun auter a 
que le plaintife agree, autrement nest bon. Et sil count dun simple assumpsit, 
et levidence prove un conditionell assumpsit, levidence nest bon ..." 
(An assumpsit must be to the plaintiff himself, or to some other person to whom the plaintiff 
agrees, or else it is not good. And if he counts of a simple assumpsit, the evidence proves a 
conditional assumpsit, the evidence is not good). 
 
Other examples: 
“Et per luy si lassumpsit soitt conditionell, destre performe del parte le 
defendant, et il dit Ne assuma point modo et forma, cest conditionell promis 
del parte le defendant ne garrante lissue le defendant, car conditionell 																																																								
44 Lord Zouche v Digby, in Dyer Lost Notebooks, or 110 Selden Society at 416 
45 BL MS. Hargrave 322, fo.13v, in Dyer Lost Notebooks, or 110 Selden Society at 466 
46 Northampton assizes, autumn circuits 1559, in Dyer Lost Notebooks, or 110 Selden 
Society at 420 
47 in Dyer Lost Notebooks, or 110 Selden Society at 453 (dated 1573) and 466 (undated) 
48 Northampton assizes, autumn circuits 1571, in 110 Selden Society at 452 
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assumption est assumption.”49 (And, according to him, if the undertaking is conditional 
[on something] to be performed on the defendant's side, and he says 'He did not undertake 
in the manner and form [alleged]', this conditional promise on the defendant's side does not 
warrant the defendant's issue, for a conditional undertaking is an undertaking.) 
“… fuit agree per curiam [...] que un express promise et assumpsit a paier le 
monie pur le baraine ..."50  (...it was agreed by the court [...] that there should be given 
and put in evidence an express promise and undertaking to pay the money for the bargain 
...) 
 
The Selden Society ‘assumpsit’ corpus  (SSCa) 
 
To complete a more detailed linguistics analysis and obtain more quantitative 
data, a corpus (SSCa) based on the search term ’assumpsit’ (including all its 
medieval spelling variations) was constituted from the original language 
sources that can be found in the Selden Society (Annual) Series51 and which 
cover the period between the late 13th and the mid-16th centuries. The corpus 
compiled from that search is extremely limited as the term assumpsit or 
similar occurred little in these documents. It consisted of 8,173 word tokens 
and 2,162 word types; the original source material consisted of 4,109 pages. 
Only 12 documents were downloaded that contained the search terms 
assumpsit, assumption or assume.52 These appeared 39 times: 
 
SSCassumpsit  
12 docs. / 8,173 word tokens / 2,162 word types 
original sources: 4,109 pages 
search term hits 
assumpsit  (incl. various spellings) 16 
assumption  (incl. various spellings) 11 
assume  (incl. various spellings) 10 
assumpsisset 2 
Total 39 
 
Table 6: search term ‘assumpsit’ in Selden Society ‘assumpsit’ corpus 																																																								
49 From Chr. Yelverton Rep., BL MS. Hargrave 322, fo. 13r, in 110 Selden Society at 457 
50 Dyer Lost Notebooks, or 110 Selden Society at 420 
51 Detailed references can be found in annex 2 (iv). 
52 All in varying forms and spellings. 
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16 times as assumpsit, 11 times as assumption and 10 times in the verb 
form. In the case of assumpsit, the word occurred 6 times in a Latin legal 
phrase and in 3 cases it was found at the beginning of the case in between 
brackets signposting the grounds for the action. The term never occurred in a 
Middle English context. In other words and according to this (albeit restricted) 
corpus, the use of assumpsit was rare in Middle English law reporting. 
 
Advanced proximity searches gave the following results. The terms in the left 
hand column were used first each as a primary search term in the SSCa – 
these results can be found in the middle column. In a second step, the same 
terms were used in a proximity search of 20 words to the right and left of the 
main search term. These results are in the right hand column. 
 
search term 
(incl. various spellings) 
hits proximity 
assum* 39 - 
consideration 2 0 
contract 3 0 
covenant 7 0 
debt 14 0 
promise 15 8 
quid pro quo 1 0 
tort 10 2 
trespass 4 0 
 
Table 7: search terms/proximity to ‘assumpsit’ in Selden Society ‘assumpsit’ corpus 
 
Consideration, contract and quid pro quo do not appear very prominent in 
this corpus, while assumpsit is discussed more frequently in the context of 
debt, tort, covenant and promise. The search terms, hits and proximity hits 
occurred mainly in texts from the first half of the 16th century, rather than in 
earlier texts. In view of the restricted size of the corpus, these figures can 
only be of indicative value. The clusters and collocates tools did not reveal 
meaningful results. 
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The way assumption is used in these concordance lines, is mostly 
interchangeable with assumpsit in the non-Latin context, including the 
surrounding vocabulary with which the search terms is associated. For 
example, compare “levidence prove un conditionell assumpsit”53 with “car 
conditionell assumption est assumption”54. This case of metalinguistic55 use 
appears to suggest that by virtue of the definitional description, the term is 
established.  Similarly, “un expres promise et assumpsit a paier” 56 and “le 
defendant trauerz le promis et lassumcion”57. We even have assumption in 
the legal phrase “El port sur le cas sur assumption” 58 . The verb form 
describes the process of making an undertaking. This descriptive form 
renders the action less abstract. 
 
The Elizabethan ‘assumpsit’ corpus  (ECa) 
 
This corpus was compiled from the original language sources that can be 
found in volumes 72, 73 and 123 of the English Reports,59 of which only the 
documents in Law French and Middle/Modern English were used, and not 
the contemporary English translations. The period covered by these reports 
spans from Henry VII to Charles II, which is from the end of the 15th century 
until the mid 17th century. Some reports from the time of Richard II are also 
included. De facto, the great majority of cases that constituted the corpus are 
from the Elizabethan era.  
 
The selected reports were searched for the term 'assumpsit' (in its various 
spellings), constituting a corpus (ECa) that includes 51 files (35 from vol. 71, 
8 from vol. 73, 8 from vol. 123) and has 40,226 word tokens and 6,127 word 
types; the original source material consisted of 1,831 pages. The corpus was 																																																								
53 Dyer Lost Notebooks Reports, or 110 Selden Society at 452 
54 Dyer Lost Notebooks Reports, or 110 Selden Society at 457 
55 ‘Metalinguistic’ here relates to the function of language in which the language itself is 
discussed. 
56 Dyer Lost Notebooks Reports, or 110 Selden Society at 420 
57 Spelman Reports, or 93 Selden Society at 3-4 
58 Dyer Lost Notebooks Reports, or 110 Selden Society at 466 
59 The full references can be found in annex 2 (v). 
Chapter	VI:	Corpus	Linguistic	Analysis	156	
uploaded into the AntConc software and searched for the word assumpsit, 
which produced 182 concordance lines. Also included were the verb forms 
'assume/assuma', which feature prominently in the context of assuming an 
undertaking/promise and have replaced the verb emprist/imprist that featured 
prominently in the earlier reports mentioned above, but were found to be 
totally absent in this particular corpus. 
 
ECassumpsit 
51 docs. / 40,226 word tokens / 6,127 word types 
original sources: 1,831 pages 
search term hits 
assum* 182 
assumpsit 128 
assumpsits 1 
assumysit 2 
assump 1 
assumptionis 1 
assumptionem 1 
assumption 10 
assume 38 
emprist/imprist 0 
 
Table 8: search term ‘assumpsit’ in the Elizabethan ‘assumpsit’ corpus 
 
From the textual evidence collected and set out in the tables below, we can 
observe that in the latter part of the 16th century, the use of the term 
assumpsit was more extensive than in earlier sources as described above, 
and there was no longer the previous great variety of forms and spellings. 
Other vocabulary that tended to appear in actions on the case and actions of 
assumpsit in the earlier sources continued to be prominent in this mainly 
Elizabethan corpus and shows that assumpsit is still being used in the 
context of issues of debt (113 hits), rather than contract (15 hits). Debt 
appears by far the most frequent situation in which assumpsit arises, 
followed by covenant trespass/quasi-trespass scenarios (e.g. trespass, 
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damage(s)). The proprietary element of quid pro quo is absent, while the 
promissory notion (42 hits for ‘promise’) is more prominent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: search terms/proximity to ‘assumpsit’ in the Elizabethan ‘assumpsit’ corpus 
 
The application of the clusters and collocates tools did not reveal meaningful 
results. But the examination of the 182 concordance lines presents a very 
different picture from the one obtained from the earlier Selden Society 
corpus. The term appears firmly integrated into the Law French language as 
a word in its own right, no longer needing an accompanying explanation, nor 
necessarily placed within a Latin context or phrase. It occurs as a term 
expressing an established concept. Also, the interchangeability with the word 
assumption is considerably less frequent than in the earlier sources. While in 
the SSCa, we can find assumpsit in 41% of the concordance lines and 
assumption in 28%, in the mainly Elizabethan corpus under discussion here, 
assumpsit (excluding the other spelling variations) occurs in 70% of the 
concordance lines, while assumption appears only 5,5% of the time. 
 
The Law French phrase, in which we find assumpsit most frequently is action 
sur le case sur assumpsit or similar variants. It appears 41 times and 
frequently acts as the signpost for the nature of the action. While in the 
earlier corpus, it tended to be the modern editors who labelled actions as 
search term 
(incl. various spellings) 
hits proximity 
assum* 182 - 
consideration 82 23 
contract 15 7 
covenant 35 2 
debt 113 22 
promise 42 9 
quid pro quo 0 0 
tort 8 1 
trespass 26 0 
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assumpsit, in this later corpus we find the categorisation clearly highlighted in 
the original sources. The term is used in a highly technical way. Not only can 
it be found between two full stops as a simple statement of fact or 
signposting the type of action, but it is frequently combined with a definite 
article (l’/le) or with prepositions such as en/in/sur/pur. We can also see 
assumpsit repeatedly occurring in combination with non, such as sur non 
assumpsit or plead non assumpsit, and a few times in Latin phrases, such as 
indebitat(us) assumpsit, non assumpsit modo & forma or super se assumpsit. 
In 20% of the concordance lines the term assumpsit can be found a second 
time within twenty words to the left and right of the search term. 
 
The application of the clusters and collocates tools did not reveal meaningful 
results.  
 
3.2 Promise 
 
Before studying the term ‘consideration’ in depth, it may be of interest to 
pause and examine the use of the word ‘promise’, the notion of which is an 
important signpost on the road to the concept of consideration. 
In the early Year Books and Selden Society sources where we can clearly 
observe an increase with time of the use of promise: 
 
date source 'promise' 
end 13th C Earliest Engl. Reports (111, 112, 122, 123 
SS) - 947 pages 
2 
14th C Y.B. Edward II & III – 6449 pages 7 
end 14th C Y.B. Richard II – approx. 759 pages 3 
1422 1 Henry VI (50 SS) – 131 pages none 
1409/1470 10 Edw. IV & 49 Hen. VI (47 SS)  – 172 
pages 
none 
1477-1509 Select Cases Before The King’s Council in 
The Star Chamber, vol. I  (16 SS) – 278 
pages  (Middle English) 
4 
 
1485-1509 Select Cases in the Council of Henry VII 
(75 SS) – 169 pages  (Middle English) 
6 
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1489-1522 Caryll Reports part 2 (116 SS) – 349 pages 3 
1502-1540 The Reports of Sir John Spelman, vol. I (93 
SS) – 238 pages 
12 
1509-1544 Select Cases Before The King’s Council in 
The Star Chamber, vol.II (25 SS) – 331 
pages  (Middle English) 
11 
 
1520-1523 Y.B. 12-14 Henry VIII (119 SS) – 192 pages 12 
1541-1581 Lost Notebooks Dyer vol. I & II (109 & 110 
SS) – 468 pages 
21 
 
Table 10: frequencies of ‘promise’ in a selection of the Selden Society (Annual) Series and 
Ames Foundation Publications60 
 
The 13th & 14th centuries Year Books and Reports 
 
As discussed in chapter V above, the concept of consideration originated in 
the growing need to allow informal agreements to become enforceable under 
certain circumstances. The earliest actions were (quasi-) trespass on the 
case, from which the action of assumpsit developed. Viewed from our 21st 
century perspective, we clearly consider these to be situations at the heart of 
which a promise was made and relied upon.  
 
As we observed from the Anglo-Norman sources, which date from roughly 
the same period, the word ‘promise’ occurred 443 times, which is a similar 
frequency to ‘debt’ (462 instances). We also find 265 instances of ‘covenant’ 
and 743 instances of ‘trespass’, but only 62 instances of ‘consideration’. In 
the early legal sources the use of the word promise appears rather reluctant 
and, hence, the corresponding notion somewhat tentative.  Instead, the 
meanings are expressed in terms of undertakings to be assumed. The step 
from the hitherto proprietary thinking of a contractual exchange in actions of 
debt, was still too deeply rooted, to give way to the new promissory thinking 
of assumpsit and later the concept of consideration. 
 
The result that may surprise at first is the seven matches for promise in the 
Year Books of Edward II and his successor Edward III. It must be stressed 
that these specific sources represent a substantial corpus by themselves, 																																																								
60 Detailed references can be found in annex 2 (iii) and (iv) 
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covering three quarters of a century, while most other sources only cover 
about half of that time span. Four references were part of declarative 
statements promising to undertake duties graciously, and that gifts and 
promises would not distract men from carrying out their duty to the best of 
their abilities.61 Of the 7 matches for ‘promise’, only one – promising to cure a 
wounded hand - described a situation that was characteristic for trespass on 
the case or assumpsit actions.62 In the Year Books of the reign of Richard II, 
which covered the last quarter of the 14th century, we find three references to 
‘promise’, all in the report of the same case, namely a 1383 action in debt for 
the payment of a hundred shillings or a pipe of wine for developing 
businesses on behalf of the defendant.63 This 13th and 14th century textual 
evidence, confirms that the use of the term ‘promise’ in the context of making 
an informal agreement enforceable was not widespread. 
 
The 15th, 16th and 17th centuries Year Books and Reports 
 
Moving to the 15th century sources, we do not find a vastly increased use of 
the word promise either. In the Select Cases Before The King’s Council in 
The Star Chamber, vol. I64 and the Select Cases in the Council of Henry 
VII65, the term occurs ten times, but in only three cases does it relate to a 
contractual situation. It is also interesting to note that these two reports are in 
Middle English rather than Law French and there is a more frequent use of 
‘promise’ in the non-contractual/legal sense. 
 
By the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th century, informal agreements 
could no longer be disregarded for lack of deed. Relief was granted to 																																																								
61 For example : “En le comencement del eyre nous vous promismes de faire grace de ceo 
qe a nous appendoit” ; in : (1329-1330) 3 & 4 Edward III, or 97 Selden Society at 195 
“…et ceo ne levrai pur doun ne pur promesse ne pur amur ne pur haungre ne pur nul ren qe 
issi ne servirai a moun power” ; in : (1321) 14 Edward II, Part I, or 85 Selden Society at 12 
62 “…ly promist de ly garrir de la play pur xl. S., et il resceut les xl. S. et il nad my garry, eynz 
par sa defaute il ad perdu sa mayn” ; in : Eyre of London, (1321) 14 Edward II, Part II, or 86 
Selden Society, at 353   
63 (1383) 6 Richard II, or Ames Foundation Publications, at 217 
64 Select Cases Before the King’s Council in the Star Chamber commonly called The Court 
of Star Chamber, vol. I (A.D. 1477-1509) 16 Selden Society  
65 Select Cases Before the King’s Council in the Star Chamber commonly called The Court 
of Star Chamber, vol. II (A.D. 1509-1544) 25 Selden Society  
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damages due to malfeasance, nonfeasance and deceit, but also in cases 
where the defendant had no benefit from the deceit yet the plaintiff suffered 
loss and damage. In 1523 St. German wrote in his Dialogue66 which was not 
a law report but more akin to a treatise: 
“if he to whom the promise is made have a charge by reason of the 
promise […]  he shall have an action […] though he that made the 
promise had no wordly profit by it.” 
 
This clearly indicates that the focus of the newly evolving action, was less the 
plaintiff’s deception/defendant’s deceit (tort) but rather the 
promise/undertaking (contract) made at the start of the interaction between 
the two parties. Yet, despite the fact that St. German uses the term ‘promise’ 
in his writings, it took a while to trickle through and feature prominently in the 
law reports to describe and discuss the enforceability of informal 
agreements. 
 
During the Elizabethan reign in the 16th century and into the early 17th 
century, the use of the word ‘promise’ not only increased, but also adopted a 
more specifically legal meaning, as it appeared in restricted contexts of 
contract formation. 
 
The Selden Society ‘promise’ corpus  (SSCp) 
 
Two corpora were constituted based on the word ‘promise’ to carry out a 
detailed linguistics analysis and obtain more quantitative data: the SSCp and 
the ECp.67 The corpus (SSCp) compiled from searching the 13th to mid 16th 
century Selden Society sources 68  for the word promise consists of 53 
downloaded documents with 88 matches for the search term, 33,862 word 
tokens and 7,485 word types; the original source material consisted of 4,109 
pages.  
 
																																																								
66 Ch. St. German (1518/1974), Doctor and Student, Second Dialogue, Chapter 24, edited 
by T. Plucknett, J. Barton (1974) for the Selden Society, vol. 91  
67 For an overview of the corpora, see annex 3. 
68 Detailed references are listed in annex 2 (iv). 
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From the advanced proximity search of 20 words to the right and left of 
‘promise’, we cannot observe any outstanding figures (see table below). It 
appears that promise is more often discussed in a context of covenant and 
debt than contract. The term assumpsit also figures more prominently than 
consideration in the context of making promises. 
 
SSCpromise 
53 docs. / 33,862 word tokens / 7,485 word types 
original sources: 4,109 words 
search term 
(incl. various spellings) 
hits proximity 
promise 88 - 
assumpsit/assumption/assume 14 4 
consideration 7 1 
contract 8 1 
covenant 27 1 
debt 29 0 
quid pro quo 2 0 
tort 10 2 
trespass 8 0 
 
Table 11: search terms/proximity to ‘promise’ in the Selden Society ‘promise’ corpus 
 
The application of the clusters and collocates tools did not reveal meaningful 
results.  
 
The word ‘promise’ is never a technical term. It always describes the act of 
making a declaration or assurance to another person, stating a commitment 
to giving/doing/refraining from doing something or guaranteeing that a 
specific thing will or will not happen.69 In the 88 concordance lines from the 
SSCp, we find that the use of ‘promise’ in a contractual context (i.e. the 
exchange of a promise in consideration of something) only accounts for 36% 
of the concordance lines (32/88). In the other cases, we are dealing with 
promises in general or in situations of affirming loyalty. 																																																								
69 See definitions in the Oxford English Dictionary 
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Looking closely at the 32 concordance lines where ‘promise’ appears in a 
contractual context, we can observe that the surrounding vocabulary is highly 
technical, littered with legal terms and a significantly high proportion of the 
vocabulary is related to payments and finances in general. In 66% we find 
some specifically legal terminology within 10 words of the search term, such 
as covenant, testator, plaintiff, defendant. In just under half of the KWIC lines 
(47% or 15/32) we find vocabulary related to financial matters, such as 
payment, paying, money, argent. 
 
As the corpus spans a long period of time, the documents of the early 16th 
century sources were isolated, removing the documents drawn from texts of 
the other centuries. This allows for a better understanding of the tendencies 
during the early 16th century, which was a pivotal time for both the 
development of the concept and terminology. Studying these 56 (early 16th 
c.) concordance lines separately, it was found that in 43% of the KWIC lines 
(24/56) ‘promise’ was used in a contractual sense. As we shall see later, this 
will considerably increase as the century progresses. 
 
The Elizabethan ‘promise’ corpus  (ECp) 
 
The second corpus built on the search term of ‘promise’ was constituted from 
the Elizabethan material that can be found in volumes 72, 73, and 123 of the 
English Reports (ECp). It contains 35 documents (9 from vol. 72, 14 from vol. 
73, 12 from vol. 123), has 32,213 word tokens and 6,041 word types and 
shows 87 hits for promise; the original source material consisted of 1,831 
pages.  
 
In this corpus, we can observe that ‘promise’ appeared considerably more 
frequently in a contractual context than in the SSCp, namely in 79 out of the 
87 KWIC lines. This represents a leap of 55 points to 91% (79/87). The 
fundamental meaning of ‘promise’ remains a general language one, but it is 
the context that changes. Of the 79 KWIC lines that deal with a contractual 
situation, we find the search term surrounded by specifically legal 
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terminology (e.g. assumpsit, covenant, demurer, testator etc.) in 53 lines 
(67%) and by vocabulary relating to financial matters (e.g. payment, pay, 
debt, sum etc.) in 28 lines (35%). 
 
From the proximity search, we can observe that ‘promise’ occurs in contexts 
that also discuss notions of consideration, assumpsit and debt, though only 
the first can be found in closer proximity spanning twenty words to the left 
and right: 
 
ECpromise 
35 docs. / 32,213 word tokens / 6,041 word types 
original sources: 1,831 pages 
search term	
(incl. various spellings) 
hits proximity 
promise 87 - 
assumpsit/assumption/assume 47 8 
consideration 57 15 
contract 17 4 
covenant 37 3 
debt 45 2 
quid pro quo 0  0 
tort 3 0 
trespass 11 0 
 
Table 12: search terms/proximity to ‘promise’ in the Elizabethan ‘promise’ corpus 
 
 ‘Consideration’ also comes high on the list of words with which ‘promise’ 
tends to collocate: it is ranked 29th of 659 collocate types with a frequency of 
11 in a word span of 10 to the left and right, while assumpsit is ranked 44th 
with a frequency of 7.  
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rank freq. freq (L) freq (R) collocate 
1 106 65 41 le 
2 46 37 9 sur 
27 11 1 10 pay 
29 11 6 5 consideration 
44 7 2 5 assumpsit 
120 3 3 0 covenant 
121 3 2 1 contract 
 
Table 13: collocates of ‘promise’ in the ECp 
 
While the context in which ‘promise’ occurs may tend to be a contractual one, 
the more frequent occurring clusters involving ‘promise’ come from the 
general language. The first technical language clusters ‘promissionem & 
assumptionem’ and ‘sur case sur promise’ appear only once or twice 
respectively. 
 
rank freq. range cluster (search term on left) 
1 8 8 promise a 
4 4 3 promise pur pay 
9 2 2 promise et declare 
10 2 2 promise fait 
22 1 1 promissionem & assumptionem 
rank freq. range cluster (search term on right) 
1 13 7 sur promise 
7 
8 
9 
10 
15 
16 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
3 
3 
2 
3 
2 
2 
def. promise 
deft promise 
deft. promise 
le deft promise 
de def. promise 
le deft. promise 
21 2 2 sur case sur promise 
28 1 1 aceion, sur case sur promise 
 
Table 14: clusters with ‘promise’ in the ECc 
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This table is also a good illustration of how the inconsistency in spelling 
results in every spelling variation having a value of its own. 
 
3.3 Consideration 
 
Turning to the main focus of this analysis, namely the word ‘consideration’, 
we can observe a steady increase in its use in law reporting. In this section 
we will examine this rise and analyse the shifts in semantic content of the 
term. 
 
The 13th, 14th & 15th centuries Year Books and Reports 
 
In the 13th, 14th and 15th century law reporting sources 70 , the word 
'consideration' is very rarely used and any occurrence has a general 
language meaning such as: considering a question, having regard to, in 
recognition of, etc. The original Latin texts frequently include the phrase ideo 
consideratum est which is also a general language use, though embedded in 
a specific legal context. 
 
In the 947 pages of the four volumes of the Earliest English Law Reports71 all 
dated from the end of the 13th century, we can find no hits in any original Law 
French source texts for 'consideration' in its various spellings. The word is 
used neither in a general sense nor with a specifically legal meaning. In the 
eight Year Books of Richard II's reign, dating from 1378-79 and 1382-139072 
																																																								
70 Earliest English Reports vol. I, II, III, IV (to 1284, 1285-1289, 1279-89) 111, 112, 122, 123 
Selden Society; Year Books of Richard II (1378-79, 1382-1390) Ames Foundation 
Publications; (1422) Year Book 1 Henry VI, 50 Selden Society; (1470) Year Books of 10 
Edward IV and 49 Henry VI, 47 Selden Society  
71 edited for the Selden Society by Paul Brand: vol. I & II, 111 & 112 Selden Society, Oxford: 
Alden Press 1996; vol. III & IV, 122 & 123 Selden Society, Cambridge: CUP, 2006 & 2007 
72 (1378-79) 2 Richard II (edited for the Ames Foundation by Morris S. Arnold; London: 
William Clowes & Sons, 1975); (1382-83) 6 Richard II (edited for the Ames Foundation by 
Samuel E. Thorne; Michigan: Edwards Brothers, Ann Arbour, 1996); (1383-84) 7 Richard II 
(edited for the Ames Foundation by Maurice J. Holland; Michigan: Edwards Brothers, Ann 
Arbour, 1989); (1385-87) 8-10 Richard II (edited for the Ames Foundation by L.C. Hector and 
Michael J Hager; London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne & Co., 1987); (1387-88) 11 Richard II 
(edited for the Ames Foundation by Isobel D. Thornley; London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne & 
Co., 1937); (1388-89) 12 Richard II (edited for the Ames Foundation by George F. Deiser; 
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and representing some 759 pages, there are no hits in any original source 
texts for 'consideration' in its various spellings. 
 
The 15th century sources edited for the Selden Society show similar trends. 
For example, the Year Book of Henry VI from (1422)73 provides no hits for 
'consideration' in its 131 pages. The same is true of the 172 pages of the 
Year Books of 10 Edward IV and 49 Henry VI (1470)74, while in the Caryll 
Reports (1485-1499)75, we find 2 matches for 'consideration', both used in 
general language contexts. 
 
The 16th & 17th centuries Year Books and Reports 
 
It is only in the 16th century sources76 that we find the term consideration 
used more frequently and in an increasingly technical legal sense. In the 
Year Books of 12-14 Henry VIII's reign77, covering the years 1520-1523, we 
have 21 matches for 'consideration', exclusively used in the legal sense as 
payment or reward or as the promise/object of an agreement. A proximity 
search between 'consideration' and other contract vocabulary78 reveals that 
although there are similar numbers of hits for both 'consideration' and 
'contract', these two search terms cannot be found in proximity of 20 words 
from each other. The same holds for 'promise', 'covenant and 'debt'. There 
are, however, 14 proximity matches with grant/graunt (out of a total of 215 
hits for grant/graunt). 																																																																																																																																																													
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1914); (1389-90) 13 Richard II (edited for the Ames 
Foundation by Theodor F.T. Plucknett; London: Spottiswoode, Ballantyne & Co., 1929). 
73 (1422) 1 Henry VI, 50 Selden Society, edited by C.H. Williams; London: Bernard Quaritch, 
1933 
74 (1470) Year Book of 10 Edward IV and 49 Henry VI, edited by N. Neilson, 47 Selden 
Society, London: Bernard Quaritch 1931 
75 Reports of Cases by John Caryll, Part I (1485-1499), 383 pages & Part II, (1501-1522) 
349 pages, edited by J.H. Baker, 115 & 116 Selden Society; Oxford: Alden Press 1999 & 
2000 
76 (1520-1523) Year Books 12-14 Henry VIII, 119 Selden Society; (1522-1558) The Reports 
of William Dalison, 124 Selden Society; Reports from the Lost Notebooks of Sir James Dyer 
109 & 110 Selden Society. 
77 (1520-1523) Year Books 12-14 Henry VIII 192 pages, edited by J.H. Baker, 119 Selden 
Society; Oxford: Alden Press 2002 
78 All the various spelling variations listed above have been respected in the search, which 
was carried out for every combination for spelling between both the search term and the 
proximity term. 
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Similarly, in the Dalison reports79 the 6 matches for 'consideration' are all in 
the legal sense. In the reports from the lost notebooks of Dyer80, the 36 
matches for 'consideration', only 9 are in the general sense, while the 
remaining 27 hits are all in the legal sense. The proximity searches in the 
Dyer Notebooks show the same trend as for the Henry VIII Year Books: 8 
proximity matches between 'consideration and grant/graunt (out of a total of 
162 hits for grant/graunt), 2 for 'covenant' and 1 hit for 'promise' and none for 
'debt' and 'contract'. 
 
As the 16th century progressed, and even more during the first half of the 17th 
century, we find ‘consideration’ used increasingly in specifically technical 
legal meanings. The lexical and grammatical patterning surrounding 
‘consideration’ signposts an abstract and autonomous concept, rather than a 
descriptive general language context, which has been prominent hitherto. 
This will be discussed in detail in relation to the Elizabethan and Stuart 
corpora under the heading for the specialist and abstract uses. 
 
The Selden Society ‘consideration’ corpus  (SSCc) 
 
Three sets of corpora were constituted based on the word ‘consideration’ for 
a more detailed linguistics analysis: the SSCc for the early period, the ECc 
for the Elizabethan reign and the SCc for the early Stuart era.81 This study 
aims to reveal not only the use of the term ‘consideration’ in quantitative 
terms but also in relation to semantic shifts; this section will, therefore, 
examine in greater detail the language that constitutes the context of the use 
of ‘consideration’ and which will enable us to draw conclusions on the 
semantic evolution of that term. 
 
																																																								
79 The Reports of William Dalison (1552-1558) 148 pages, edited by J.H. Baker, 124 Selden 
Society, Cambridge, CUP, 2007 
80 Reports from the Lost Notebooks of Sir James Dyer, vol. I & 2 (1541-1581) 219 & 246 
pages, edited by J.H. Baker, 109 & 110 Selden Society; Oxford: Alden Press 1994 
81 For an overview of the corpora, see annex 3 
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The SSCc compiled from searching the 13th to mid 16th centuries Selden 
Society sources82 for the word ‘consideration’ consists of 57 downloaded 
documents with 38,899 word tokens and 6,716 word types; the original 
source material consisted of 4,109 pages. Searching that corpus for 
‘consideration’ resulted in 102 matches, while the search for other terms 
showed that covenant, debt and trespass were more prominent than 
contract. The advance proximity search gave no significant results. 
 
SSCconsideration 
57 docs. / 38,899 word tokens / 6,716 word types 
original sources: 4,109 pages 
search term	
(incl. various spellings) 
hits proximity 
consideration 102 - 
assumpsit/assumption/assume 5 0 
contract 1 0 
covenant 18 1 
debt 14 0 
promise 8 1 
quid pro quo 0  0 
tort 3 0 
trespass 12 0 
 
Table 15: search terms/proximity to ‘consideration’ in the Selden Soc. ‘consideration’ corpus 
 
The element that characterised this corpus, in particular in comparison to the 
later corpora of the Elizabethan and Stuart era, discussed below, is the high 
frequency of ‘consideration’ in a general language meaning. In 43% of the 
concordance lines we find consideration used in the sense of ‘taking into 
account’. It is also interesting that the context of these general language 
KWIC lines is almost exclusively in Middle English. For example: 
“In tender consideration whereof, and for asmuch as the saied Lorde 
Dier did greatelie mislike our service and manner and dealing in the 
publique administration of justice….”83 																																																								
82 Detailed references are listed in annex 2 (iv) 
83 In: Reports from the Lost Notebooks of Sir James Dyer Part 2 or 110 Selden Society 314 
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It only occurs three times in Anglo-French. For example: 
“Sir, le deffendant gist languishant en son lict, par que nous priomus 
que il poit estre par attornay. Mes jeo say bien que sans tiel 
consideration il ne respondra par attorney, mes convient apere en 
proper person…”84 
 
In 17% of the concordance lines, consideration is used in a general language 
meaning but embedded in a legal technical context and in 38% of the lines 
the word has a technical meaning. An example for each: 
“Nota que si home a cest jour ou devant grant al auter per son fait que 
en consideration de son bon service que il ad fait ou a faire a luy ou 
en consideration que son file marier ove moye ou mon fittes que il 
avera tout le terre en un ville et cest graunt est per fait et nient enrolle 
que ore nul use est alterate sur cest graunt entant que il va per voy de 
graunt et done soit execute per liverey de seisin …”85 
 
“Et cest plee per Portman Justice et Gawdy Serjeant fuit tenus bon 
plee en barr et le bargaine bon et cest consideration alter le use en le 
terre coment que la est un rent reserve devant lestatute…”86 
 
SSCconsideration 
language matches % of total 
General language 44 43 % 
General legal language 17 17 % 
Technical language 39 38 % 
Latin 2 2 % 
TOTAL 102 - 
 
Table 16:  ‘consideration’ in the SSCc 																																																								
84 “Sir, the defendant is lying sick in bed, and so we pray that he may appear by attorney. I 
am quite aware that in other circumstances he would not be able to answer by attorney, but 
must appear in his own person..” in: Reports of Cases by John Caryll Part 1, or 115 Selden 
Society 113 
85 “Note that if someone at the present day (or before) grants to someone else by his deed 
that, in consideration of his good service that he has done or is to do for him, or in 
consideration that his daughter should marry me or my son, he should have all the land in a 
vill, and this grant is by deed and not enrolled, no use is altered upon this grant inasmuch as 
it goes by way of grant and gift and takes no effect until the gift is executed by livery of 
seisin.” in: Reports of William Dalison, or 124 Selden Society 50 
86 “And this plea was held a good plea in bar by Portman J. and Gawdy, serjeant, and the 
bargain good; and this consideration alters the use in the land even though there is a rent 
reserved before the statute…” in: Reports of William Dalison, or 124 Selden Society 60 
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Of the 102 KWIC lines, 48 are in Middle English, of which 41 lines are of the 
general language category, 5 lines of the general legal language and 2 lines 
of the technical language: 
 
SSCconsideration – Middle English uses 
48 KWIC lines 
language matches % of total 
General language 41 85,5 % 
General legal language 5 10,5 % 
Technical language 2 4 % 
TOTAL 48 - 
 
Table 17:  Middle English uses of ‘consideration’ in the SSCc 
 
It appears that the technical legal sense of ‘consideration’ was developed in 
Law French and not exported at this stage into Middle English. 
 
The high proportion of general language use is also reflected in the results 
applying the collocate and clusters tools. When searching for the words that 
collocate with ‘consideration’, the first general terms that can take on a legal 
meaning in a legal context, are ‘graunt’, which also appears 112 times in the 
entire corpus, and ‘terre’ which can be found 182 times in the entire corpus. 
The first two specifically technical terms are: ‘feffee’ (36 times in the whole 
corpus) and ‘indenture’ (11 times in the entire corpus). 
 
SSCconsideration 
rank freq. freq (L) freq (R) collocate 
1 
2 
81 
54 
38 
23 
43 
31 
the 
le 
23 13 10 3 graunt 
32 10 3 7 terre 
65 6 5 1 feffee 
71 5 5 0 indenture 
 
Table 18: collocates of ‘consideration’ in the SSCc 
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The same can be observed from the cluster search. Any clusters occurring 
most frequently have general language meanings. The technical legal 
language cluster ‘est implie consideration’ only occurs twice. Similarly, the 
cluster ‘consideration dun mariage’  which has a general language meaning 
but within a legal language context can also be found in only two instances. 
 
rank freq. range cluster (search term on left) 
1 7 7 consideracion whereof 
2 5 5 consideration of 
13 2 2 consideracion of the premisses 
20 2 2 consideration dun mariage 
rank freq. range cluster (search term on right) 
1 
2 
4 
12 
7 
5 
12 
7 
4 
in consideracion 
in consideration 
en consideration 
8 3 3 ascun consideration 
19 2 2 est implie consideration 
 
Table 19: clusters with ‘consideration’ in the SSCc 
 
The Elizabethan ‘consideration’ corpus  (ECc) 
 
The corpus constituted from the Elizabethan sources consists of 114 
downloads (60 documents from vol. 72, 7 documents from vol. 73, and 47 
documents from vol. 123). It has 176,449 word tokens and 13,787 word 
types; the original source material consisted of 1,831 pages. As before, this 
can only be treated as indicative in view of the spelling variations.  
 
The concordance search for consideration with AntConc in this particular 
corpus gave 392 concordance hits. A proximity search, using the advanced 
search tools showed the word 'consideration' to be found 51 times within 20 
words of 'covenant', 25 instances of 'assumpsit', 20 instances of 'promise' 
and 13 instances of 'debt' but again only twice in the proximity of 'contract'. 
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The same corpus, originally selected on the basis of the occurrence of the 
term ‘consideration’, was also searched for other search terms. All results 
can be found in table 20 below. 
 
ECconsideration 
114 docs. / 176,449 word tokens / 13,787 word types 
original sources: 1,831 pages 
Search term87 hits proximity88 
consideration 392 - 
assum* 109 25 
contract 15 2 
covenant 299 51 
debt 79 13 
promise 51 20 
quid pro quo 3 0 
tort 16 0 
trespass 41 0 
 
Table 20: search terms/proximity to ‘consideration’ in the Elizabethan ‘consideration’ corpus 
 
From this textual evidence and the proximity search, in particular, it appears 
that the term consideration can frequently be found in discussions involving 
covenant. The latter occurs 299 times in this corpus, and in 17% of the cases 
it can be found in the proximity of 20 words to the left and to the right of 
consideration. Debt is less prominent than it had been during the preceding 
centuries, when the occurrence of the word debt tended to outstrip that of 
covenant (see above). We also have a low frequency of the term contract, of 
which only 13% can be found in the proximity of consideration. 
 
Of particular interest is the relatively higher frequency of the word promise, of 
which 39% can be found in the proximity of consideration in this particular 
corpus (not to be confused with the previous corpora, SSCp and ECp, 																																																								
87 The various spellings were covered. 
88 Using the advanced search tool searching in the proximity of twenty words to the left and 
to the right of the search term, for specific other terms. The various combinations of the 
different spellings were all covered. 
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compiled specifically with the search term ‘promise, described in section 3.2 
above). To obtain contextual information on the 51 occurrence of ‘promise’ in 
the ECc, the 51 concordance lines were studied more closely. These KWIC 
lines show that the notion of promise was frequently in a context of legal 
discussion. In almost 75%, the word promise could be found in close 
proximity (10 words to the left and right) of specifically legal vocabulary or 
legal phrases. In the other cases, vocabulary relating to financial matters, 
such as paying/payment, selling, administrator, assets were in close 
proximity to the ‘promise’. As far as the legal vocabulary is concerned, in 
approximately half of the 51 concordance hits for promise, we find in its 
immediate vicinity words such as assumpsit, consideration, covenant, grant, 
action, judgement, demur, plaintiff etc. In 8 concordance hits, promise is a 
part of the more abstract legal expression: action sur le case sur promise, or 
just action sur promise.  
 
The application of the collocation and clusters tools gave no significant 
results. It underlined once again how inconsistency in spelling could skew the 
results, as every spelling variation has a collocate/clusters value of its own. 
 
 
ECconsideration 
rank freq. freq (L) freq (R) collocate 
1 380 206 174 le 
8 116 62 54 est 
21 59 16 43 marriage 
28 46 33 13 covenant 
36 34 16 18 terre 
 
Table 21: collocates of ‘consideration’ in the ECc 
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rank freq. range cluster (search term on left) 
1 
2 
34 
22 
26 
20 
consideration de 
consideration del 
9 
13 
6 
4 
4 
2 
consideration de marriage 
consideracon de marriage 
rank freq. range cluster (search term on right) 
1 
2 
5 
14 
38 
30 
9 
4 
27 
18 
9 
2 
in consideration 
en consideration 
en consideracin 
en considerac 
4 11 11 bone consideration 
8 5 5 ascun consideration 
13 4 2 available considerac 
 
Table 22: clusters with of ‘consideration’ in the ECc 
 
As far as the occurrence of the term ‘consideration’ in the ECc is concerned, 
we find the term in a more specifically legal technical use rather than in a 
general language one, in the overwhelming majority of the 392 concordance 
lines.  
 
ECconsideration 
Language matches % of total 
General language 43 11% 
General legal language 111 28% 
Technical language 227 58% 
Latin 11 3% 
TOTAL 392 - 
 
Table 23: ‘consideration’ in the ECc 
 
Latin uses 
 
The word consideration occurs 11 times in a Latin text context. These were 
not included in this study, as it would contribute little to the understanding of 
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how the language used in the development of the concept of consideration 
shifted from a general language use to a specialised one. The Latin uses of 
consideration can usually be found in a (or several) Latin phrase(s) within an 
Anglo-French text, rather than in an entirely Latin text. For example: 
…in considertatione maritagii89 
…pro considerationibus pradict’ ad omnis tempora90 
…quod quidem judicium quo ad consideration91 
…ideo consideratum est. 
Its use tends to be in the general language meaning of ‘taking into 
consideration’, rather than in the contractual sense of the element that makes 
an informal agreement enforceable. 
 
General language uses 
 
In the sub-section of general language use, consideration is to be understood 
in terms of careful thought/contemplation, viewing, observing typically over a 
period of time, taking into account, motives/reasons, deliberation, opinion or 
conclusion; also included is the notion of kindness and thoughtfulness for 
another and esteem, importance, consequences among men and for things. 
In 43 concordance hits of this particular corpus, ‘consideration’ appears 
within the context of a general language meaning. For example: 
… et pur difficulty le case hors del court fuit referre al consideration des 2 
Chiefs Jutices Popham & amp;92 
… et apres argument & consideration del Case lea Justices …93 
… l’opinion de eux touts sur conference ensemble, et consideration ewe de 
touts les livres et cases …94 
… ceo fuit l’opinion sur consideracon de touts les livres …95 
… n’est done sur deliberate consideration de le statute …96 																																																								
89 1 Anderson 19, or 123 Eng. Rep. at 331-334, 1 Anderson 138, or 123 Eng. Rep. at 395-
398 
90 72 Eng. Rep. 635 
91 2 Anderson 127, or 123 Eng. Rep. 581; 2 Anderson 131, or 123 Eng. Rep. 583 
92 72 Eng. Rep. 872-3 
93 1 Anderson 12, or 123 Eng. Rep. at 327 
94 Moore (K.B.) 145, or 72 Eng. Rep. at 495 
95 Moore (K.B.) 540, or 72 Eng. Rep. 744 
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******** 
 
In the remaining 338 concordance hits, we find the term ‘consideration’ 
appearing in a continuum of uses ranging from general language use in a 
legal context to an technical use in a specialised context. The general legal 
use can be defined in terms of consideration as payment or reward and as 
the promise/object of a contract. It describes a concrete situation of a causal 
link between two elements necessary to making an agreement: something is 
said/given/paid/done in consideration of something said/given/paid/done. 
These were the basic elements required for the formation of a legally binding 
informal agreement. When the term is used in an abstract way – e.g. “the 
instrument imported a prima facie consideration” - it no longer refers to a 
concrete causal link between two events, as is the case with the expression 
‘in consideration of’. Instead, it has become a cover term expressing an 
abstract concept or range of ideas. 
 
While the collocation ‘in consideration of’ is a general language construct 
adopted in the legal context of contract, it can be used in a wide range of 
semantic meanings, both legal and non-legal. When consideration is used as 
part of a specialised language, it is restricted semantically to the specialised 
contexts in question. It tends to be combined with a relatively restricted set of 
technical words, which in itself points to technical language: the more limited 
the vocabulary in proximity, the more specialised the language. Grammatical 
features are further important pointers to the use of specialised language. In 
concordance lines that show a more abstract use of the word consideration, 
it tends to be used as full noun, sometimes even in a one-word sentence. To 
that extent it is a cover term that stands for abstracts concepts and thus 
becomes a part of specialised and technical language. 
 
 
 																																																																																																																																																													
96 Moore (K.B.) 439, or 72 Eng. Rep. 681-682 
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General language in legal use and context 
 
In just over 28% or 111 of the 392 concordance lines we find the word 
consideration in the causal collocation ‘in consideration of’ or different 
variations. In the corpus, this phrase is in its Middle/Modern English versions 
as well as the Anglo-French equivalents en/in consideration d’/de/del/do/dun. 
Also included are similar causal phrases such en/in consideration que and 
pur consideration del. In other words, while the term consideration appears 
as a noun, it does not behave as a full noun, but rather depends on the 
phraseological pattern without which it would not have the same meaning. 
The function of this phrase is to provide a causal link between two events or 
elements at the centre of the concept of striking an informal agreement. 
 
With reference to the functional linguistic conception of language, as 
discussed in chapter III/1,97 the phrase ‘in consideration of’ was studied in 
relation to the experiential function and meanings encoded from the 
experience of reality. In the case of this particular phrase, we are on the 
outer layer of the experience:  
§ something is (done) = PROCESS  
§ in relation to something or someone = PARTICIPANTS 
§ in consideration of = CIRCUMSTANCES 
For example: 
…le covenant est fait en consideration advancer les issues de son 
corps…98 
…le use est limit per fait en consideration de brotherly love…99 
…le case sur l’assumpsit del def. en consideration que le pl’ assume…100  
…count que le def. en consideration que le pl’ avoit vendus al def…101  
…le dit. def. pur consideration del marriage fait perenter le fitz…102  
																																																								
97 See in particular figure 3 in chapter III/1 
98 Moore (K.B.) 495, or 72 Eng. Rep. 717 
99 ibid. 
100 Moore (K.B.) 548, or 72 Eng. Rep. 750 
101 Moore (K.B.) 700, or 72 Eng. Rep. 849 
102 Benloe 58, or 123 Eng. Rep. 45 
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‘Consideration’ in these general legal language uses is a part of the outer 
blue layer of experience and thus twice removed from the inner core of the 
experience. We will see later how this changes in the KWIC lines where 
consideration can be found in legal technical meaning. 
 
When considering the KWIC concordance lines in greater detail, we can 
observe that the language to the right of the search term tends to describe 
common events, ‘things’ done or affections, duties and services undertaken 
by people. By far the most common word is marriage which occurs 34 times. 
Similar matters such as natural affection, the bringing up of children, fatherly 
care or brotherly love, loyal service can also be found as elements in the 
consideration of which agreements are made. Furthermore, words relating to 
financial matters such as payments or debts or the mention of specific sums 
of money can be found in 16 concordance lines and the words plaintiff or 
defendant 18 times. The language to the left of the search term is of a more 
specialised nature. We can count considerably more technical terms 
describing legal instruments or legal persons or titles. ‘Covenant’ occurs 9 
times before the search term, in contrast to twice after it. ‘Indenture’ can be 
found 8 times before and only once after the search term. ‘Assumpsit’ a 
dozen times before but only twice after it. The financial vocabulary is also 
more technical: we can find words such as fine, purchase, fee, which were 
far less prominent before the search terms. Furthermore, words relating to 
property and related legal instruments or legal titles occur more frequently 
before the search term, such as intestate, legacy, estate, grant, possession, 
heirs, testator, enfeoffor, executor etc. In other words, the collocation ‘in 
consideration of’ in the context of law reporting appears to link specifically 
legal instruments or concepts with more common events, ‘things’ done or 
affections, duties and services undertaken by people, frequently in a private 
or family context.  
 
From this textual evidence, we can observe that the word consideration 
occurs in general language uses expressing the causal link between two 
elements or events that are necessary for striking an agreement. However, 
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the textual context clearly shows that we are dealing with specialist technical 
matters of the law. While the collocation ‘in consideration of’ could be used in 
any situation of exchange, in this corpus we have a relatively restricted set of 
vocabulary concerned with legal instruments and persons, payments, 
indenture, estate etc. in exchange of mainly marriage and other family 
matters. In other words, both the meaning and function of the collocation is in 
a general language sense but it is the lexical and semantic context that is 
highly technical. 
 
Specialist and technical uses 
 
In 58% or 227 of the 392 concordance lines, the word consideration can be 
found in a specialised context more akin to an abstract concept. It is 
frequently a one-word sentence, where the word is between two full-stops 
and thus signposting a conceptual meaning. As discussed above, the main 
pointers to the use of technical language can be observed in the interaction 
between the lexical and grammatical patterning. The word ‘consideration’ in 
the technical context is no longer embedded and dependent on a causal 
prepositional phrase but appears and behaves as a full noun and in 
combination with adjectives, articles, pronouns and prepositions. 
 
The most common accompanying elements (words span of 20 to the left and 
right) are adjectives (60 times or 26%) that usually precede the noun, such 
as good, effectual, valuable, available, (in)sufficient etc. The combination 
with determiners is also frequent, for example definite articles, mainly in the 
singular form: le(s) consideration(s) (47 times or 21%) or quantifying 
determiners such as nul or with prepositions such as pur, sans, sur, de etc. 
(38 times or 17%).  
 
words accompanying 
‘consideration’ 
occurrence percentage 
adjectives, e.g. good, effectual, valuable 60 26% 
determiners, e.g. le, les 47 21% 
prepositions, e.g. pur, sans, sur, de 38 17% 
 
Table 24: words associated with ‘consideration’ in the ECc
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As far as verbs are concerned, only those directly associated with the noun 
‘consideration’ were taken into account. Any verb associated with other 
words, even if in the immediate vicinity of ‘consideration’ was not taken into 
account. The verb mostly associated with the noun ‘consideration’ is ester (to 
be), in 42 of these concordance lines it can be found before and in 32 lines 
after the noun. The verbs aver (to have) and faire (see table 5 below) are 
also more frequent than average. Although these are the among the most 
frequent used verbs in the English language, all three represent material 
processes and associate the noun consideration in a function of participants 
within the clause. In roughly 28% we can find the noun consideration in the 
traditional class of subject, while in two thirds of the concordance lines, we 
find the noun can be categorised as object, usually directly linked to a verb. 
 
verb to left 
(10 words) 
search term to right 
(10 words) 
ester (être) 42 consideration 32 
aver (avoir) 6 consideration 1 
faire 8 consideration 8 
 
Table 25: verbs associated with ‘consideration’ 
 
Moving beyond traditional grammar classification of words and considering 
the function they play, we refer to the functional linguistic conception of 
language, as discussed in chapter III/1. As the word consideration appears in 
its technical and abstract uses, its experiential function shifts from the outer 
blue layer to the middle green layer, namely that of the participants in the 
process, most commonly realised by nominal groups. 
 
Examining the experiential meaning of ‘consideration’ in its specialised use, 
we can observe that the way experience and reality is encoded in those 
cases represents a major shift in the function of the use of ‘consideration’. 
With reference to the functional linguistic conception of language, as 
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discussed in chapter III/1, 103  the experiential function of ‘consideration’ 
moves from the outer blue layer to the middle green layer, namely that of the 
participants in the process, most commonly realised by nominal groups. In 
this way, it becomes a signpost to signal an autonomous concept, rather than 
a causal connector, as discussed in the previous paragraph. Considering the 
unit of meaning rather than the unit of analysis according to traditional 
grammar, we find that the role in which the word consideration appears is 
that of participant (notion of ‘thingness’), sometimes as actor, sometimes as 
goal. The examples given below show that the term tends to appear in a 
context of material processes (what-happened? or what-did-X-do?) rather 
than behavioural processes (encoding physiological or psychological 
behaviour) or mental processes (reflecting the inner world of cognition, 
perception, (dis)liking, inclination).  
 
Example from the ECc : 
…per le ley a luy payer, & ideo le consideracon fuit insufficient…104  
…Accin sur le case sur assumpsit, le consideration fuit q le pl’ assume al 
estranger…105  
…lour reason fuit pur ceo que nul consideration est expresse en le fait pur 
raiser…106 
…le consanguinity est consideracan imply…107  
…les Feffees sais consideration ou cause pur que ils aver use…108 
… sur consideration do marriage ill Covenant…109 
…limit use sur covenant il covient daver effectual consideracn…110 
…nul use est create per le dit covenant & consideracin, mes ceo deviant un 
covenant…111 
 																																																								
103 See in particular figure 3 in chapter III/1 
104 Moore (K.B.) 685, or 72 Eng. Rep. 839 
105 Moore (K.B.) 573, or 72 Eng. Rep. 767 
106 1 Anderson 141, or 123 Eng. Rep. 397 
107 Moore (K.B.) 684, or 72 Eng. Rep. 838 
108 2 Anderson 201, or 123 Eng. Rep. 620 
109 2 Anderson 199, or 123 Eng. Rep. 619 
110 Moore (K.B.) 381, or 72 Eng. Rep. 642 
111 Moore (K.B.) 121, or 72 Eng. Rep. 481 
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We find the function of ‘consideration’ at the heart of the experiential 
meaning of the language used. In the role of participant, it relates to a 
material process and the strength of the experiential meaning can be such 
that a single word is sufficient to signify the concept. In other words, in the 
specialised and technical uses of the term, the strength of its experiential 
meaning has been underlined in comparison to its use in the phrase ‘in 
consideration of’, as described above. 
 
In addition, the information generated by the AntConc tool further underlines 
the technical nature of the texts and language. It shows that a dozen 
specifically legal terms can frequently be found both in the vicinity of the 
search term, and in the rest of the corpus: e.g. use, covenant, plaintiff, 
estate, assumpsit, indenture etc. Similarly, there are words that are not 
particularly technical in the sense that they come from everyday language 
use, but take on a specific legal significance in a legal context, such as 
marriage, terre, promise etc. In general, the term ‘consideration’ tends to be 
combined with a limited set of words, which is further indicative for the use of 
specialised language. 
 
The Stuart ‘consideration’ corpus  (SCc) 
 
The Stuart corpus constituted on the basis of the search term ‘consideration’ 
(including the various spellings) consists of 151 documents downloaded from 
volume 81 of the English Reports – Full Reprint on the HeinOnline data base. 
These include the original Law French versions of the reports compiled by 
Henry Rolle and Jeffrey Palmer between 1614 and 1629, mainly during the 
reign of James I of England (1603-1625) but also including a few years of the 
reign of Charles I (1625-1649). The corpus has 132,582 word tokens and 
9,697 word types; the original source material consisted of 941 pages. 
Similarly to the previous corpora this is only indicative in view of the spelling 
variations, though by the 17th century spelling was less chaotic than in the 
earlier periods.  
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The concordance search for consideration with AntConc shows 465 
concordance hits. A proximity search using the advanced search tool showed 
the term ‘consideration’ to be found 42 times within 20 words of ‘assumpsit’, 
11 instances of ‘contract’, 17 instances of ‘covenant’, 24 instances of ‘debt’ 
and 62 instances in the proximity of ‘promise’. The corpus, originally selected 
on the basis of the occurrence of the term ‘consideration’, was also searched 
for all these words in the main search function rather than just the proximity 
search tools. The results can be found in table 26. 
 
SCconsideration 
151 docs. / 132,582 word tokens / 9,697 word types 
original sources: 941 pages 
Search term112 hits proximity113 
consideration 465 - 
assumpsit 162 42 
contract 93 11 
covenant 191 17 
debt 193 24 
promise 222 62 
quid pro quo 1 0 
tort 61 1 
trespass 59 1 
 
Tables 26: search terms/proximity to ‘consideration’ in the Stuart ‘consideration’ corpus 
 
The search for the word ‘assumpsit’ was undertaken a little differently from 
previous searches on earlier corpora. When the Elizabethan corpus was 
searched with assum*, we obtained 8 different word forms and spellings, as 
we can learn from table 8 above. Searching the Stuart ‘consideration’ corpus 
with assum* we only obtained 4 different word forms and spellings: 
 																																																								
112 The various spellings were covered. 
113 Using the advanced search tool searching in the proximity of twenty words to the left and 
to the right of the search term, for specific other terms. The various combinations of the 
different spellings were all covered. 
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- verb form ‘assume/assumed/assumer’: 79 hits 
- assumpsit: 160 hits 
- assump: 2 hits 
- assumsion: 1 hit 
 
By the 17th century, the use of the word ‘assumpsit’ had become more 
settled, stable and technical. It was no longer used interchangeably with 
‘assumption’ or the verb form. The verb forms and the one hit for ‘assumsion’ 
were, therefore, disregarded and only ‘assump/assumpsit’ were used. 
 
Using ‘assumpsit’, ‘contract’, ‘covenant’, ‘debt’ and ‘promise as concordance 
search terms and applying the advanced search tool revealed their proximity 
to each other. The most striking element in these concordance and proximity 
searches is the increased occurrence of the word ‘promise’. It has become 
more prominent in this 17th century ‘consideration’ corpus than it was in the 
earlier corpora. Of the 222 occurrences of ‘promise’, we find that: 
- in 28% of the hits we find the word ‘consideration’ in the vicinity (62/222) 
- in 10% we find ‘assumpsit’ (22/222) 
- in 7% we find ‘debt’ (16/222). 
The words ‘covenant’ and ‘debt’ continue to be prominent but ‘contract’ still 
lags behind. It appears from this textual evidence that the discussions 
involving ‘consideration’ have moved towards a context also involving also 
the notion of promise, but are not yet firmly within the context of ‘contract’. 
 
The results from applying the collocates and clusters tools show that the 
language surrounding the search term is not particularly technical. 
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SCconsideration 
rank freq. freq (L) freq (R) collocate 
1 532 293 239 le 
4 
(23) 
261 
62 
139 
29 
122 
33 
est 
(ester) 
15 96 64 32 bon 
16 90 52 38 case 
24 62 38 24 defendant 
25 59 35 24 promise 
36 46 21 25 plaintiff 
46 36 17 19 assumpsit 
 
Table 27: collocates of ‘consideration’ in the SCc 
 
rank freq. range cluster (search term on left) 
12 10 10 consideration est 
14 9 9 consideration que le plaintiff 
21 
(24) 
5 
(4) 
4 
(1) 
consideration de marriage 
(consideration del’ marriage) 
23 4 4 consideration a faire 
rank freq. range cluster (search term on right) 
3 49 32 le consideration 
5 13 9 est bon consideration 
14 7 4 valuable consideration 
 
Table 28: clusters with ‘consideration’ in the SCc 
 
The concordance lines for the term consideration were grouped in the same 
four types of language uses as was done with the Elizabethan corpus (ECc) 
discussed above. The results are summarized in table 29 below: 
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SCconsideration 
Language matches % of total 
General language use 9 2% 
General legal language  155 33% 
Technical language 294 63% 
Latin 7 1,5% 
Total 465 - 
 
Table 29: consideration’ in the SCc 
 
General language and Latin 
 
The most obvious change in relation to the earlier corpora is the drastic fall in 
the general language use. From 43% of the concordance hits in the SSc 
(15th/early 16th century), and 11% in the Elizabethan corpus (ECc), to a mere 
2% during the early Stuart reign cases. The general language meanings 
relate to the court taking specific factors into consideration during the 
process of their decision. There are no major quantitative changes in the 
Latin uses, though there is considerably less variety in the Latin phrases in 
the present corpus. In 6 out of the 7 occurrences, the word is part of the 
phrase ideo consideratum est. In the remaining 96.5% of the concordance 
hits, we find the word consideration in a continuum of uses ranging from legal 
connotations to specialised legal language. 
 
General language in legal use and context 
 
In over 33% or 155 of the 465 concordance hits, the word consideration is a 
part of the causal phrase ‘in consideration of’ and other variations, such as 
en consideration d’un/de/del/que, in consideration d’un/de/del/inde/que etc. 
As observed in the corpora discussed previously, the term appears as a 
noun, yet it does not behave as a full noun, but is embedded in a 
phraseological pattern without which it would not have the same meaning. 
The phrase provides a causal link between two events or elements at the 
centre of the concept making an informal agreement. However, the language 
Chapter	VI:	Corpus	Linguistic	Analysis	188	
surrounding the phrase is not specifically technical, as had been the case in 
the ECc. The words that can be found most frequently in the immediate 
vicinity of the phrase are: (span of 10 words to left and right) 
 
 to left 
(10 words) 
search term to right 
(10 words) 
total 
assumpsit 14 consideration 2 16 
defendant 25 consideration 18 43 
plaintiff 19 consideration 29 48 
promise 19 consideration 16 35 
 
Table 30: words associated with ‘consideration’ in the SCc 
 
The language to the right of ‘consideration’ within the causal phrase tends to 
relate to everyday matters, that may typically be the subject of an informal 
agreement:  
- marriage, love, natural affection, parental link: appear in 28 
concordance lines (18%) immediately after the causal phrase; 
- payment/debt/sums of money: appear in 77 concordance lines (almost 
50%) immediately after the causal phrase. 
 
No pattern can be observed in the language to the left of the phrase; it is 
neither specifically technical nor abstract. In other words, in this corpus the 
phrase ‘in consideration of’ retains its legal connotation but without being 
embedded in highly technical language. 
 
Specialist and technical uses 
 
In just over 63% or 294 of the 465 concordance lines, the word consideration 
has taken on a specialised and abstract meaning. It appears and ‘behaves’ 
as a stand-alone noun with the usual noun-attributes such as adjectives, 
articles, pronouns and prepositions. The most common accompanying 
elements are adjectives (107 times or 36,4%), such as good, valuable, 
sufficient, natural etc. and determiners such as definite and indefinite articles 
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(77 times or 26,2%), or quantifying determiners such as nul (11 times or 
3,7%). Also relatively frequent are prepositions such as de, sur, sans etc. (48 
times or 16,3%). 
 
words accompanying 
‘consideration’ 
occurrence percentage 
adjectives, e.g. good, effectual, valuable 107 36% 
determiners, e.g. le, les, nul 88 30% 
prepositions, e.g. pur, sans, sur, de 38 17% 
 
Table 31: words associated with ‘consideration’ in the SCc 
 
The verb mostly associated with ‘consideration’ in these concordance lines is 
ester (to be). It can be found 98 times immediately before and 66 times 
immediately after the search term. The data for the three verbs to be, to 
have, and to do can be found in the following table: 
 
verb to left 
(10 words) 
search term to right 
(10 words) 
total 
ester (être) 98 consideration 66 164 
aver (avoir) 2 consideration 1 3 
faire 11 consideration 7 18 
 
Table 32: verbs associated with ‘consideration’ 
 
All three verbs indicate material processes (i.e. processes indicating what 
happens or what X does) and associate the noun consideration with a 
function of key participant in the clause, rather than on a more peripheral 
level of circumstances surrounding the process. This is a grammatical 
signpost to signal that in these concordance lines the word consideration 
refers to a concept in its own right rather than a mere causal connector as 
was the case when the word appeared in the phrase ‘in consideration of’. In 
other words, as a unit of meaning and function, it is as that of participant 
(notion of ‘thingness’) – at times in the role of actor, at other times in that of 
goal. The strength of its experiental meaning has been underlined to a point 
that even as a single word it is sufficient to signify an abstract concept.  
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This is also borne out by the semantically restricted language that surrounds 
the word consideration in the concordance lines. Similarly to the ECc, the 
same terminology tends to appear: specifically legal terms such as plaintiff, 
defendant, assumpsit, use, covenant, indenture, conveyance etc., or general 
language words with specific legal connotations, such as marriage, promise, 
money etc. 
 
4. Abridgments 
 
For the sake of completeness, it was also decided to briefly examine other 
documents, such as Abridgements. It must be stressed that abridgements 
are not as such cases reports but collections of cases for easy reference. 
The terms in which the cases are described and the words used do not 
necessarily reflect the language actually used in court at the time of the 
hearings, but express how the author of the abridgement understands, 
evaluates and categorises the cases. In other words, it reports the law as it is 
in the mind of a particular abridgment author. Written later than the original 
report, it still reflects the way these cases were seen at the later time of 
writing the abridgements. 
 
The Abridgement of Cases to the End of Henry VI114 spans from Edward III 
until Henry VI (1327-1413). Reading through it, we find that assumpsit is not 
listed, though we can find 24 entries for action on the case (accions sur le 
cas). Most of them are what was later called trespass on the case, though 
the word trespass does not appear either. The key words in these actions are 
a tort, negligence, vis et armis, gift, bargain conspiration, emprist sur luy. The 
actions with emprist sur luy, in particular, are what would be later classed as 
assumpsit actions. 
 
																																																								
114 N. Statham (1490) Abridgement of Cases to the End of Henry VI, Rouen: Per me. R. 
Pynson, www.heinonline.org - Selden Society Publications and the History of Early English 
Law; Henry VI reigned until 1461. 
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In Fitzherbert's Le Graunde Abridgement115 52 cases of accion sur le cas are 
listed. These deal with a variety of matters, such as debt, grants, deceit, vi et 
armis, bargain/warranty, covenant. The notion of promise is not mentioned. 
Assumpsit as such is not discussed in any detail either, though there are two 
cases that use the phrase emprist sur luy and two others with assuma sur 
luy/nous. The Fitzherbert Abridgement further lists one case of contract 
(discussion on action of contract v. convenant) 31 cases of covenant and 184 
cases of debt. In the last category of cases we frequently find key words 
such as payment, rent count, annuity, grant, contract. But the basic concept 
of a debt action can be found in the notion of obligation: det sur/par 
obligacion 
 
In his 1573 Abridgement116 Brooke lists 123 cases of action sur le case, of 
which 17 deal with situations of assumpsit in the sense of an undertaking. He 
adopts a greater use of the term assumpsit; in 4 cases the word even figures 
in the title and in 11 we finds it in the description of the case. The verb 
emprendre (to undertake), usually in the form of il emprist, appears in 7 
cases, sometimes alongside assumpsit. 
 
The word assumpsit is used in varying degrees of abstraction. It ranges from 
more descriptive uses, generally in the verb form, such as home fait promise 
ou assumpc de faire chose117 and defend assumps de paier118, to more 
abstract, usually noun, uses such as issue sur non assumpsit119 and case 
sur assumptio120, action sur case sur Assumps121. It is also interesting to 
compare how Brooke abridged the cases in his collection of 1573 with the 
original Year Book reports written earlier. In one of the surgeon's negligence 																																																								
115 A. Fitzherbert (1577) Le Graunde Abridgement, London: In Aedibus Ricardi Tottelli, 
www.heinonline.org - Selden Society Publications and the History of Early English Law 
116 R. Brooke (1573) Le Graunde Abridgement, London: In Aedibus Ricardi Tottelli, 
www.heinonline.org - Selden Society Publications and the History of Early English Law  
117 R. Brooke (1573) Le Graunde Abridgement, London: In Aedibus Ricardi Tottelli, 
www.heinonline.org - Selden Society Publications and the History of Early English Law at 4, 
case 10 (original report 20 Hen.VI 34, or LBEx.) 
118 Brooke (1573) at 7, case 105 (original report YB 33 Hen. VIII, or LBEx.) 
119 Brooke (1573) at 4, case 5 (original YB report 27 Hen. VIII 24, or LBEx.) 
120 Brooke (1573) at 5, case 40 (original YB report 11 Hen. IV 33, or LBEx.) 
121 Brooke (1573) at 7, case 107 (original YB report 34 Hen. VIII, or LBEx.) 
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cases122, Brooke described that the defendant emprist de cur le pl dun 
wounde. He also used the word assumpc. The original Edward III Year Book 
report for the year 1374 presented this action as a trespas sur son case. 
There was also a discussion of vi et armis, ne contra pacem, which in these 
early days was a prerequisite for engaging an action of trespass.123 The 
notion of an undertaking is expressed in extensive use of the verb emprendre 
(to undertake), usually in the form of il emprist; the word assumpsit does not 
appear. This comparison is very telling of the evolution that the enforceability 
of informal contracts has undergone in the two centuries that separate these 
two reports of the same case. At the time of the original case, the notion of 
assumpsit had not emerged, and cases were still firmly grounded in the 
action of trespass, which eventually gave way to the action of assumpsit. But 
in his report written 200 years later, Brooke reconceptualised the facts of the 
case using parameters of his own time that were not available at the time the 
case occurred. 
 
Similarly, a case abridged by Brooke124 from the time of Henry VIII (1535/36), 
deals with the question of whether an undertaking to pay a debt is an action 
on debt. Brooke presents the debate of the case as aver accion de dett sur le 
contract ou accion del case sir le promise et issint ceo est in deivers 
respectes, car sur le promise ne gist acc de dett. His use of the word promise 
is interesting, introducing a notion absent from the Year Book report fifty 
years earlier. While both the reports and the abridgment present this case as 
one about an undertaking through their extensive use of the word assumpsit 
(and various variants), the concept that such an undertaking is a promise 
does not appear in the Year Book report, but only in the abridgement. There 
we find the undertaking (25 uses of assumpsit and variants) described in 
terms of 'agreement' (22 uses of agreement or the verb form). This reflects 
the evolution that the action of assumpsit has undergone during the 
																																																								
122 Brooke (1573) at 4, case 24 (original YB report 48 Edw. III 6, or LBEx.) 
123 See discussion in chapter V above 
124 Brooke (1573) at 4, case 5 (original YB report 27 Hen. VIII 24, or LBEx.) 
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intervening years.125 And in general, it is striking that in these early assumpsit 
cases the key words tend to be actions, obligation, duty, conditions, 
guarantees, undertaking and covenant/contract/debt. The notion that 
something was promised may appear as inherent in these action to us today, 
but it was never expressed as such in the use of the vocabulary. 
 
A century later the very comprehensive abridgement of Henry Rolle 126 
presents a very different picture. In the section on Action sur Case we find a 
dozen chapters on assumpsit and consideration, which are also headed as 
such. They date mainly from the mid 16th century to the mid 17th century, 
though a few cases from either side of the time scale are also included. A 
manual analysis of the vocabulary in the selected 168 cases shows that 
'consideration' is the term that appears by far the most frequently (231 
times), followed closely by 'promise' (155 times), then 'assumpsit' (40 times), 
'obligation' (39 times) and 'agreement' (11 times). So, by the mid 17th century, 
not only are assumpsit cases classified as such, but the terminology used 
reflects that these actions on informal undertakings are discussed in terms of 
consideration and promise as the elements that make an informal agreement 
enforceable. This is certainly a very different representation to the 
abridgements discussed hitherto. 
 
5. Lexicons and dictionaries 
 
Looking at references works, we would today call lexicons, dictionaries or 
glossaries - though the works considered here do not use these terms - we 
also find the evolution of the concept of assumpsit and consideration 
reflected in the terminology used. Such reference works tend to be thought of 
as an orderly list of definitions and meanings of relatively reliable and stable 
units. Yet it can be argued that dictionaries represent much more and that 
																																																								
125 See discussion in chapter V 
126 H. Rolle (1668) Abridgment des Plusieurs Cases et Resolutions del Common Ley, 
London: Printed for A. Crooke [and 12 others], www.heinonline.org - Selden Society 
Publications and the History of Early English Law 
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their compilation and use are ‘communicative occasions occurring under 
characteristic circumstances’.127 
 
In 1579, Rastell 128  records no separate entries for 'assumpsit' nor 
'consideration', though there is one for bare or naked contract, which does 
not include the word consideration, but rather 'recompense'. He defines 
contract in terms of bargain and covenant (contracte est vn bargeine ou 
couenaunt per enter ii. parties) and the term ‘consideration’ is used to 
describe quid pro quo or "one thing given for another" (vn chose est done pur 
auter que est appelle quid pro quo [...]en consideration de [...] que vous 
dones a moy ceux font bone contractes, pur ceo que il ad vn chose pur 
auter). This language of one-thing-for-another still points to the remnants of 
the proprietary notions that were central in the earlier actions of debt. So 
does the use of the words quid pro quo, which was the standard terminology 
in debt and clearly expresses a bargain and equivalence of exchange. Yet, 
by the mid 16th century, the action of assumpsit had evolved to include the 
concept of promise. And, despite the more proprietary language described 
above, Rastell mentions promise in the second, more explanatory, half of his 
entry on contract:  
-“...mes si vn home fayt promise a moye que ieo auera xx s. & que il voyle 
este debtour a moy de ceo…” 
 (but if a man make promise to mee that I shall have twenty shyllinges, and that hee will be 
debtour to mee thereof ) 
-“…mes si ascun chose fuyt done pur le xx. s. mesque il ne fuit forsque al 
value de vn dernier, donques il fuit bone contracte… “ 
(but if any thinge were geuen for the xx. shillinges though it were not but to the value of a 
peny, then it had ben a good contracte) 
																																																								
127 R. de Beaugrande (1997) Text Linguistics, Discourse Analysis, and the Discourse of 
Dictionaries, in Hermans A. (ed.) Les dictionnaires specialisés et l’analyse de la valeur, 
Louvain-la-Neuve: Peeters, 57-74 
128 W. Rastell (1579) Exposition of Certaine Difficult and Obscure Wordes and Termes of the 
Lawes of This Realme, Newly Set Fourth & Augmented, Both in French and English, for the 
Helpe of Such Younge Studentes as Are Desirous to Attaine the Knowledge for the Same. 
Whereunto Are Also Added the Olde Tenures, London: In adibus Richardi Totelli, 
www.heinonlin.org - Selden Society Publications and the History of Early English Law 
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Here we have clearly moved on from the idea of basic quid pro quo, to one of 
a more 'symbolic' exchange, of what we would today think of as 
consideration, in order to 'confirm' the promise and thus make it enforceable. 
To our 21st century reality and knowledge, this definition may appear 
paradoxical, as it introduces both the more proprietary concept of quid pro 
quo and the concept of confirming the intention of a promise through an 
exchange that does not reflect the actual material value of the exchange. It is 
unlikely to have appeared as such to the lawyers of the mid 16th century, who 
were still in a transitional phase of evolution and change. The legal concepts 
at issue were not yet settled in a definite way but were still being developed 
in the courts. 
 
In Cowell's Interpreter129 over fifty years later, a contract is defined as 'a 
covenant or agreement with a lawful consideration or cause'. In other words, 
we move away from notion of bargain towards something more akin to a 
meeting of minds and the use of word 'lawful' gives to understand that there 
is a legal definition of 'consideration'. Cowell also includes definitions of 
'assumpsit' and 'consideration'. The former describes assumpsit as a 
 "voluntary promise made by word, whereby a man assumeth, or 
taketh upon him to performe or pay any thing unto another. This word 
containeth any verball promise made upon consideration, which the 
Civilians expresse by divers words, according to the nature of the 
promise..." 
 
Consideration is defined as 
"the materiall cause of a contract, without the which, no contract 
bindeth. This consideration is either expressed [...] or else implyed..." 
 
For comparison's sake, it is interesting to leap forward two centuries and 
consider the entries in Wharton's Law Lexicon.130 The definitions are much 																																																								
129 J. Cowell (1637) Interpreter: Or Booke, Containing the Signification of Words, London: 
Printed for William Sheares, www.heinonlin.org - Selden Society Publications and the 
History of Early English Law 
130 J.J.S. Wharton (1848) Law Lexicon, or Dictionary of Jurisprudence: Explaining All the 
Technical Words and Phrases Employed in the Several Departments of English Law, 
including also the Various Legal Terms Used in Commercial Transactions; Together with an 
Explanatory as well as Literal Translation of the Latin Maxims Contained in the Writings of 
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more detailed and definite, especially in comparison to the 1579 Rastell 
entry. A contract is described as "a deliberate engagement between 
competent parties [...] founded upon the mutual agreement of the parties." A 
contract must be made "upon a legal consideration to do, or to abstain from 
doing, some act." Here, the concept was expanded by notions represented in 
the use of words such as 'deliberate', 'competent', 'mutual' and the inclusion 
of non-feasance as well as feasance. Wharton also takes the definition of 
'consideration' beyond Cowell's 'materiall cause'. He describes consideration 
as "the price, motive, or matter of inducement of a contract, which must be 
lawful in itself." This lexicon shows that by the mid 19th centuries, the legal 
concepts governing contracts have been settled in a broader and more 
detailed manner. 
 
6.  Consideration as moral obligation in the Mansfield corpus 
 
As we fast-forward to the 18th century, we come to an episode in the history 
of the concept of consideration that lasted a few decades - roughly the 
second half of the 18th century - which is of particular interest because it 
represents a temporary innovation in doctrinal thinking accompanied by shifts 
in terminology. The lawyer at the centre of these attempts to change the 
concept of consideration into a moral obligation, was Lord Mansfield, but 
there were a number of fellow judges who adopted his approach and this 
was reflected in their rulings. Consequently, the idea lasted beyond 
Mansfield’s death. As late as 1863, we can find references to the notion of 
consideration as moral obligation. 
 
The corpus that was constituted for the purpose of the 18th/19th century part 
of the study was compiled in a very different way to the ones described 
previously in this chapter. The reason is that the purpose of this part of the 
study is not a continuation of the research done on the 15th, 16th and 17th 
																																																																																																																																																													
the Ancient and Modern Commentators (From the London ed.), Harrisburg, Pa.: I.G. 
M'Kinley & J.M.G. Lescure, www.heinonlin.org - Selden Society Publications and the History 
of Early English Law 
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centuries corpora. Instead it offers some insight into how the use of 
terminology in particular types of cases was guided by new ideas in the 
underlying legal thinking. In other words, we are pursuing a specific aspect of 
the concept of consideration, namely Mansfield’s idea of seeing it as a moral 
obligation. This is also the reason why the study of the Mansfield corpus is 
presented in a separate section in this chapter, rather than as a continuation 
of section 3.3 above. It is important to stress that in the 18th and 19th century, 
the language situation is very different to that of the late Middle Ages and 
Renaissance. The language used was no longer Law French, nor Middle 
English but Modern English, which had already been the subject of the Great 
Vowel Shift, inflectional simplification and Johnson’s linguistic 
standardisation. The language is a lot more structured and precise. 
 
So far, the texts for inclusion in the corpora discussed were chosen on the 
basis that a specific search term occurred in the documents from which the 
text extracts were drawn – consideration, promise, contract etc. Case reports 
were singled out, not on the basis of content or whether this was primarily a 
contract/consideration case, but on the presence of the search term(s). In 
other words, the approach was to ‘follow’ specific terms, independent of the 
legal context in which these occurred. For the compilation of the Mansfield 
corpus, the case reports were selected on the basis of their content and 
whether these were a part of the corpus of cases stipulating Mansfield’s 
concept of consideration as moral obligation. Moreover, in order to reveal 
Mansfield’s idea, the corpus was searched with terms that had not figured in 
relation to the earlier corpora, such as obligation, duty, conscience, all terms 
that were likely to indicate the context of Mansfield’s idea of consideration as 
a moral obligation. Each search was restricted to the noun form in both 
singular and plural. This study is more limited compared to the earlier ones 
described above. It does not attempt to demonstrate the use of the search 
term(s) in the 18th/19th century law reports in general but only in the specific 
cases dealing with consideration as moral obligation. 
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The Mansfield corpus (MC) consists of 51 cases that are reported in 56 
downloaded documents, as 5 cases were reported twice. Most decisions 
were taken between the 1760s and the 1840s. Two cases before that period 
were included (1731 & 1759)131 and two from the mid 19th century (1860 & 
1863).132 A full list of the cases can be found in annex 2 (vi). The corpus has 
136,788 word tokens and 6,347 word types; the original source material 
consisted of 161 pages. A concordance search for the term consideration 
shows 714 hits. The corpus is comparable in size to the ECc and SCc, but 
the page count for the original source texts is significantly lower: 
 
Ref. page count 
of original 
sources 
files 
downloaded  
Word 
tokens 
Word 
types 
Hits for 
‘consideration’ 
ECc 1,831 114 176,449 13,787 392 
SCc 941 151 132,582 9,697 465 
MC 161 56 136,788 6,347 714 
 
Table 33: 16th – 19th ‘consideration’ corpora 
 
The language used in the Mansfield corpus is a largely standardised English, 
with the exception of one KWIC line which is in Law French. This contrasts 
with the Law French of the Selden Society sources and English Reports that 
were still subject to spelling variations and included sections in Latin and 
some Middle/early Modern English.  
 
In comparison to the legal sources of the previous centuries, the MC shows a 
striking increase of the use of ‘consideration’. The concordance and 
advanced proximity searches provided the following results: 
 
 
 
																																																								
131 Hayes v Warren (1731) 2 Strange 933 or 93 Eng. Rep. 950;  Exeter Corporation v Trimlet 
(1759) 2 Wils. K.B. 95 or 95 Eng. Rep. 705 
132 Shadwell v Shadwell (1860) 9 C.B. (N.S.) 159 or 142 Eng. Rep. 62; Flight v Reed (1863) 
1 H. & C. 703 or 158 Eng. Rep. 1067 
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MC 
56 docs. / 136,788 word tokens / 3,347 word types 
original sources: 161 pages 
Search term hits proximity 
assumpsit 156 32 
conscience 52 5 
consideration 714 - 
contract 320  32 
covenant 6 1 
debt 403 63 
duty 56 14 
moral(s)/morally/morality 111  45 
obligation 160 35 
promise 739 268 
quid pro quo 3 0 
tort 4 0 
trespass  18 0 
 
Tables 34: search terms/proximity to ‘consideration’ in the Mansfield corpus 
 
These findings are also reflected in the results for the collocate and the 
clusters functions. ‘Promise’ is the first noun to appear in the list of collocates 
and the list of clusters with the search term on the left, sorted by frequency: 
 
rank freq. freq (L) freq (R) collocate 
11 246 76 170 promise 
18 112 86 26 sufficient 
25 86 75 11 good 
58 36 20 16 new 
59 36 15 21 assumpsit 
62 32 25 7 moral 
79 26 16 10 obligation 
100 22 16 6 contract 
 
Table 35: collocates of ‘consideration’ in the MCc (window span: 10L, 10R) 
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rank freq. range cluster (search term on left) 
1 113 29 consideration for 
8 21 13 consideration for the promise 
9 19 12 consideration for a promise 
12 17 9 consideration to support 
rank freq. range cluster (search term on right) 
1 130 24 the consideration 
3 70 18 sufficient consideration 
5 54 20 good consideration 
13 14 5 legal consideration  
21 10 8 moral consideration 
 
Table 36: clusters with ‘consideration’ in the MCc 
 
As far as the register of the language is concerned, the same categorisation 
of language use was applied as for the previous corpora discussed above: 
 
MCconsideration 
Language matches % of total 
General language use 14 2% 
General legal language  106 15% 
Technical language 594 83% 
Latin 0 0 
Total 714 - 
 
Table 37: ‘consideration’ in the MCc 
 
General language and Latin 
 
The general language use is very low. In 14 lines we find ‘consideration’ in 
the sense of taking into account when forming an opinion. There are no 
concordance lines in Latin. 
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General language in legal use and context 
 
In 106 concordance lines, we find ‘consideration’ used in a general language 
meaning but in a specific legal context, namely within the causal phrase ‘in 
consideration of’ which links the two elements of striking an agreement: 
something is said/given/paid/done in consideration of something 
said/given/paid/done. During Mansfield’s time and well into the 19th century, 
these were still the elements required for the formation of a legally binding 
informal agreement, since the doctrine of offer and acceptance that governs 
today’s contract formation thinking, was not yet established. 
 
The use of the phrase is more stable than had been the case in the previous 
Law French corpora where we could find any permutation a number of 
possibilities: 
en/in/pur consideration d’/de/del/do/dun/que. 
In the Mansfield corpus, we find 
in  consideration of (73 times) 
in  consideration that (20 times) 
in  consideration thereof (12 times) 
and one equivalent Law French phrase en consideration que. 
 
The vocabulary surrounding the phrase in the 106 KWIC lines is dominated 
by the words ‘plaintiff’ and ‘defendant’. In half of these concordance lines, we 
can find one or both of these words once or several times in a word span of 
10 words to the left and right of the phrase. In general, the language is not 
very technical. In 20% of the lines, we find a legal technical term, such as 
legacy, executor, assumpsit. In 24% of the lines, a term relating to financial 
matters is in the vicinity of the phrase. 
 
Specialist and technical uses 
 
In 83% of the concordance lines, we find ‘consideration’ has a specialised 
legal meaning. In these cases, it appears as a noun with the vested role of 
full participant in the process, rather than as a part of the layer representing 
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the circumstances surrounding the process. The grammatical and lexical 
patterning underline this function. In three quarters of the lines the noun is 
immediately preceded by elements that are typically associated with a full 
noun, such as determiners and adjectives. 
 
words immediately preceding 
‘consideration’ 
occurrence percentage 
determiner, e.g. a, the, that, any, no  284 40% 
adjectives, e.g. good, legal, moral, valuable 252 35% 
 
Table 38: words preceding ‘consideration’ in the MCc 
 
This is also confirmed by the results from the search for collocates (see table 
35 above). The first four adjectives in the list of collocates sorted by 
frequency are sufficient, good, new, and moral. These tend to be to the left of 
the search term. 
 
As to processes, it is the verb ‘to be’ that occurs most frequently and in direct 
association with ‘consideration’. This verb expresses a finite stand - 
something is or it is not. The language is of a definite nature and rarely 
moderated by words that express modality of possibility, such as may, might 
or could. 
 
verb to left 
(10 words) 
search term to right 
(10 words) 
total 
to be 205 consideration 84 289 
others 120 consideration 117 237 
 
Table 39: verbs associated with ‘consideration’ in the MCc 
  
The first verbs that figure in the collocate list sorted by frequency are three 
forms of ‘to be’: 
 
rank freq. freq (L) freq (R) collocate 
7 335 184 151 is 
9 269 151 118 was 
13 189 90 99 be 
 
Table 40: collocates of ‘consideration’ with ‘to be’ in the MCc (window span: 10L, 10R) 
Chapter	VI:	Corpus	Linguistic	Analysis	 203	
 
As far as collocates for ‘consideration’ are concerned, we find ‘to be’ in the 
past and present forms high on the list. ‘Promise’ is also the first noun that 
appears in the ranking, according to frequency: 
 
rank freq. range cluster (search term on left) 
7 26 14 consideration was 
8 21 13 consideration for the promise 
9 19 12 consideration for a promise 
11 18 10 consideration is 
 
Table 41: clusters with ‘consideration’ in the MCc 
 
From the textual evidence collected from the Mansfield corpus, we can 
observed definite shifts in the use of terminology. 
 
******** 
 
Each set of findings in relation to the various search terms and corpora, 
discussed so far, is rendered more interesting when put in a diachronic and 
comparative perspective with the information drawn from all the findings. The 
overall picture of the evolution of the term ‘consideration’ shows a striking 
increase in its use. The relative frequencies in the table below were 
calculated in relation to the page count for each set of sources. The results 
were multiplied by 1000 to avoid too many decimal places. 
 
 
 SSsources 
(4,109 pages) 
Esources 
(1,831 pages) 
Ssources 
(941 pages) 
Msources 
(161pages) 
search term	
(various spellings) 
hits relat. 
freq. 
x 1000 
hits relat. 
freq. 
x 1000 
hits relat. 
freq. 
x 1000 
hits relat. 
freq. 
x 1000 
consideration 102 25 392 214 465 494 714 4435 
 
Table 42: ‘consideration’ in the four sets of sources. The relative frequency is calculated in 
relation to the total pages that make up each source 
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Chart 3: ‘consideration’ in the four sets of sources. 
 
If we consider the frequencies of other terms in the four ‘consideration’ 
corpora (not the original sources as a whole), we can observe that the 
frequencies for both ‘assumpsit’ and ‘covenant’ level out with time, while 
‘contract’ and ‘promise’ rises. The absolute frequencies were counted as they 
occurred in each ‘consideration’ corpus, not in the sources. The relative 
frequencies were calculated in relation to the tokens in each corpus. 
 
 SSCc 
(38,899 tokens) 
ECc 
(176,449 tokens) 
SCc 
(132,582 tokens) 
MC 
(136,788 tokens) 
search term	
(various spellings) 
hits relat. 
freq. 
x1000 
hits relat. 
freq. 
x1000 
hits relat. 
freq. 
x1000 
hits relat. 
freq. 
x1000 
assum* 5 0,13 109 0,62 162 1,22 156 1,12 
contract 1 0,03 15 0,09 93 0,70 320 2,34 
covenant 18 0,46 299 1,69 191 1,44 6 0,04 
debt 14 0,36 79 0,45 193 1,46 403 2,95 
promise 8 0,21 51 0,29 222 1,67 739 5,40 
quid pro quo 0 0 3 0,02 1 0,007 3 0,02 
 
Table 43: search terms and relative frequencies in relation to the word tokens in the SSCc, 
ECc, SCc and MC 
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Chapter	VI:	Corpus	Linguistic	Analysis	 205	
The increased use of ‘contract’ points to the fact that consideration was 
discussed in the context of contracts, as we would expect from our 21st 
century view point. Finally, the concordance search for moral*: moral, morals, 
morally, morality produced 111 matches. Only one match was found in the 
seven corpora complied from the Selden Society, Elizabethan and Stuart 
sources, spanning several centuries altogether. 
 
 
 
Chart 4: search terms (relative frequencies in relation to the word tokens) in the SSCc, ECc, 
SCc and MC 
 
So much for the linguistic study revealing an overall picture of the evolution 
of the term ‘consideration’ and its surrounding language. The last chapter will 
discuss the conclusions that the results from the study show from a 
diachronic perspective, as well as the concordances that were revealed 
between the evolution of the term and concept of consideration. 
 
Habent sua fata verba. 
  
01
23
45
6
SSCc ECc SCc MC
Search	terms	in	'consideration'	corpora
assumpsit contract covenant debt promise
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Chapter VII.  Conclusions 
 
 
“We may put it, by way of comparison, that whereas the historian of 
French law has a continuity of language with a discontinuity of law, his 
English counterpart has a continuity of law with a discontinuity of 
language.”1 
 
The aim of this research was to trace the advent and early use of the concept 
of consideration in English contract law, by studying the doctrinal development 
in parallel with the corresponding terminological evolution between the 15th 
and 18th centuries. The question of continuity and discontinuity of law and 
language is, therefore, at the heart of the research question. 
 
The issue of continuity or discontinuity of law is bound up with that of 
customary or codified law. English law was never subject to the kind of 
sweeping tabula rasa that was experienced in France during the 18th century. 
Changes in English law tended to be the result of gently pushing boundaries 
and then exploiting the wriggle-room obtained. There was continuity, which 
does not preclude changes, though these were perceived as part of a 
continuum rather than any radical transformation. The concept of assumpsit 
and later of consideration is a prime example of changing the law by shifting 
the categories for legal actions. In the courts there was a need to make 
agreements legally binding without having to resort to the very complex 
procedures of deeds (see chapter V). It is this process of conceptualisation of 
informal, yet legally enforceable, promises and agreements, that is at the heart 
of this study. 
 
Whether there was continuity or discontinuity of language in England is more 
complex to assess, and depends on the extent to which the multilingual 
landscape of medieval England is perceived as a linguistic continuum. This 
																																																						
1 Year Books of 11 Edward II (1317-1318), J.P. Collas, W.S. Holdsworth (eds.) 61 Selden 
Society, at p. xiii (J.P. Collas) 
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has been discussed at length in chapter IV. The fact is that there were 
continuous interplay and lexical borrowings, in particular, between continental 
(Parisian-basin) French, Norman-French, insular French and Middle English 
on English soil. This resulted in substantial absorption of French words into 
Middle English, the evidence of which can still be found in today’s English, as 
well as in our contemporary legal English. But at a time when both language 
and the common law were evolving substantially, the use and substantial 
imports of French vocabulary in England did not go hand in hand with the 
import of legal concepts. These may or may not have corresponded to the 
imported terms, except for land law, which was brought over by the conquering 
Normans, together with its specific terminology. An example other than the 
words discussed in this study is the term tort, which came into the 11th century 
Old French from the Medieval Latin tortum,2 meaning wrong, injustice, from 
tortus, tortum (wrung, twisted), past participle of Latin torquere (to twist, wring). 
It has that sense in the 12th century Chanson de Roland3 and troubadour 
literature.4 The law of tort, as we know it today, goes back to the 13th century 
in the form of actions of trespass and action as on the case and various terms 
were used to describe concepts of personal remedies. But in the context of 
legal action for breach of duty, the term tort first appeared in English in the 
1580s5 and the action evolved and expanded considerably during the 
centuries that followed, today covering intentional and negligent infliction of 
economic loss as well as some emotional, psychological, reputational (etc.) 
injuries. In other words, the term tort has evolved from the Old French general 
meaning of injustice and wrong (still its modern French meaning) to cover 
today’s very specialised type of wrong. The term must have appeared 
convenient to use as the action of trespass on the case evolved, but it was not 
imported into English with any other sense other than the general (French) 
																																																						
2 compare tortum facere, in Art. 20, 23 and 26 of the Edictum  Pistense by Charles the Bald of 
864 (A. Boretius and V. Krause, Capitularia regum francorum, II (Monumenta Germaniae 
Historica, Legum, II), Hannover, Hahn, 1897, nr. 273, 310-328 
3 Verse 1051: Paienunt tort e chrestiensuntdreit 
4 e.g. Guillaume de Cabestaing: Fis amans deugran tort perdonar (Lo jornqu’ie us) 
5 The term was used in Law French well before then in phrases such as tort e force and de 
son tort demene. 
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language meaning. It gradually developed its very specialised legal meaning. 
While its etymological root is still intact, it describes an autonomous legal 
concept. We are no doubt dealing with two different sets of language – French 
(dialects) and English – but this example shows how it is possible to perceive 
the medieval linguistics landscape in England as a continuum as far as the 
language of the law is concerned. 
 
In this study on the history of the concept of consideration, language was seen 
as a continuum. The use of Law French continued to flourish and expand while 
Anglo-French in other registers was declining from the 14th century. Case law 
reporting was written in French, though this was not necessarily the language 
spoken in court pleadings. But in many case reports, we find entire passages 
in English in the middle of the French language report of what appears 
verbatim transcripts of declarations (written or spoken) made by one of the 
parties to the case. It is reasonable to conclude that the English language 
figured alongside French in court proceedings, though we do not know in what 
proportions. It is likely there was a constant code switching between the two 
languages without the need for translation, linguistic or conceptual 
adjustments, nor the danger of anything lost in translation. It is on this basis 
that the present study considered the original language texts as a language 
continuum, i.e. as a continuous collection of texts independent of whether the 
language was Law French, Middle English or early Modern English. 
 
To return to Collas’ view of (dis)continuity of law and language, it may be 
nuanced by suggesting that in both law and language there were changes but 
within a continuum. In the law, boundaries were nudged, categories extended 
to let new legal actions in through the back door. The corresponding language, 
always in need of new terms for emerging legal concepts, did not go as far as 
introducing neologisms, but relied on everyday vocabulary that gradually 
evolved into specialised terminology, signposting autonomous legal concepts 
in concordance with the evolution of legal conceptual thinking. 
 
******** 
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At the heart of this study was the extent to which the historical and conceptual 
development of the concept of consideration were matched by changes and 
shifts in the language, terms and vocabulary used, most notably in relation to 
the increased abstraction and technicality of both concept and language. This 
was revealed by undertaking diachronic linguistic and semantic analysis using 
corpus linguistics methodologies. It is important to stress at this point that the 
study was not meant either as a full inquiry into the history of the concept of 
consideration, nor as a complete analysis of the language used in the early 
Year Books and Law Reports. The research undertaken was of an 
interdisciplinary nature, using linguistics methodologies of analysis as tools to 
reveal the evolution of specific legal thinking and ideas, namely in relation to 
the enforceability of informal contracts. 
 
The underlying premise of the research was that tracing the historical process 
of legal thought which constituted the concept of consideration, required a 
wider ambit than just the description and analysis of the content of the case 
law and legal writings. Though these are essential units of analysis, they must 
be placed within their diachronic contexts for the conceptual shifts in thought 
and meaning to be revealed. This approach is akin to the Begriffsgeschichte 
work undertaken in German-speaking academia (see chapter II). One of the 
methodological principles they applied was to analyse the semantic fields of 
political and social language, because language offers a reliable indicator of 
the thinking and contexts in which concepts are established and shift in 
meaning. The study of law is, among other things, an enquiry into the abstract 
entities that make up a legal order. Law is a phenomenon entirely created by 
man, it does not exist as such in the physical world. The customary law set-up 
of the late Middle Ages allowed for the intellectual and doctrinal process 
involved in the development of a concept to be revealed more readily. 
Consequently, the language used to describe this phenomenon is intrinsically 
linked to its specific reality. Studying this language and terminology reveals 
how legal concepts materialise, evolve and translate into the letter of the law. 
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We often perceive long-standing, well-established legal concepts and the 
language used to express them as having been carved in stone as far back as 
the legal mind can remember. The doctrine of consideration is a central 
element to contract formation; it appears so well anchored in contract law and 
in our legal minds, that we may find it difficult to imagine its development took 
a tortuous and at times haphazard path, stretching over several centuries (see 
chapter V). The forerunners of consideration arose in a medieval legal world 
rigid with archaic procedures and complex technicalities, where the need was 
increasingly felt for a tool that could meet growing commercial needs in terms 
of contracts and quasi-contracts. But various strands from different legal 
issues came together in the idea that informal promises should be enforceable 
- the evolution was somewhat haphazard. This is reflected in the terminology, 
which settled only hesitantly and shows a concordance between the 
complexity of the concept’s evolution and the terminology used to express it. 
Also relevant in this context is the linguistic landscape of multi-lingual medieval 
England and the continuous switching between Law French and Middle and 
later Modern English (see chapter IV). 
 
In this research, language was considered as an act of communication that 
encodes meanings in the socio-political, cultural and historical contexts in 
which they are uttered (see chapter III/1). The language of the law is no 
exception, as its use, in particular in legal proceedings, is the product and a 
reliable indicator of these contexts and of how laws are created, practiced and 
interpreted. The methodology most appropriate to reveal how language and 
the evolution of legal concepts interact, is to examine the language in question 
in its textual context. The use of corpus linguistics methods and 
linguistics/concordance software are ideal for this sort of empirical approach, 
as they allow for systematic analysis of authentic evidence (see chapter III/2). 
 
For this research, a diachronic corpus was compiled, which is a collection of 
naturally occurring texts that vary along the parameter of time. It constituted 
the empirical basis for carrying out systematic linguistic investigations on 
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authentic evidence. The fact that it is held digitally and searchable 
electronically offers possibilities that are not otherwise available. The corpus 
was compiled by continuously revising its design following empirical research 
carried out on the initial pilot corpus in order to adjust the design parameters. 
This was particularly relevant in view of the complexity of working with 
medieval texts of a specialised but not very uniform register, including two 
languages neither of which was standardised. 
 
The sources from which the documents were drawn to constitute the corpus 
can be divided into six groups from which twelve subcorpora were compiled: 
 
• Anglo-Norman sources 
Ø Anglo-Norman corpus (ANC) 
 
• 14th century sources (Year Books Edward II, Edward III and Richard II) 
Ø Three subcorpora based on the following search terms: 
- assumpsit (ESCa) 
- consideration (ESCc) 
- promise (ESCp). 
 
• York/early Tudor sources (approx. 1440 – 1550) Selden Society docs. 
Ø Three subcorpora based on the following search terms: 
- assumpsit (SSCa) 
- consideration (SSCc) 
- promise (SSCp). 
 
• Elizabethan/early Stuart sources (approx. 1550 – 1610) 
Ø Three Elizabethan corpora based on the following search terms: 
- assumpsit (ECa) 
- consideration (ECc) 
- promise (ECp). 
 
• Stuart sources (17th century) 
Ø One corpus based on the search term ‘consideration’ (SCc). 
 
• Mansfield sources (approx. 1750 – 1860). 
Ø Two 18th/19th century corpora drawn from Mansfield’s case law and 
based on the search term ‘consideration’ (MC). 
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All sources could be accessed electronically via the HeinOnline database. 
The size of the sources, in terms of word tokens, was only ascertainable for 
the Anglo-Norman texts. The sources from the HeinOnline database do not 
offer the possibility of counting the word tokens. Therefore, statistical analysis 
such as relative frequencies of search terms cannot be undertaken in the 
conventional way.  
 
This textual evidence collected from the corpora that were constituted from the 
Year Books and Law Reports spanning from the late 14th century to the mid-
19th century, was the empirical basis for evaluation. At the centre of the study 
we find the concept of consideration and its immediate signifier, namely the 
use of the word ‘consideration’. But in order to provide context, the study also 
included ‘consideration’ in a general language use, as well as other relevant 
terms, such as ‘assumpsit’ and ‘promise’. The underlying language theory was 
discussed in chapter III. The corpus linguistics methodology, the linguistics 
analysis and all detailed results were described in chapter VI. In the present 
chapter we will conclude by considering the results from a diachronic 
perspective with the information drawn from all corpora, to present the findings 
in a comparative and contrastive way and in order to reveal an overall picture 
of the evolution of the term and concept of consideration. 
 
The two corpora compiled on the basis of the word ‘assumpsit’ are texts 
drawn from the earlier Year Books and Law Reports, spanning a period from 
the 14th to the end of the 16th century (see chapter VI 3.1). The word 
‘assumpsit’, which we associate today with the newly emerging notion that 
informal promises could be enforceable, lagged behind in its establishment as 
a legal technical term. Until the 16th century, the vocabulary used in cases we 
would see essentially as actions of assumpsit, is not yet settled nor 
specialised. The language, in particular in the early cases, is descriptive, with 
relatively little use of nouns that express established concepts and very little 
specific terminology, except for a few Latin legal phrases.  In other words, while 
the new action of assumpsit was increasingly becoming a legal reality, the 
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textual evidence up to the end of the 15th century did not show the term 
assumpsit as an established legal technical term or category. 
 
It is only from the latter part of the 16th century, that the use of the term 
assumpsit became more prominent. By the turn of the century and the early 
17th century, the term appears firmly integrated into the Law French language 
as a word in its own right and no longer needing an accompanying explanation, 
nor necessarily placed within a Latin context or phrase. It occurs as a term 
expressing an established concept. It has the grammatical function of a noun 
accompanied by an article or adjective and thus offers a use more akin to an 
abstract concept. It has also been found in a definitional use in: conditionell 
assumption est assumption. It never appears in a Middle English context. It 
seems that at this stage, the increased specialisation of the language 
happened in Anglo-French rather than in the more vernacular Middle English. 
From the textual evidence that spans from the 14th to the early 17th centuries, 
we can observed a definite evolution from tentative uses of the term assumpsit 
to its firm establishment as a term in the legal vocabulary. Thus embedded in 
the specific terminology of making agreements, it clearly sign-posts the 
concept of enforceability of certain promises. 
 
The two corpora compiled on the basis of the word ‘promise’ are texts drawn 
from the same sources and time span as the assumpsit corpora (see chapter 
VI 3.2). The term ‘promise’ and its corresponding contractual notion, which are 
actually at the heart of the new concept, also struggled to emerge. The sources 
for the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries showed very little textual evidence for the 
use of the term ‘promise’ in the context of making an informal agreement 
enforceable. Despite the fact that St. German used the term in his writings at 
the beginning of the 16th century, it only began to feature prominently in the 
context of the enforceability of informal agreements later that century. Although 
the use of the term in a strictly contractual sense was known, it was not 
necessarily in widespread use. The concept of a promissory rather than 
proprietary basis for informal agreements was still not reflected in a substantial 
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way in the use of the vocabulary used to describe such cases in the earlier 
sources, while ‘debt’ and ‘covenant’ remained prominent. 
 
 
The use of the word ‘promise’ adopted a more specifically legal meaning, as it 
appeared in restricted contexts of contract formation. In the ECp, ‘promise’ 
appears in a contractual context in 79 of the 87 KWIC lines, which represents 
a leap of 55 point to 91%. This semantic shift towards a contractual meaning 
begins during the Elizabethan reign and will be confirmed in the 17th and 18th 
centuries, as can be observed from the Stuart and Mansfield corpora. 
 
For both terms, ‘assumpsit’ and ‘promise’, we can see from the frequency of 
their use in the corpora just described and in the ‘consideration’ corpora, that 
the use in the early sources was tentative. Moreover, in the case of ‘promise’ 
it was not used in a strictly contractual sense. As far as ‘assumpsit’ was 
concerned, while the new action was gaining ground, the vocabulary did not 
follow at the same speed. Both terms were used increasingly with time; 
‘promise’ soared exponentially, while ‘assumpsit’ levelled out as the action 
became obsolete. 
 
The main focus of the research centred around the word ‘consideration’ (see 
chapter VI 3.3). From the study of the Anglo-Norman On-line Hub, we can 
observe that ‘consideration’ was a term in use in the second half of the 14th 
century, though it tended to occur in general language meanings, such as 
examination, reflection, study, contemplation, opinion, conclusion, motive. It 
could not be found in a general context of making promises or concluding 
agreement, contracts or covenant, nor in situations of debt or trespass. 
 
The study of the Year Book and Law Reports, spanning from the 14th to the 
early 19th centuries, as well as a selection of abridgments and lexicons, has 
revealed the changes in language and the semantic shifts of the term 
‘consideration’ as the new legal concept of enforcing informal agreements 
emerged. It is of particular interest to observe the process of increased 
terminological abstraction alongside the consolidation and development of the 
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concept. To reveal this evolution, four corpora were compiled from the original 
language sources of the Year Books and Law Reports on the basis of the 
occurrence of the search term ‘consideration’: 
 
Ref. Page count 
of original 
sources 
Files 
downloaded  
Word 
tokens 
Word 
types 
Hits for 
‘consideration’ 
SSCc 4,109 57 38,899 6,716 102 
ECc 1,831 114 176,449 13,787 392 
SCc 941 151 132,582 9,697 465 
MC 161 56 136,788 6,347 714 
 
Table 44: 16th – 19th century ‘consideration’ corpora 
 
The use of the term ‘consideration’ rises considerably with time and so do the 
hits for proximity to other key terminology, which suggests an increased 
intensity in the preoccupation with the concept. We can observe two 
exceptions to this trend, namely ‘covenant’ and ‘assumpsit’. The use of the 
latter levelled out as the concept became obsolete. As to covenant, it was a 
legal instrument used less widely over time, as other instruments became 
more prominent, notably in the area of informal agreements. 
 
In the 13th, 14th and 15th century law reporting sources, the word 'consideration' 
is very rarely used and any occurrence has a general language meaning. It is 
only in the sources from the 16th century that we find the term used more 
frequently in a legal sense. Yet, key word searches for 'promise' and 'contract’ 
showed few hits, while the terms 'covenant' and 'debt' usually occur a great 
deal more. Long-established concepts and terminology were still prominent, 
despite the fact that conceptual boundaries shifted. This corresponds to the 
fact that both the actions of debt and covenant, as forefathers of contractual 
promises, were not yet seen in terms of contractual agreements or notions of 
promise but tended to be related to proprietary concepts, rather than 
promissory ones. While the use of the term ‘assumpsit’ levels out, as the action 
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becomes obsolete, there is an increase in the use of ‘contract’, which rises in 
parallel from the 17th century onwards. 
 
Beside this basic quantitative data, which shows a general increase, we can 
also observe a shift in the semantic content of the term ‘consideration’. This is 
best revealed by studying the register of the language, in which the term is 
embedded. For the sake of this study, four language registers were defined, 
as explained in chapter VI under section 1.3. In the comparative table and 
chart below, we can find the quantitative analysis of the language registers in 
the concordance lines that featured ‘consideration’ as search term. 
 
 SSCc ECc SCc MC 
language hits % hits % hits % hits % 
General language 44 43 % 43 11% 9 2% 14 2% 
General legal 
language 
17 17 % 111 28% 155 33% 106 15% 
Technical 
language 
39 38 % 227 56% 294 63% 594 83% 
Latin 2 2 % 11 3% 7 1,5% 0 0 
TOTAL 102 - 392 - 465 - 714 - 
 
Table 45: language register in the ‘consideration’ corpora SSCc, ECc, SCc and MC  
 
General language uses of ‘consideration’, as represented by the blue part of 
the stacked columns in chart 5 below, fall substantially with time. In the earlier 
sources, it is frequently used in the sense of the court or the judges ‘taking 
(something) into account’ when reaching a decision. From the late 16th century, 
this use is less frequent: in the Elizabethan corpus it falls to a 11% share. It is 
interesting that the context of these general language KWIC lines in the ECc 
is almost exclusively in Middle English. It only occurs three times in Anglo-
French. This suggests that the increased specialisation of the legal language 
appears to have happened in Anglo-French rather than Middle English.  
 
Chapter	VII	:	Conclusions	218	
 
 
Chart 5: language register in the ‘consideration’ corpora SSCc, ECc, SCc and MC  
 
The principal semantic shift in the use of the term ‘consideration’ appears to 
have happened during the 16th century. We can observe two main changes. 
First, there is an increased use of the collocation ‘in consideration of’ as a 
causal conjunction between the two elements or events necessary for striking 
a contractual agreement. While this particular collocation could be used in any 
situation of exchange, the textual context clearly shows that we are dealing 
with specialist technical matters of the law. It is a relatively restricted set of 
vocabulary concerned with legal instruments and persons, payments, 
indenture, estate etc. in exchange of mainly marriage and other family matters. 
In other words, both the meaning and function of the collocation is in a general 
language sense but it is the lexical and semantic context that is highly 
technical. 
 
Second, as we move further into the 16th and towards the 17th centuries, we 
find ‘consideration’ in technical uses. The lexical variety of its textual context 
is relatively poor and semantically restricted. The term consideration tends to 
be combined with a limited set of words, which is indicative for the use of 
specialised language. Furthermore, it appears as a full noun in a function of 
S S C c E C c S C c MC
43
11 2 2
17
28
33
15
38
58 63
83
2 3 1.5 0
Language register
General language General legal language Technical language Latin
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participants, accompanied by adjectives and prepositions, and associated with 
material processes. The term can also be found as a one-word sentence, 
where the word is between two full-stops and thus pregnant with conceptual 
meanings. All these grammatical pointers put the word consideration in prime 
positions within the clauses, a position where it appears in its own right and as 
a signpost for a concept, rather than as a mere causal link between two other 
prime elements. It is in this sense that the word is used in a way akin to a 
concept.  
 
As we come to the decisions taken by Lord Mansfield and his fellow judges 
between the mid 18th and the early 19th century, we have a very different 
language situation (see chapter VI 6). The language is Modern English and 
had already been the subject of the Great Vowel Shift, inflectional simplification 
and Johnson’s linguistic standardisation. It means that the use of language 
and terminology is a lot more structured. Moreover, the selection criteria were 
different from the other corpora: case reports were not chosen because a 
specific search term occurred in the documents from which the text extracts 
were drawn – consideration, promise, contract etc. The corpus compiled for 
this part of the study was built by selecting cases on the basis of their content 
and whether these were a part of the corpus of cases stipulating Mansfield’s 
concept of consideration as moral obligation. 
 
The occurrence of both ‘consideration’ and ‘promise’ rises exponentially in 
comparison to earlier corpora. ‘Promise’ is the first noun to appear in the list of 
collocates and the list of clusters with ‘consideration’. ‘Contract’ is also more 
prominent than it had ever been before in the informal 
agreement/consideration context. It suggests that consideration was 
discussed in the context of contracts, as we would expect from our 21st century 
perspective. Finally, the wildcard concordance search for moral* (moral, 
morals, morally, morality) showed an important presence, in comparison to 
only one match that was found in the seven corpora complied from the Selden 
Society, Elizabethan and Stuart sources, spanning several centuries. 
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The shift in the use of the terminology at the time of Mansfield cannot be 
denied. The quantitative data of the linguistic analysis not only shows a more 
intensive and precise use of specialised terminology and language, but also 
bears witness to the new aspects of the concept, namely that informal 
agreements are seen as contracts and that there is a moral element inherent 
in the making of a promise, which is a definite, though short-lived, 
rapprochement with the civil law concept of causa. 
 
******** 
 
The quantitative analysis has revealed the use and development of the 
vocabulary associated with the concept of consideration. We have observed a 
linear evolution showing not only a rising trend in the use of the word 
‘consideration’, but also leading to a more intensive use of the term in a legal-
technical context and to describe an autonomous legal concept. As to the 
development of the idea of enforcing informal agreements from a conceptual 
point of view, we observe a concordance between the two, yet with a gap in 
time as the terminology tends to lag behind. 
 
In the table below, a selection of relevant cases has been listed with the 
vocabulary that dominated each case. This is by way of illustration of how the 
language evolved from the hesitant use of diverse terms to a more settled and 
structured language. 
 
Date terminology case law/legal 
writings 
1300-
1350 
1321 “defaute” surgeon negligence6 
1329 “lui promist de eyder a tort e a droit”  assistance7 
1348 “emprist a carier”, “covenant”, “trespass”” Humber Ferry case8 
(malfeasance) 
1350-
1400 
1370 “manucepit”, “emprist”, covenant”, “negligence” Waldon v Marshall9 
(malfeasance) 
1374 “emprist” Action on the case10 
(surgeon) 
																																																						
6 YB 14 Edw. II 
7 3 & 4 Edw. III or 97 Selden Society, 237 
8 Bukton v Tounesende (1348) Lib. Ass. 22 Edw III Folio 94a-94b, pl. 41, or LBEx 
9 Y.B Mich. 43 Ed. III, 33, 38, or LBEx 
10 YB 48 Edw. III, 6, 11, or LBEx 
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1400-
1450 
1400 “covenant”, “negligence” Watton v Brinth11 (non-
feasance) 
1429 “deceit”, “bargain’, QPQ Action on the case12 
1431 “deceit”, “bargain” Action on the case13 
1433 “assumpsit” in Latin phrase, “assumpc”, “assumer”, 
“assumption” 
Action on the case14 
1436 “non feasance”, “covenant” Trespass on the case 
action15 
1450-
1500 
1476 “bargain” (successful) action of 
‘deceit on the case’16 
1493 “super se assumpsit”, “non assumpsit mode et forma”, 
“emprist”, “quod non assumpsit” 
Johnson v Baker17 
1500-
1550 
1504 “covenant”, “non fes”, “deceit” non-feasance 
recognised18 
1518 “promise” St German19 
1522 “jeo done terre en taylle icy est consideration” replevin20 
1535 “det”, “assumpsit”, “assumpc”, assumption”, “agreemt”, 
“covenat”, “contract” 
Action on the case21 
1550-
1600 
1553 “en consideration que son file marier” uses with/without 
consideration22 
1572 “assumpsit”, “contract”, “det”, “assume” Action on the case23 
1573 “en considerac q”, “assume de payer”, “assumpsit” Edwards v Burre24 
1600-
1650 
1602 “assumpsit”, “en consideracin de”, “contract” Slade v Morley25 
1623 “le surrender des patents est ben consideration a faire 
novell grant” 
Seignior Zouch v Sir 
Edward Moore26 
1629 “le consideration del sanke & amor la pier est continuant” Besfich & Coggil27 
1750-
1850 
1765 “whether this be a promise without a consideration” Pillans v Van Mierop28 
1782 “to make a consideration to support and assumpsit” Hawkes v Saunders29 
																																																						
11 Case of 1400 in Y.B. 2 Hen. IV, 3, 9, or in LBEx 
12 7 Hen.VI,1, 3, or LBEx  
13 9 Hen. VI, 53, 37, or LBEx  
14 11 Hen. VI, 18, 24, or LBEx 
15 Y.B. 14 Hen. VI, 18, 58, or in LBEx.) 
16 Y.B. 16 Pasch. Edw. IV, 7, or LBEx 
17 C.P., Hil. 1493. Record CP 40/914, m. 104 or 115 Selden Society 135 
18 Y.B. 20 Mich. Hen. VII, 8, 18, or LBEx 
19 Ch. St. German (1518/1974), Doctor and Student, Second Dialogue, Chapter 24, edited 
by T. Plucknett, J. Barton (1974) for the Selden Society, vol. 91  
20 Gervys v Cooke, (1522) YB 12-14 Hen. VIII, or 119 Selden Society, 108 at 117 
21 Y.B. 27 Mich. Hen.VIII, 24, 3, or LBEx  
22 Reports of William Dalison, or 124 Selden Society, at 50 
23 Dalison 84, 35, or 123 Eng. Rep. 293 
24 Dalison 104, 45, or 123 Eng. Rep. 310 
25 4 Co Rep. 92 a. 
26 81 Eng. Rep. 795-96 
27 81 Eng. Rep 1219-1221 
28 Pillans and Rose v Van Mierop and Hopkins, (1765) 3 Burr. 1663, or 97 Eng. Rep. 1035, 
at p. 1040 
29 Hawkes v Saunders, (1782) 1 Cowp. 289, or 98 Eng. Rep. 1091 
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1811 “here was a consideration directly moving to the 
defendant” 
Barrell v Trussell30 
1860 “voluntary courtesy will not have a consideration to 
uphold an assumpsit” 
Shadwell v Shadwell31 
 
Tables 46: terminology in the case law between 1400-1650 and 1750-1850 
 
The idea that failing to honour an undertaking should be actionable emerged 
in the second half of the 14th century in a number of trespass on the case 
actions, first for malfeasance then for non-feasance, coupled at times with 
deceit. The action of debt and indebitatus assumpsit was also added to the 
already mixed bag of legal actions (see the brown, green and light blue parts 
of the table). The Slade case in 1602 clarified the content and ambit of the 
action of assumpsit. But, while the new action was increasingly becoming a 
legal reality, the textual evidence until towards the end of the 16th century does 
not show the term ‘assumpsit’ as an established legal technical term or 
category, nor does it show the vocabulary in the actions on the case to be very 
uniform. We can frequently find the verb ‘to undertake’ (emprist), some use of 
‘assumpsit’, though frequently embedded in a Latin phrase, akin to a legal 
formula. There are repeated references to ‘covenant’, ‘bargain’ and ‘debt’, all 
notions emanating from older actions but based on proprietary rather than 
promissory concepts. It appears as though the new legal thinking could not 
overcome old established categories of proprietary concepts. The terminology 
used was hesitant and remained on well-trodden paths. The term ‘promise’ 
and its underlying notion only figured tentatively in the case law. With today’s 
hindsight, we understand that promise was actually already at the heart of the 
new legal thinking, in particular in indebitatus assumpsit cases. But then it had 
to be discussed more intensively and for a longer period of time, in particular 
in the indebitatus assumpsit cases, to emerge as a proper concept in its own 
right. The uncertainty in the use of the vocabulary is a witness to that hesitancy 
in the legal thinking. 
 
																																																						
30 Barrell v Trussell, (1811) 4 Taunt. 117, or 128 Eng. Rep. 273, at p. 274 
31 Shadwell v Shadwell, (1860) 9 C.B. (N.S.) 159, or 142 Eng. Rep. 62, at p. 67 
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Following the greater clarity that the Slade case brought in 1602, we can not 
only see the rise in the use of the word ‘promise’, but also that of the causal 
phrase ‘in consideration of’ that links one promissory part of the informal 
agreement to the other. As this concept is tried out, discussed and challenged 
in the courts, it becomes more established and settled. This can also be 
observed in the use of the terminology. We have moved from ‘consideration’ 
as a general concept to ‘in consideration of’ in a general context, to ‘in 
consideration of’ in a specifically legal context (though still within a general 
language understanding), to ‘consideration’ as the linguistic expression of a 
legal concept. As the concept gained in stature, so did its position as an 
autonomous concept. This was reflected in the use of the term ‘consideration’, 
no longer solely in the context of a causal connector but as an stand-alone 
noun and cover-term for the conceptual thinking of how to make informal 
agreements enforceable. The term ‘consideration’ stood hitherto for a legal 
concept, that has continued to evolve to the present day. 
 
******** 
 
This research has examined the concept of consideration in the English 
common law, but to conclude on a more general note, it must be stressed that 
this type of study need not be restricted to either the Middle Ages/Renaissance 
or the common law of contract. The approach and methodology adopted are 
cognitive models that have allowed us to go beyond the conceptual and 
doctrinal framework of the law and gain a deep level understanding of the 
origins and evolution of legal thinking and the terminology. Two general 
concluding remarks should be made here.  
 
First, studying the language of the law from a diachronic terminological angle 
in combination with the basic premises of the Begriffsgeschichte approach, 
reveals the etymological, terminological and historical aspects of terms. Such 
knowledge of the emergence and evolution of terminology equips us with a 
better understanding of how to adapt and use it differently in the present and 
future. This may be relevant, for example, in the context of legal language 
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reforms. 
 
The language of the law has long been criticised as archaic, complex and 
pompous, thus, excluding large parts of the population from understanding it.32 
And indeed, the language used in the law forms a part of the rather grand 
institutions and practices that have developed due to historical traditions, its 
normative nature, prescriptive and performative functions and the basic 
premise that the letter of the law is supreme. The fact that some terms have 
everyday language meanings, such as ‘consideration’, only adds to the 
confusion. Any attempts to reform the legal language, usually with the aim to 
make it more widely accessible, must start from a deep-level understanding of 
the significance of terms, including their historical evolution. The kind of 
linguistic research that was carried out for this study offers essential insights 
into such deeper understanding. 
 
Moreover, diachronic terminological studies may also be relevant in the 
context of newly emerging bodies of law, such as environmental law that has 
developed over a relatively short period of time and has thus missed out on 
the benefits of a more ‘organic’ evolution in relation to conceptual foundations 
and the relevant language and terminology.33 Similarly, corpus linguistics 
methodologies have also been advocated by members of the US judiciary as 
a tool for statutory interpretation.34 
 
Second, a linguistic and terminological approach also contributes to a better 
comprehension of the conceptual evolution of the law and of its socio-cultural 
content. This represents an important contribution to a better understanding of 
the differences or similarities between legal systems. A better grasp of the 
origins and evolution of specific aspects or elements of the law or a legal 
system, can contribute to a contextual approach for, among others, 
																																																						
32 P. Tiersma (1999) Legal Language, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, at 241 
33 C. Laske (forthcoming) Environmental law: lexical semantics in the quest for conceptual 
foundations and legitimacy 
34 e.g. Justice Thomas Lee of the Utah Supreme Court, article forthcoming in the Yale Law 
Journal: Judging Ordinary Meaning 
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comparative law, legal translation or legal harmonisation projects. Moreover, 
a deep-level understanding of the concepts of law through the study of its 
language, provides context when tracing the law’s “first rudiments among 
savages, through successive changes, to its highest improvements in a 
civilised society”, as advocated by Lord Kames. To that extent, this is an 
approach essential for all students of the law. The linguistic and terminological 
diachronic analysis, as set out in this study is an important methodological tool 
that should be in every student’s learning kit in order to deepen the 
understanding of their subject. It is context that renders facts truly 
informative…  
… wodurch doch allein alles Wissen erst Wert bekommt.  (Schiller) 
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Annex 1 – Anglo-Norman sources 
 
A collection of Anglo-Norman source texts can be found on the Anglo-
Norman On-Line Hub (www.anglo-norman.net) - Anglo-Norman textbase : 
 
 
In alphabetical order : 
 
Amys e Amillyoun 
Edited by H. Fukui 
London, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1990 
 
French materials from: Annales Monasterii de Burton [MS. Cotton. 
Vespas.. E. iii.] 
Edited by H.R. Luard 
London 1871 
 
French materials from: Annales Londonienses and Annales Paulini 
edited by W. Stubbs 
London, Longman & Co. 1882 
 
French materials from: The Anonimalle Chronicle 1307-1334 [From 
Brotherton Collection MS 29]  
Edited by W.R. Childs and J. Taylor 
Leeds, Yorkshire Archaeological Society 1991 
 
An Anglo-Norman Rhymed Apocalypse 
Edited by O. Rhys 
Oxford, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1946 
 
Guernes de Pont-Sainte-Maxence, La Vie de Saint Thomas Becket 
Edited by E. Walberg 
Paris 1935 
 
Walter de Bibbesworth. Le Tretiz 
Edited by W. Rothwell 
London, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1990 
 
The Black Book of the Admiralty, Vol. 1 
Edited by T. Twiss 
London 1871 
 
Britton 
Edited by F.M. Nichols 
Oxford 1865 
 
An Anglo-Norman Brut [MS ROYAL 13.A.xxi] 
Edited by A. Bell 
Oxford, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1969 
 
Le livre des psaumes. Ancienne traduction française d'après les 
manuscrits de Cambridge et de Paris 
Edited by F. Michel 
Paris 1876 
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Le Livre de Catun 
Edited by T. Hunt 
London, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1994 
 
Phillipe de Thaon, Comput 
Edited by I. Short 
London, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1984 
 
Robert le Chapelain, Corset. A Rhymed Commentary on the Seven 
Sacraments 
Edited by K.V. Sinclair 
London, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1995 
 
Croniques de London depuis l'an 44 Hen III jusqu'à l'an 17 Edw III 
Edited by G.J. Aungier 
London, Camden Society 1844 
 
La Destructioun de Rome 
Edited by L. Formisano 
London, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1990 
 
The Black Book of the Admiralty, Vol. 2 
Edited by T. Twiss 
LONDON 1871 
 
Les Gius Partiz des Eschez. Two Anglo-Norman Chess Treatises 
Edited by T. Hunt 
London, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1985 
 
Eighteen Anglo-Norman Fabliaux 
Edited by I. Short and R. Pearcy 
London, Anglo-Norman Text Society, London 2000 
 
French materials from: Foedera 
edited by T. Rymer & R. Sanderson 
Vols 1-4 London 1816-1869 
 
The Anglo-Norman 'Folie Tristan' 
Edited by I. Short 
London, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1993 
 
Fouke le Fitz Waryn 
Edited by E. J. Hathaway, P. T. Ricketts, C. A. Robson and A. D. Wilshere 
Oxford, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1975 
 
L'Estoire des Engleis by Geffrei Gaimar 
Edited by A. Bell 
Oxford, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1960 
 
John of Gaunt's Register (1372-76) 
Edited by S. Armitage-Smith 
London, Camden Society 1911 
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The Romance of Horn by Thomas 
Edited by M. K. Pope 
Oxford, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1955 
 
The Hospitallers' Riwle 
Edited by K. V. Sinclair 
London, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1984 
 
French materials from: A Roll of the Proceedings of the King's Council 
in Ireland for a Portion of the Sixteenth Year of the Reign of Richard 
II A.D. 1392-93 
Edited by J. Graves 
London 1877 
 
Anglo-Norman Letters and Petitions and Petitions from All Souls MS 
182 
Edited by M. Dominica Legge 
Oxford, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1941 
 
French materials from: Liber Albus [Munimenta Gildhallae Londoniensis, 
Vol 1]  
Edited by H.T. Riley 
London 1860 
 
French materials from: Liber Custumarum, with extracts from Cottonian 
MS Claudius D. II [Munimenta Gildhallae Londoniensis, Vol 2]  
Edited by H.T. Riley 
London 1860 
 
Liber Donati. A Fifteenth-Century Manual of French 
Edited by B. Merrilees and B. Sitz-Fitzpatrick 
London, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1993 
 
La Lumere as Lais by Pierre d'Abernon of Fetcham 
Edited by G. Hesketh 
London, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1996-2000 
 
Manières de Langage (1396, 1399, 1415) 
Edited by A.M. Kristol 
London, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1995 
 
Mirour de Seinte Eglyse (St Edmund of Abingdon's Speculum 
Ecclesiae) 
Edited by A. D. Wilshere 
London, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1982 
 
Nominale sive Verbale 
Edited by W.W. Skeat 
Transactions of the Philological Society, 1903-06, pp. 1*-50* 1906 
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French materials from: Northern Petitions illustrative of life in Berwick, 
Cumbria and Durham in the fourteenth century 
Edited by C. M. Fraser 
Durham, Surtees Society 1981 
 
French materials from: Ancient Petitions relating to Northumberland 
Edited by C. M. Fraser 
Durham and London, Surtees Society 1966 
 
The Oak Book of Southampton (c. A.D. 1300) 
Edited by P. Studer 
2 Vols. Southampton 1910. 
 
The Oxford Anglo-Norman Psalter [MS Bodleian Douce 320] 
Edited by F. Michel 
Paris 1876 
 
French materials from: The Percy Chartulary 
edited by M.T. Martin 
Durham, Surtees Society 1911 
 
La Petite Philosophie: An Anglo-Norman Poem of the Thirteenth 
Century 
Edited by W. H. Trethewey 
Oxford, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1939 
 
Le Petit Plet 
Edited by B.S. Merrilees 
Oxford, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1970 
 
Anglo-Norman Political Songs 
Edited by I. S. T. Aspin 
Oxford, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1953 
 
The Port Books of Southampton, 1427-1430 
Edited by P. Studer 
Southampton 1913 
 
French materials from: Private Indentures for Life Service in Peace and 
War, 1278-1476 
 
Hue de Rotelande, Protheselaus 
Edited by A.J. Holden  
London, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1991-3 
 
Rauf de Linham, Kalender 
Edited by T. Hunt 
London, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1983 
 
The Red Book of the ExchequerPart III 
Edited by Hubert Hall 
London, HMSO 1896 
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French materials from: Registrum Epistolarum Fratris Johannis 
Peckham, Archepiscopi Cantuariensis 
Edited by C.T. Martin 
London 1882 
 
Le Livere de Reis De Brittanie e Le Livere de Reis de Engletere 
Edited by J. Glover 
London 1865 
 
Li Rei de Engleterre.Ein anglo-normannischer Geschichtsauszug. 
Edited by J. Koch 
Berlin 1886 
 
La Seinte Resureccion from the Paris and Canterbury MSS 
Edited by T.A. Jenkins, J.M. Manly, M.K. Pope and J.J. Wright 
Oxford, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1943 
 
The Crusade and Death of Richard I 
Edited by R. C. Johnston  
Oxford, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1961 
 
French materials from:Memorials of the Church of SS. Peter and 
Wilfrid, Ripon Vols. I and 2 
2 vols. Durham, Surtees Society 1882,1886 
 
The Anglo-Norman 'Alexander'. 'Le Roman de toute Chevalerie' by 
Thomas of Kent 
Edited by B. Foster with the assistance of I. Short 
London, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1976-7 
 
'Le Roman de Philosophie' in: Les Oeuvres de Simund de Freine  
Edited by J. E. Matzke 
Paris 1909 
 
French materials from: Register of Daniel Rough, Common clerk of 
Romney1353-1380 
Edited by K. M. E. Murray 
Canterbury, Kent Archaeological Society 1945 
 
French materials from:Royal and Other Historical Letters Illustrative of 
the reign of Henry III 
Edited by W. Waddington Shirley 
London, Longmans 1866 
 
The Anglo-Norman Voyage of St Brendan 
edited by I. Short and B. Merrilees 
Manchester, MUP 1979 
 
La Passiun de Seint Edmund 
Edited by J. Grant 
London, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1978 
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La Estoire de Seint Aedward le Rei 
Edited by K.Y. Wallace 
London, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1983 
 
La Vye de Seynt Fraunceys d'Assise (MS Paris, BNF, Fonds 
Français 13505) 
Edited by D.W. Russell, with the collaboration of A.R. Harden and H.S.F. 
Collins 
London, Anglo-Norman Text Society 2002 
 
Vie de Saint Georges in: Les oeuvres de Simund de Freine  
Edited by J. E. Matzke 
Paris 1909 
 
St. Modwenna 
Edited by A.T. Baker and A. Bell 
Oxford, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1947 
 
Les Proverbes de Salemon by Sanson de Nantuil 
Edited by C. C. Isoz 
London, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1988-94 
 
Le Secré; de Secrez by Pierre d'Abernun of Fetcham 
Edited by O. A. Beckerlegge 
Oxford, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1944 
 
An Anglo-Norman Rhymed Sermon on Shrift 
Edited by Robin F. Jones 
Originally published in Modern Philology Volume 79 1981-2 
 
French materials from: The War of Saint-Sardos (1323-1325) Gascon 
Correspondence and Diplomatic Documents 
Edited by P. Chaplais  
London, Royal Historical Society 1954 
 
French materials from: The Register of Walter de Stapeldon Bishop of 
Exeter, A.D. 1307-1326 
edited by F. C. Hingeston-Randolph  
London 1892 
 
French materials from: The Statutes of the Realm Vol. 1 
London 1810 
 
Le livre de seyntz medicines: the unpublished devotional treatise of 
Henry of Lancaster 
Edited by E.J. Arnould 
Oxford, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1940 
 
French materials from: Testamentata Eboracensia 
Edited by L. Baker and J. Raine 
London, Surtees Society 1836, 1855 & 1864 
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The Anglo-Norman Pseudo-Turpin Chronicle of Williame de Briane 
Edited by I. Short 
Oxford, Anglo-Norman Text Society 1973 
 
Documents Illustrating the Rule of Walter de Wenlok, Abbot of 
Westminster, 1283-1307 
edited by Barbara F. Harvey  
London, Royal Historical Society 1965 
 
The Anglo-Norman Chronicle of Wigmore Abbey 
Edited by J.C. Dickinson and P.T. Ricketts 
Transactions of The Woolhope Naturalists' Field Club Vol. 39, 1967-9, 
pp.413-45 
 
French materials from:York Memorandum Book Part I. (1376-1419) 
edited by M. Sellers 
Durham, London, Berlin, Surtees Society 1912. 
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Annex 2 – Legal Sources 
 
Year Books/Law Reports and other sources: 
All sources listed here are electronically accessible via the database of HeinOnline 
(www.heinonline.org). Beside every title below, I have listed each click to access the 
documents in question. 
 
(i) Lawbook Exchange - Year Books: HeinOnline – Selden Society Publications 
and the History of Early English Law – Year Books, 11v. Clark, N.J: Lawbook 
Exchange 2007, 1678 
• 1-10 Edward III 1327-1337 
• 17-39 Edward III 1343-1366 
• 40-50 Edward III 1366-1377 
• Liber Assisarum 1327-1377 
• Henry IV & Henry V 1399-1422 
• 1-20 Henry VI 1422-1442 
• 21-39 Henry VI 1442-1461 
• Edward IV 1461-1483 
• 5 Edward IV 1465-1466 
• Edward V, Richard III, Henry VII & Henry VIII 1483-1535 
 
(ii) Year Books of the Reign of King Edward the First: HeinOnline – Selden 
Society Publications and the History of Early English Law – Year Books 
• 1 (Years XX-XXI) 
• 2 (Years XXI-XXII) 
• 3 (Years XXII-XXXII) 
• 4 (Years XXXII-XXXIII) 
• 5 (Years XXXIII-XXV) 
 
(iii) Ames Foundation Publications: HeinOnline – Selden Society Publications and 
the History of Early English Law – Ames Foundations Publications 
Year Books of Richard II:   
• 2 Richard II 1378-79  
• 6 Richard II 1382-83   
• 7 Richard II 1383-84   
• 8-10 Richard II 1385-87 
• 11Richard II 1387-88   
• 12 Richard II 1388-89   
• 13 Richard II 1389-90   
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(iv) Selden Society Publications: HeinOnline – Selden Society Publications and 
the History of Early English Law – Selden Society Publications – Selden Society 
(Annual) Series 
• Earliest English Law Reports Vol. I & II (111 & 112 Selden Society) 
• Earliest English Law Reports Vol. III & IV (122 & 123 Selden Society) 
• Year Books of Edward II & III: 
o 1 and 2 Edward II 1307-1308 and 1308-1309 (Year Book Series I or 17 
Selden Society) 
o 2 and 3 Edward II 1308-1309 and 1309-1310 (Year Book Series II or 
19 Selden Society) 
o 3 Edward II 1309-1310 (Year Book Series III or 20 Selden Society) 
o 3 and 4 Edward II 1310 (Year Book Series IV or 22 Selden Society) 
o 4 Edward II 1310-1311 (Year Book Series V or 24 Selden Society) 
o 4 Edward II 1311 (Year Book Series VI or 26 Selden Society) 
o 4 Edward II 1311 (Year Book Series X or 63 Selden Society) 
o 5 Edward II 1311 (Year Book Series XXI or 54 Selden Society) 
o 5 Edward II 1311-1312 (Year Book Series XI or 31 Selden Society) 
o 5 Edward II 1312 (Year Book Series XII or 33 Selden Society) 
o 6 Edward II 1312-1313 (Year Book Series XIII or 34 Selden Society) 
o 6 Edward II 1312-1313 (Year Book Series XIV or 38 Selden Society) 
o 6 Edward II 1313 (Year Book Series XIV or 43 Selden Society) 
o 6 and 7 Edward II 1313 (Year Book Series XV or 36 Selden Society) 
o 6 and 7 Edward II 1313-1314 (Year Book Series VII or 27 Selden 
Society) 
o Eyre of Kent, 6 and 7 Edward II 1313-1314 (Year Book Series VIII or 
29 Selden Society) 
o 7 Edward II 1313-1314 (Year Book Series XVI or 39 Selden Society) 
o 8 Edward II 1314-1315 (Year Book Series XVII or 41 Selden Society) 
o 8 Edward II 1315 (Year Book Series XVIII or 37 Selden Society) 
o 9 Edward II 1315-1316 (Year Book Series XIX or 45 Selden Society) 
o 10 Edward II 1316-1317 (Year Book Series XX or 52 Selden Society) 
o 10 Edward II 1316-1317 (Year Book Series XXI or 54 Selden Society) 
o 11 Edward II 1317-1318 (Year Book Series XXII or 61 Selden Society) 
o 12 Edward II 1318 (Year Book Series XXIII or 65 Selden Society) 
o 12 Edward II 1319 (Year Book Series XXIV or 70 Selden Society) 
o 12 Edward II 1319 (Year Book Series XXV or 81 Selden Society) 
o 14 Edward II 1320 (Year Book Series XXVII or 104 Selden Society) 
o The Eyre of London, 14 Edward II 1321 (Year Book Series XXVI part I 
or 85 Selden Society) 
o The Eyre of London, 14 Edward II 1321 (Year Book Series XXVI part II 
or 86 Selden Society) 
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o The Eyre of Northhamptonshire, 3 and 4 Edward III 1329-1330 (Year 
Book Series or 97 & 98 Selden Society) 
• Select Cases before the King's Council, 1243-1482 (35 Selden Society) 
• Select Cases in the Exchequer Chamber before all the Justices of England, 
1377-1461 (51 Selden Society) 
• Year Books of Henry VI, 1 Henry VI A.D. 1422 (50 Selden Society) 
• Year Books of 10 Edward IV and 49 Henry VI A.D. 1470 (47 Selden Society) 
• Reports of Cases by John Caryll, part I, A.D. 1485-1499 (115 Selden Society) 
• Reports of Cases by John Caryll, part II, A.D. 1501-1522 (116 Selden 
Society) 
• Select Cases in the Council of Henry VII  (1485-1509) (75 Selden Society) 
• Select Cases Before The King's Council in The Star Chamber, vol. I, A.D. 
1477-1509 (16 Selden Society) 
• Select Cases Before The King's Council in The Star Chamber, vol. II, A.D. 
1509-1544 (25 Selden Society) 
• The Reports of Sir John Spelman, vol. I, 1502-1540 (93 Selden Society) 
• Year Books of Henry VIII, 12-14 Henry VIII, A.D. 1520-1523 (119 Selden 
Society) 
• The Reports of William Dalison, A.D. 1552-1558 (124 Selden Society) 
• Reports from the Lost Notebooks of Sir James Dyer, vol. 1 & 2 (109 & 110 
Selden Society) 
 
(v) English Reports – Full Reprint: Heinonline – English Reports, Full Reprint 
 
• Volume 72 Eng. Rep. 
The English Reports - King's Bench Division containing 
 
Ø Bellewe (1585):  
LES ANS DU ROY RICHARD LE SECOND. Collect' Ensembl' Hors les Abridgments 
De Statham, Fitzherbert et Brooke. Per RICHARD BELLEWE, de Lincolns Inne. 
1585 
 
Ø Keilwey (1688): 
REPORTS d'ascuns CASES (qui ont evenus aux temps dy Roy Henry le Septieme 
de tres heureuse memoire, & du tres illustre Roy Henry le huitiesme, & ne sont 
comprises deins les livres des Terms & Ans demesmes les Roys.) Seliges hors des 
papiers de ROBERT KEILWEY, Esp.; par JEAN CROKE, Sergeant al Ley, Jades 
Recorder del City de Londres & Prolocuteur del meason des Communes es derniers 
jour du rege de la Royne Elisabeth. 1688. 
Ovesque les Reports d'ascuns Cases prises per le Reverend Juge Guilleaume 
Dallison un des Justices del Bank le Roy, au temps de la Reyne Elisabeth & per 
Guilleaume Bendloe Serjeant al Ley au temps de la mesme Royne; touchants la 
construction de divers Acts de Parliament par equitè. 
La tierce Edition embellie de pluis que deux milles References aux autres livres 
cybien Ancient que Moderne de la ley, Jamais uncore imprimès. 
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Ø Moore (1688): 
CASES Collect and Report per Sir Fra. Moore, Chevalier, Serjeant del Ley. Imprime 
and Publie per l'Original jadis remainent en les maines de Sir GEFREY PALMER, 
Chevalier and Bar., Attorney-General a son Tres-Excellent Majesty le Roy Charles le 
Seond. Le Seco Edition. 1688 
 
 
• Volume 73 Eng. Rep. 
The English Reports - King's Bench Division containing: 
 
Ø Benloe (1661): 
 
Les REPORTS de GULIELME BENDLOES Serjeant de la Lay: Des Divers 
Resolutions et Judgments donne par les Reverendes Judges de la Ley: De certeine 
Matieres en la Ley en le Temps del Raigne de Roys et Roignes Hen. VIII., Edw. VI., 
Phil et Mar. et Elisab. Avec que Autres Select Cases en la Ley adjudges et resolves 
en le Temps del Regne de Tresillustres Roys Jaques et Charles le premier: 
Jammais par cy devant imprimee. Publies en le XIII au de Treshaut et Renosmes 
Charles le Second Par le Grace de Deiu Roy d'Angleterre, Scoce, Fr. et Irel. Le 
Restituteur et Conservateur de la Ley. 1661 
 
Ø also containing in English translation: 
Dyer, volumes 1, 2 and 3; Brook's new cases; these were disregarded. 
 
• Volume 123 – Eng. Rep. 
The English Reports - Common Pleas containing: 
 
Ø Benloe (1689): 
Les REPORTS de GULIELME BENLOE, Serjeant del Ley, Des divers PLEADINGS 
et CASES en le COURT del COMON-BANK, en le several Roignes de les tres Hault 
& Excellent Princes, le ROY HENRY VII., HENRY VIII., EDW. VI., & le ROIGNES 
MARY & EIZABETH. 1689 
 
Ø Dalison (1689): 
Les REPORTS des divers SPEICAL CASES Adjudge en le COURT del COMON 
BANK en les Reignes de les tres hault & Excellent Princes HEN. VIII. EDW. VI. et 
les Reignes MAR. & ELIZ. Colligees par GULIELME DALISON un des JUSTICES 
Del BANK le ROY. London, 1689. 
 
Ø Anderson, vols. 1 and 2 (1664): 
Les REPORTS du Treserudite EDMUND ANDERSON, Chivalier, Nadgairs, 
Seigniour CHIEF JUSTICE del COMMON-BANK. Des mults principals CASES 
ARGUES & AGJUGES en le temps del jadis ROIGN ELIZABETH cibien en le 
COMMON-BANK come devant touts les Juges de cest Poialme, colligees & escries 
per luy mesme & imprimees per l'Original ore remaneant en les maines des 
Imprimeur. London, 1664. 
 
Ø Savile (1688): 
Les REPORTS de Sir JOHN SAVILE, Chevalier, Nadgairis Baron de l'Exchequer, de 
Divers SPEICAL CASES cybien en le COURT de COMMON Bank, come 
L'EXCHEQUER en le Temps de ROYNE ELIZABETH. London, MDCLXXXVIII 
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Ø also containing in English translation: 
Brownlow and Goldesborough, vols. & and 2; Hutton; Bridgman; these were 
disregarded. 
 
• Volume 81 – Eng. Rep. 
The English Reports - King's Bench Division containing: 
 
Ø Rolle (1675): 
Les REPORTS de HENRY ROLLE Searjeant del’ Ley, de divers CASES en le 
COURT del’ BANKE le ROY. En le Temps del’ REIGN de ROY JAQUES. Colligees 
par luy mesme & Imprimees par L’Original. 1675. 
 
Ø Palmer (1721): 
The REPORTS of SIR JEFFREY PALMER, Knight and Baront; ATTORNEY 
GENERAL to His Most Excellent Majesty, KING CHARLES the SECOND; The 
Second Edition. 1721 
 
Ø also containing in English translation: 
Bulstrode; this was disregarded. 
 
(vi) Mansfield & co cases: (in alphabetical order) – HeinOnline – English Reports, 
Full Reprint – Eng. Rep. reference 
 
Atkins v Banwell 
(1802) 2 East 505, or 102 Eng. Rep. 462 
 
Atkins v Hill 
(1775) 1 Cowp. 284, or 98 Eng. Rep.1088 
 
Barnes v Hedley 
(1809) 2 Taunt. 184, or 127 Eng. Rep. 1047 
 
Barrell v Trussell 
(1811) 4 Taunt. 117, or 128 Eng. Rep. 273 
 
Haigh v Brooks  
(1839) 10 Ad & E. 309, or 113 Eng. Rep. 119 
 
Brooks v Haigh 
(1840) 10 Ad & E. 323, or 113 Eng. Rep. 124 
 
Clarke v Shee 
(1774) 1 Cowp. 197, or 98 Eng. Rep. 1041 
 
Cooper v Martin 
(1803) 4 East 77, or 102 Eng. Rep. 759 
 
Exeter Corporation v Trimlet 
(1759) 2 Wils. K.B. 95, or 95 Eng. Rep. 705 
 
Earle v Oliver 
(1848) 2 Ex. 71, or 154 Eng. Rep. 410 
 
Eastwood v Kenyon 
(1840) 11 Ad. & E. 438, or 113 Eng. Rep. 482 
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Flight v Reed 
(1863) 1 H. & C. 703, or 158 Eng. Rep. 1067 
 
Grenville v Da Costa 
(1797) Peake Add Cas. 113, or 170 Eng. Rep. 213 
 
Hawkes v Saunders 
(1782) 1 Cowp. 289, or 98 Eng. Rep. 1091 
 
Hayes v Warren 
(1731) 2 Strange 933, or 93 Eng. Rep. 950 
 
Holliday v Atkinson 
(1826) 5 B. & C. 501, or 108 Eng. Rep. 187 
 
Jestons v Brooke 
(1778) 2 Cowp. 793, or 98 Eng. Rep. 1365 
 
Lee v Muggeridge 
(1813) 5 Taunt. 36, or 128 Eng. Rep. 599 
 
Lindon v Hooper 
(1776) 1 Cowp. 414, or 98 Eng. Rep. 1160 
 
Littlefield v Shee 
(1831) 2 B. & Ad. 811, or 109 Eng. Rep. 1343 
 
Martyn v Hind 
(1776) 2 Cowp. 437, or 98 Eng. Rep. 1174 
(1776) 1 Dougl. 142, or 99 Eng. Rep. 94 
 
Mawson v Stock 
(1801) 6 Ves. Jun. 300, or 31 Eng. Rep. 1062 
 
Mayor Yarmouth v Eaton 
(1763) 3 Burr. 1402, or 97 Eng. Rep. 896 
 
Meyer v Haworth 
(1763) 8 Ad. & E. 467, or 112 Eng. Rep. 916 
 
Montefiori v Montefiori 
(1762) 1 Black. W. 363, or 96 Eng. Rep. 203 
 
Moses v Macferlan 
(1760) 2 Burr. 1005, or 97 Eng. Rep. 676 
 
Munt v Stokes 
(1792) 4 T.R. 561, or 100 Eng. Rep. 1176 
 
Nightingal v Devisme 
(1770) 5 Burr. 2589, or 98 Eng. Rep. 361 
 
Paynter v Williams 
(1833) 1 C. & M. 810, or 149 Eng. Rep. 626 
 
Pillans and Rose v Van Mierop and Hopkins 
(1765) 3 Burr. 1663, or 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 
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Price v Neal 
(1762) 1 Black. W. 390, or 96 Eng. Rep. 221 
 
Randall v Morgan 
(1805) 12 Ves; Jun. 66, or 33 Eng. Rep. 26 
 
Rann v Hughes 1778 
(1778) 4 Bro. P.C. 27, or 2 Eng. Rep. 18 
7 T.R. 350, or 101 Eng. Rep. 1014 
 
Reech v Kennegal 
(1748) 1 VEs. Sen. 123, or 27 Eng. Rep. 932 
 
Shadwell v Shadwell 
(1860) 9 C.B. (N.S.) 159, or 142 Eng. Rep. 62 
 
Smith v Bromley 
(1760) 2 Dougl. 696, or 99 Eng. Rep. 441 
 
Stock v Mawson 
(1798) 1 Bos. & Pul. 286, or 126 Eng. Rep. 907 
 
Tate v Hilbert 
(1793) 2 Ves. Jun. 111, or 30 Eng. Rep. 548 
 
Thomas v Thomas 
(1842) 2 Q.B. 851, or 114 Eng. rep. 330 
 
Thornton v Illingworth 
(1824) 2 B. & C. 824, or 107 Eng. Rep. 589 
 
Trueman v Fenton 
(1777) 2 Cowp. 544, or 98 Eng. Rep. 1232 
 
Wells v Horton 
(1826) 2 Car. & P. 383, or 172 Eng. Rep. 173 
 
Wendall v Adney 
(1803) 3 Bos. & P., 247 at 250, or 127 Eng. Rep. 137 
 
Weston v Downes 
(1778) 1 Dougl. 23, or 99 Eng. Rep. 19 
 
Willliams v Moor 
(1843) 11 M. & W. 256, or 152 Eng. Rep. 798 
 
Wing v Mill 
(1817) 1 B. & Ald. 104, or 106 Eng. Rep. 39 
 
(vi) Abridgements – HeinOnline - Selden Society Publications and the History of 
Early English Law - Abridgements 
 
Ø N. Statham (1490): 
Abridgement of Cases to the End of Henry VI (original title page lacking) 
N.B. Henry VI reigned until 1461 
Rouen: Per me. R. Pynson  
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Ø R. Brooke (1573): 
Le Graunde Abridgement 
London: In Aedibus Ricardi Tottelli 
 
Ø Fitzherbert (1577): 
Le Graunde Abridgement, Collecte par le Iudge tresreuerend monsieur Anthony 
Fitzherbert, dernierment Conferre ouesque la Copye escript et per ceo correcte, 
ouesque le nombre del feuil, per quell facilement poies trouer les cases cy Abrydges 
en les Liuers dans, nouelment annote: iammais deuaunt imprimes. Auxi vous 
troueres les residuums de lauter liuer places icy in ceo liuer en le fine de lour apte 
titles 
London: In Aedibus Ricardi Tottelli, 
 
Ø H. Rolle (1668): 
Un Abridgment des Plusieurs Cases et Resolutions del Common Ley 
London: Printed for A. Crooke [and 12 others] 
 
(vii) Lexicons and dictionaries – HeinOnline - Selden Society Publications and the 
History of Early English Law – alphabetical search 
 
Ø W. Rastell (1579) 
Exposition of Certaine Difficult and Obscure Wordes and Termes of the Lawes of 
This Realme, Newly Set Fourth & Augmented, Both in French and English, for the 
Helpe of Such Younge Studentes as Are Desirous to Attaine the Knowledge for the 
Same. Whereunto Are Also Added the Olde Tenures 
London: In adibus Richardi Totelli 
 
Ø J. Cowell (1637) 
Interpreter: Or Booke, Containing the Signification of Words 
London: Printed for William Sheares 
 
Ø J.J.S. Wharton (1848) 
Law Lexicon, or Dictionary of Jurisprudence: Explaining All the Technical Words and 
Phrases Employed in the Several Departments of English Law, including also the 
Various Legal Terms Used in Commercial Transactions; Together with an 
Explanatory as well as Literal Translation of the Latin Maxims Contained in the 
Writings of the Ancient and Modern Commentators (From the London ed.) 
Harrisburg, Pa.: I.G. M'Kinley & J.M.G. Lescure 
 
Corpora	 257	
Annex 3 - Corpora 
 
 
SSC = Selden Society publications corpus 
EC = Elizabethan corpus 
SC = Stuart corpus 
MC = Mansfield corpus 
 
The corpora constituted from the sources listed in annex 2. 
 
Selden Society publications listed under (iii)  in annex 2: 
 
Ref. Search term/criteria 
(all spelling 
variations) 
Number of 
downloaded 
files 
Word 
tokens 
Word 
types 
SSCa assumpsit 12 8,173 2,162 
SSCp promise 53 33,862 7,485 
SSCc consideration 57 38,899 6,716 
 
English Reports – Full Reprint, listed under (iv) in annex 1:  72, 73, 123 ER 
=> EC 
 
Ref. Search term/criteria 
(all spelling 
variations) 
Number of 
downloaded 
files 
Word 
tokens 
Word 
types 
ECa assumpsit 51 40,226 6,127 
ECp promise 35 32,213 6,041 
ECc consideration 114 176,449 13,787 
 
English Reports – Full Reprint, listed under (iv) in annex 2:  81 ER => SC 
 
Ref. Search term/criteria 
(all spelling 
variations) 
Number of 
downloaded 
files 
Word 
tokens 
Word 
types 
SCc consideration 151 132,582 9,697 
 
English Reports – Full Reprint, listed under (v) in annex 2:  Mansfield 
cases =>  MC 
 
Ref. Search criteria Number of 
downloaded 
files 
Word 
tokens 
Word 
types 
MC Mansfield/co. 
decisions 
56 136,788 6,347 
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The following spellings were taken into account when constituting the corpora 
and undertaking the linguistic analysis: 
 
assumpsit: assumpsits, assumysit, assump, assumptionis, assumptionem 
assumption, assumcion, assume, assuma 
 
consideration: consideracion, consideracioun, consideraciun, consideracon, 
consideracoun, consideration 
 
contract: contracte, contrait, contraite, contrat, contret 
 
covenant: covenand, covenaunt, covenaunte, covenance, covenantz, 
couenaunces, couenantz, couenaunt 
 
debt: , debte, depte, dette, det dete, deite, deitte, debit, decte, dectes, doite, 
duite, duyte, deceis, dettus  
 
promise: promise, promess, promès, promese, promis, promisse, pramesse, 
pramez, premez, preméz, premesses, premis 
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Annex 4 – Drop box 
 
A number of corpora were constituted for the linguistic aspect of this study. 
These are listed in annex 3 and much of the discussion in chapter VI is based 
on these corpora. 
 
Eight corpora were used particularly intensively for the detailed linguistic 
studies using concordance, clusters and collocate tools.  
 
‘Assumpsit’ corpora: 
 
Ref. Page count of 
original sources 
Downloaded 
files 
Word tokens Word types 
SSCa 4,109 12 8,173 2,162 
ECa 1,831 51 40,226 6,127 
 
‘Promise’ corpora: 
 
Ref. Page count of 
original sources 
Downloaded 
files 
Word tokens Word types 
SSCp 4,109 53 33,862 7,485 
ECp 1,831 35 32,213 6,041 
 
‘Consideration’ corpora: 
 
Ref. Page count of 
original sources 
Downloaded 
files 
Word tokens Word types 
SSCc 4,109 57 38,899 6,716 
ECc 1,831 114 176,449 13,787 
SCc 941 151 132,582 9,697 
MC 161 56 136,788 6,347 
 
The corpora, i.e. the downloaded files in .txt form can be found in the drop-box 
constituted for this project. The drop-box is accessible via the following link: 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/2vson7l2lvwfsai/AACJLVjs5pwJI0zzN2BZEe06a?dl=0  
 
It contains three main files, one for each search term: ‘assumpsit’, ‘promise’, 
and ‘consideration’. In each file we can find the subcorpora put together in a 
sub-file with a label that refers to the original sources from which the corpus 
was constituted and to the search term on the basis of which the corpus was 
put together. For examples, SSCa*assum* is a corpus drawn from the Selden 
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Society sources (‘SSC’), as listed in annex 2, and on the basis of the search 
assumpsit (‘a’). Also included is the information of how the search was 
undertaken (‘*assum*’); in this example it was a wildcard search, which 
allowed for the spelling variations to be taken into account. 
 
Moreover, next to each subcorpus are further documents that show the results 
of the various studies using concordance, clusters and collocate tools. 
Documents labelled ‘KWIC’ show the concordance lines around a search term. 
These Key Word In Context lines are the results of the search of a corpus with 
a specific search term. For examples, KWIC SSCc*considera*1L1R, lists the 
textual context lines of searching the ‘consideration’ corpus from the Selden 
Society sources (SSCc), as listed in annex 2, with the wildcard search 
*considera*. It also shows that the concordance lines were sorted 
alphabetically, first one word to the left, then one word to the right (1L1R). 
 
Documents with the label ‘collocates’ show the results of searching a particular 
corpus for the collocates in relation to a particular search term. For example, 
‘SSCc collocates’ is the list of words with which ‘consideration’ collocates in 
the Selden Society consideration corpus. The list is sorted by frequency and 
shows the first 125 collocates. 
 
There are also documents labelled ‘clusters’, which show the results of 
searching a particular corpus for the clusters in relation to a particular search 
term. For example, ‘SSCc clusters’ is the list of words which cluster with 
‘consideration’ in the Selden Society consideration corpus. The list is sorted 
by frequency and shows the first 30 clusters to the left of the search term and 
the first 30 clusters to the right of the search term. 
 
The lists of collocates and clusters were not included when the application of 
those tools did not deliver significant results. 
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Date Case name Original report references  Report reference page
1294 Anon. 2 Y.B. Mich. 22 Edw. I SS/YBEdw I, at 499 94
1294 Anon. 2 Y.B. Mich. 22 Edw. I SS/YBEdw I, at 349 94
1303 Anon. 3 Y.B. Mich. 31 Edw. I SS/YBEdw I, at 389 93
1304 Anon. 4 Y.B. Hil. 32 Edw. I SS/YBEdw I, at 37 93
1304 Anon. 4 Y.B. Mich. 32 Edw. I SS/YBEdw I, at 341 93
1305 Anon. 5 Y.B. Mich. 33 Edw. I SS/YBEdw I, at 39 93
1306 Anon. 5 Y.B. Hil. 34 Edw. I SS/YBEdw I, at 153 94
1307 Anon. 5 Y.B. Mich. 35 Edw. I SS/YBEdw I, at 439 94
1310 Loveday v Ormesby Y.B. 3 Edw. II, 25 20 Selden Society 191 71
1312 Anon. Y.B. 5 Edw. II 33 Selden Society 2 97
1313 Anon. Y.B. 6, 7 Edw. II 83 36 Selden Society 83 97
1321 Anon. Y.B. 14 Edward II 86 Selden Society 353 77
1329 Anon. 3 & 4 Edw. III 97 Selden Society 237 77
1348 Bukton v Tounesende Lib. Ass. 22 Edw. III, 94a-94b, 41 Lawbook Exchange 78
1370 Waldon v Marshall Y.B. Mich. 43 Edw. III, 33, 38 Lawbook Exchange 80
1400 Watton v Brinth Y.B. 2 Hen. IV, 3, 9 Lawbook Exchange 82
1428 Anon. Y.B. Hen. VI, 1, 3 Lawbook Exchange 82
1433 Somerton's Case - writ Y.B. 11 Pasch. Hen. VI, 1, 25 Lawbook Exchange 82
1433 Somerton's Case - legal arguments Y.B. 11 Hen. VI Trin., 55, 26; Lawbook Exchange 82
1433 Somerton's Case - legal arguments ibid. Hil., 18, 10; ibid., Pasch., 24, 1 Lawbook Exchange 82
1436 Anon. Y.B. 14 Hen. VI, 18, 58 Lawbook Exchange 82
1442 Doige's Case Y.B. 20 Trin. Hen. VI, 34, 4 Lawbook Exchange 83
1458 Anon. Y.B. 37 Mich. Hen. VI, 8, 18 Lawbook Exchange 73, 94
1476 Anon. Y.B. 16 Pasch. Edw. IV, 9, 7 Lawbook Exchange 82, 83
1504 Anon. Y.B. 20 Mich. Hen. VII, 8, 18 Lawbook Exchange 82, 83
1516 Assaby v Lady Manners Dyer 335a 73 Eng Rep. 520 112
1520 Anon. Y.B. 12 Mich. Hen. VIII, 11, 3 Lawbook Exchange 84
1535 Anon. Y.B. 27 Mich. Hen.VIII, 24, 3 Lawbook Exchange 85
1535 Jordan’s  or Tatam’s Case Y.B. 27 Mich. Hen. VIII, 24, 3 Lawbook Exchange 109
1539 Marler v Wilmer KB 27/1111, m. 64 in Baker (2013) at 1180 95
1549 Newman v Gybbe KB 27/1152, m. 135 in Baker (2013) at 1182 96
1556 Pecke v Redman 2 Dyer 113a 73 Eng. Rep. 248 104
1557 Joscelin v Shelton 3 Leonard 4 74 Eng. Rep. 503 98, 104
1558 Norwood v Reed 1 Plowden 180 75 Eng. Rep. 277 84
1564 Sharington v Strotton 1 Plowden 298 75 Eng. Rep. 460 98, 105, 110, 114
1567 Lord Grey’s Case in Baker & Milsom at 492 109, 110
1568 Hunt v Bate Dyer 272 73 Eng. Rep. 605 103, 110,  112
1572 Anon. Dalison 84, 35 123 Eng. Rep. 293 86
1572 Rogers v Snow Dalison 94 123 Eng. Rep. 301 106
1573 Edwards v Burre Dalison 104, 45 123 Eng. Rep. 310 86
1574 Calthorpe’s Case 3 Dyer 334b 73 Eng. Rep. 756 90, 97, 98, 101 
1574 Moore v Williams Moore K.B. 220 72 Eng. Rep. 542 103
1577 West v Stowell 2 Leonard 154 74 Eng. Rep. 437 104, 106
1577 Onely v Earl of Kent Dyer 355b 73 Eng Rep. 797 106
1577 Webb’s Case 4 Leonard 110 74 Eng. Rep. 763 106
1584 Richards v Bartlett 1 Leonard 19 74 Eng. Rep. 17 102, 106
1585 Sidenham v Worlington 2 Leonard, 224 74 Eng. Rep. 497 98, 101, 103, 112
1586 Fuller’s Case Godbolt 95 78 Eng. Rep. 58 104
1586 Golding’s Case 2 Leonard 72 74 Eng. Rep. 367 105
1586 Gill v Harewood 1 Leonard 61 74 Eng. Rep. 57 106
1586 Fooly v Preston 1 Leonard 297 74 Eng. Rep. 270 106
1587 Whorwood v Gybbons Gouldsborough 48 75 Eng. Rep. 986  98
1587 Manwood v Burston 2 Leonard 203 74 Eng. Rep. 479 99
1587 Sturlyn v Albany Cro. Eliza. 67 78 Eng. Rep. 327 102
1587 Marsh v Kavenford (Rainsford) Cro. Eliz. 59 78 Eng. Rep. 319 103
1587 Foster v Scarlett Cro. Eliz. 70 78 Eng. Rep. 330 106
1587 Browne v Garborough Cro. Eliz. 64 78 Eng. Rep. 324 113
1587 Pearle v Unger Cro Eliz. 94 78 Eng. Rep. 353 103
1587 Preston v Tooley Cro. Eliz. 74 78 Eng. Rep. 334 106
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1588 Marsh and Rainsford’s Case 2 Leonard 111 74 Eng. Rep. 400 103, 112
1588 Simmes v Westcott 1 Leonard 299 74 Eng. Rep. 273 104
1588 Stone v Wythipol 1 Leonard 113 78 Eng. Rep. 106 106, 107
1588 Harford and Gardiner’s Case 2 Leonard 30 74 Eng. Rep. 332 112
1589 Strangeborough v Warner 4 Leonard 3 74 Eng. Rep. 686 84
1590 Applethwait and Nertleys Case 4 Leonard 56 74 Eng. Rep. 727 104
1590 Byne v Playne 1 Leonard 220 74 Eng. Rep. 202 106
1593 Stone v Wythipol Cro. Eliz. 126 78 Eng. Rep. 383 106, 107
1593 Sackford v Phillips Moore K.B. 690 72 Eng. Rep. 842 105
1594 Jeremy v Goochman Cro. Eliz. 442 78 Eng. Rep. 683 103
1595 Reynolds v Pinhowe Cro. Eliz. 429, 78 Eng. Rep. 669 108
1596 Gower v Capper Cro Eliz. 543 78 Eng. Rep. 790 105
1597 Metcalfe's Case Moore K.B. 549 72 Eng. Rep. 750 105
1598 Rigges v Bullingham Cro. Eliz 714 78 Eng. Rep. 949 103
1599 Wichals v Johns Cro Eliz. 703 78 Eng. Rep. 938 105, 106
1599 Barker v Halifax Cro. Eliz 741 78 Eng. Rep. 974 113
1600 Bret v J.S. and his Wife Cro. Eliz 755 78 Eng. Rep. 987 95, 113
1600 Sherwood v Woodward Cro. Eliz. 700 78 Eng Rep. 935 108
1602 Slade v Morley 4 Co. Rep. 92 a. 76 Eng. Rep. 310 87, 119
1602 Riches v Briggs Yelverton 4 80 Eng. Rep. 4 106
1602 Riches v Briggs Cro. Eliz 883 78 Eng. Rep. 1108 106
1602 Pinnel’s Case 5 Co. Rep. 117a 77 Eng. Rep. 237 107
1602 Lea v Exelby Cro Eliz. 888 78 Eng. Rep 1112 105
1603 Bosden v Thinne Yelverton 40 80 Eng. Rep. 29 103
1604 Game v Harvie Yelverton 50 80 Eng. Rep. 36 106
1608 Pickas v Guile Yelverton 128 80 Eng. Rep. 86 106
1609 Bettisworth v Campion Yelverton 133 80 Eng. Rep 90 105
1610 Warbrook v Griffin 2 Brownl. & Golds. 254 123 Eng. Rep. 927 88
1613 Bagge v Slade 3 Bulstrode 162 81 Eng. Rep. 137 108
1613 Jones v Clarke 3 Bulstode 73 80 Eng. Rep 969 103
1615 Nichols v Raynbred Hob. 88 80 Eng. Rep. 238 105
1616 Hodge v Vavisour 3 Bulstrode 222 81 Eng. Rep. 188 104
1616 Lampleigh v Braithwaite Hob 105 80 Eng. Rep. 255 104, 105, 107
1616 Cotton v Westcott 1 Rolle 381 81 Eng. Rep. 549 103
1616 Spanish Ambassador v Gifford 1 Rolle 336 81 Eng. Rep. 526 105
1618 Winter v Foweracres 2 Rolle 39 81 Eng. Rep. 645 115
1620 Browne v Downing 2 Rolle 194 81 Eng. Rep. 745 105
1623 Wheatley v Low Cro Jac. 668 79 Eng. Rep. 578 106
1625 Flight v Crasden Cro. Car. 8 79 Eng. Rep. 612 108
1628 Bibble v Cunningham Hetley 89 124 Eng. Rep. 365 105
1635 Townsend v Hunt Cro. Car. 408 79 Eng. Rep. 955 103, 113
1651 Shann v Bilby Style 280 82 Eng. Rep. 710 105
1660 Bennett v Astell 1 Lev. 20 83 Eng. Rep. 276 105
1662 Anon. 1 Lev. 87 83 Eng. Rep. 311 105
1667 Johnson v Astell 1 Lev. 198 83 Eng. Rep. 367 108
1670 Edgcomb v Dee Vaughan, 101 124 Eng. Rep. 984 87
1671 Peters v Opie 1 Vent. 177 86 Eng. Rep.  120 105
1697 Ball v Hesketh Comb. 381 90 Eng. Rep. 541 119
1699 Hyleing v Hastings 1 Ld. Raym. 389 119
1760 Moses v Macferlan 2 Burr. 1005 97 Eng. Rep. 676 117
1765 Pillans and Rose v Van Mierop & Hopkins 3 Burr. 1663 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 117, 118
1775 Atkins v Hill 1 Cowp. 284 98 Eng. Rep. 1088 120
1777 Trueman v Fenton 2 Cowp. 544 98 Eng. Rep. 1232 120
1778 Rann v Hughes - pleadings/arguments 4 Brown, P.C. 27 2 Eng. Rep. 18 89,118
1778 Rann v Hughes - judgement of Skynner L.C.B. in 7 T.R. 350 89, 118
1782 Hawkes v Saunders 1 Cowp. 289 98 Eng. Rep. 1091 119
1802 Atkins v Banwell 2 East 505 102 Eng. Rep. 462 121
1803 Wendall v Adney 3 Bos. & P., 247 127 Eng. Rep. 137 121
1813 Lee v Muggeridge 5 Taunt. 36 128 Eng. Rep. 599 121
1817 Wing v Mill 1 B. & Ald. 104 106 Eng. Rep. 39 120
1840 Eastwood v Kenyon 11 Ad. & E. 438 113 Eng. Rep. 482 122
1863 Flight v Reed 1 H. & C. 703 158 Eng. Rep. 1067 121
1870 Callisher v Bischoffsheim L.R.5.  Q.B.449 107
1884 Foakes v Beer 9 A.C. 605 108
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Date Case name Original report references  Report reference page
1294 Anon. 2 Y.B. Mich. 22 Edw. I SS/YBEdw I, at 499 94
1294 Anon. 2 Y.B. Mich. 22 Edw. I SS/YBEdw I, at 349 94
1303 Anon. 3 Y.B. Mich. 31 Edw. I SS/YBEdw I, at 389 93
1304 Anon. 4 Y.B. Hil. 32 Edw. I SS/YBEdw I, at 37 93
1304 Anon. 4 Y.B. Mich. 32 Edw. I SS/YBEdw I, at 341 93
1305 Anon. 5 Y.B. Mich. 33 Edw. I SS/YBEdw I, at 39 93
1306 Anon. 5 Y.B. Hil. 34 Edw. I SS/YBEdw I, at 153 94
1307 Anon. 5 Y.B. Mich. 35 Edw. I SS/YBEdw I, at 439 94
1313 Anon. Y.B. 6, 7 Edw. II 83 36 Selden Society 83 97
1321 Anon. Y.B. 14 Edward II 86 Selden Society 353 77
1329 Anon. 3 & 4 Edw. III 97 Selden Society 237 77
1428 Anon. Y.B. Hen. VI, 1, 3 Lawbook Exchange 82
1436 Anon. Y.B. 14 Hen. VI, 18, 58 Lawbook Exchange 82
1458 Anon. Y.B. 37 Mich. VI, 8, 18 Lawbook Exchange 73, 94
1476 Anon. Y.B. 16 Pasch. Edw. IV, 9, 7 Lawbook Exchange 83
1504 Anon. Y.B. 20 Mich. Hen. VII, 8, 18 Lawbook Exchange 83
1520 Anon. Y.B. 12 Mich. Hen. VIII, 11, 3 Lawbook Exchange 84
1535 Anon. Y.B. 27 Mich. Hen.VIII, 24, 3 Lawbook Exchange 85
1662 Anon. 1 Lev. 87 83 Eng. Rep. 311 105
1458 Anon. Y.B. 37 Mich. Hen. VI, 8, 18 Lawbook Exchange 73, 94
1312 Anon. Y.B. 5 Edw. II 33 Selden Society 2 97
1572 Anon. Dalison 84, 35 123 Eng. Rep. 293 86
1590 Applethwait and Nertleys Case 4 Leonard 56 74 Eng. Rep. 727 104
1516 Assaby v Lady Manners Dyer 335a 73 Eng Rep. 520 112
1802 Atkins v Banwell 2 East 505 102 Eng. Rep. 462 121
1775 Atkins v Hill 1 Cowp. 284 98 Eng. Rep. 1088 120
1613 Bagge v Slade 3 Bulstrode 162 81 Eng. Rep. 137 108
1697 Ball v Hesketh Comb. 381 90 Eng. Rep. 541 119
1599 Barker v Halifax Cro. Eliz 741 78 Eng. Rep. 974 113
1660 Bennett v Astell 1 Lev. 20 83 Eng. Rep. 276 105
1609 Bettisworth v Campion Yelverton 133 80 Eng. Rep 90 105
1628 Bibble v Cunningham Hetley 89 124 Eng. Rep. 365 105
1603 Bosden v Thinne Yelverton 40 80 Eng. Rep. 29 103
1600 Bret v J.S. and his Wife Cro. Eliz 755 78 Eng. Rep. 987 95, 113
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Annex 6 
 
Reigns of Kings and Queens between 1066 and 1900 
 
House of Normandy 
William I 25 Dec. 1066-1087 
William II 26 Sept. 1087-1100 
Henry I 5 Aug. 1100-1135 
Stephen 26 Dec. 1135-1154 
 
Angevins (House of Plantagenet) 
Henry II 19 Dec. 1154-1189 
Richard I 3 Sept. 1189-1199 
John  27 May 1199-1216 
 
Plantagenets 
Henry III 28 Oct. 1216-1272 
Edward I 20 Nov. 1272-1307 
Edward II 8 July 1307-1327 
Edward III 25 Jan. 1327-1377 
Richard II 22 June 1377-1399 
 
House of Lancaster 
Henry IV 30 Sept. 1399-1413 
Henry V 21 March 1413-1422 
Henry VI 1 Sept. 1422-1461 
 
House of York 
Edward IV 4 March 1461-1483 
Edward V 9 April 1483 
Richard III 26 June 1483-1485 
 
House of Tudor 
Henry VII 22 Aug. 1485-1509 
Henry VIII 22 April 1509-1547 
Edward VI 28 Jan. 1547-1553 
Mary I (alone) 19 July 1553-1554 
Philip & Mary 25 July 1554-1558 
Elisabeth I 17 Nov. 1558-1603 
 
House of Stuart 
James I 24 March 1603-1625 
Charles I 27 March 1625-1649 
[Interregnum 1649-1660] 
Charles II 30 Jan. 1649 (de jure); restored 29 May 1660-1685 
James II 6 Feb. 1685-1688 
William & Mary  13 Feb. 1689-1694 
William III (alone)  28 Dec. 1694-1702 
Anne  8 March 1702-1714 
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House of Hannover 
George I 1 Aug. 1714-1727 
George II 11 June 1727-1760 
George III 25 Oct. 1760-1820 
George IV 29 Jan. 1820-1830 
William IV 26 June 1830-1837 
Victoria 20 June 1837-1901 
 
King James VI of Scotland was proclaimed King of England in 1603 following 
Elisabeth I, who died without a direct heir. James styled himself ‘King of 
Great Britain’. However, the kingdoms of England and Scotland were united 
as the United Kingdom of Great Britain only in 1707 during the reign of the 
last Stuart ruler, Queen Anne. 
 
As far as Ireland is concerned, Henry VIII assumed the style ‘King of Ireland’ 
in 1541. But the two kingdoms remained distinct until the Act of Union of 
1800, when the Kingdom of Ireland became part of the ‘United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland’. Following the partition of Ireland in 1922, the 
kingdom was described as ‘United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland’. 
 
